Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights as an Abuse of Dominance under EU Competition Law: What is the Best Solution for Legal Certainty from a Rule of Law Perspective by Narmiq, Marwa Marwan shafiq
 1 
Vol. 1 of 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights as an Abuse of 
Dominance under EU Competition Law: 
 What is the Best Solution for Legal Certainty from a Rule of Law 
Perspective? 
 
 
By 
Marwa Marwan Shafiq Narmiq 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy at the University of Central Lancashire 
October 2019 
 
 
The law is stated as at 30th November 2018 and all the internet sources mentioned in 
the thesis were accessible as at end of November 2018.  © Marwa Narmiq, 2018 
 2 
 
STUDENT DECLARATION FORM 
 
*I declare that while registered as a candidate for the research degree, I have not 
been a registered candidate or enrolled student for another award of the University or 
other academic or professional institution. 
 
*I declare that no material contained in the thesis has been used in any other 
submission for an academic award and is solely my own work. 
 
*No proof-reading service was used in the compilation of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
Signature of Candidate _________ ____________  
Type of Award: Doctor of Philosophy  
School: Lancashire Law School 
 
 3 
  ABSTRACT 
 
The researcher has adopted the rule of law as a theoretical framework to critically 
analyse European Union (‘EU’) competition law intervention in cases of refusal to 
license intellectual property right (‘IPR’). The research also examined the approaches 
adopted by EU judiciary and competition authorities when dealing with a competition 
law defence. The study was particularly focused on the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test 
used by EU competition authorities to assess unlawful conduct of dominant 
undertakings. The exceptional circumstances test under Article 102 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) has aggressively expanded throughout EU 
case law. This has resulted in inconsistencies or gaps in law as EU case law progressed 
which could clash, to some degree, with one of the basic elements of the rule of law: 
the legal certainty, predictability consistency of decision-making. 
The case of finding abusive conduct by patent or standard essential patents’ owners 
(‘SEPs’) under EU competition law can potentially challenge the rule of law doctrine, the 
essence of IPRs, the protection offered under CFREU and Directive 2004/48 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. A lot of attention in contemporary EU law 
has been focused on the question of when should competition law compel a dominant 
undertaking to license its intellectual property (‘IP’) to its rivals? And what are the 
required terms, if supply was found to be mandatory? These questions are discussed 
with reference made to EU case law starting with one of the earliest cases, Volvo v Veng, 
and some of the latest cases, most prominently Huawei v ZTE. 
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This thesis has contributed to knowledge through the use of the doctrine of the rule of 
law as a tool to assess EU case law and explore the extent to which the rule of elements 
has been met. It has also contributed to knowledge via the reflection on EU law and 
how it has been interpreted by national courts pre-and-post Huawei v ZTE. The UK, 
Germany and Netherlands are used as examples to evaluate how the EU competition 
law has been applied and interpreted by the domestic judiciary and to explore the 
implications of Huawei v ZTE on cases brought before domestic cases. 
The researcher ultimately called for major reforms to Article 102 TFEU to identify its 
scope and limitations and its main objectives. It was concluded that the EU competition 
law is built on a degree of uncertainty and EU decision-making can be categorised by 
unconformity that could be challenged by some of the rule of law elements. The study 
indicated that the EU judiciary and competition law authorities could adopt an 
approach similar to that of the UK by examining the legitimate expectations of both 
right-holders and licence seekers as opposed to the examination of the legitimate 
expectations of licence seekers.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 
 
 
I. OUTLINE: THE RELEVANCY OF THIS TOPIC AS A CURRENT LEGAL ISSUE 
 
Competition law and IPRs have developed as two distinct systems of the law. Both areas 
of law are meant to foster innovation and economic growth. However, different 
methods are adopted for reaching the set-out objectives.1  
Generally, IPRs and competition law have been seen as contradictory principles, given 
that IPRs provide right holders with monopolies that can facilitate barriers to entry, 
whereas competition law aims to maintain effective competitive structure by 
preventing legal barriers to entry.2  It has, thus, been argued by some scholars3 that 
there is a considerable gap between both areas of law, particularly in the intersection 
of their goals4 and the means embraced to meet such objectives.  
The finding of abusive conduct could oblige a proprietor to allow others to use the IPR 
in question. Therefore, this system has passed criticism to the subject matter, whereby 
                                                          
1 L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 320 
2 J. Turner, Intellectual Property and EU competition Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2010) 
3 Such as the arguments put forward by Steven Anderman, The Interface Between Intellectual Property 
Rights and Competition Policy (Cambridge University Press 2009) 1. 
4 Atari Games Corp.v. Nintendo of America Inc, [1990] F, 2d. 1572 (Fed. Cir.) 
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numerous commentators have questioned the constitutionality5 and the fairness6 of 
such practices. 
It is important to mention here that the objective of Article 102 TFEU, ex Article 82 EC, 
has been set out to ensure that: 
…A balance should be kept between the interest in preserving or creating free 
competition in a particular market and the interest in not deterring investment and 
innovation by demanding that the fruits of commercial success be shared with 
competitors.7 
With the exclusive exercise of IPRs, there is a possibility that such an exercise could 
establish an abuse of dominance under EU competition law.8 However, the 
determination of an appropriate ‘balance’ could be difficult to achieve or even to 
identify. Indeed, it is not the aim of Article 102 TFEU to prevent a business from 
becoming dominant as the mere dominant position in the market is not considered as 
an abuse.9 Nonetheless, Article 102 TFEU normally comes to play after a dominant 
industry had abused its market power by participating in abusive conduct that has an 
adverse impact on competition.10  
                                                          
5 N. Reitz, 'Compulsory Licensing in the Industrial and Commercial Arena: A Compromise' [1966] 54(3) 
California Law Review 1364-1381; Note, ‘Compulsory Licensing: A Controversial Topic in the Latest 
Revision of Our Copyright Law’ [1964] 83 (33) U. Cinc. L. Rev. 94-98  
6  N. Reitz, 'Compulsory Licensing in the Industrial and Commercial Arena: A Compromise' [1966] 54(3) 
California Law Review 1364-1381 
7 C-109/03 KPN Telecom BV v Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit [2004] E.C.R. I-11273, 
(Poiares Maduro A.G.'s Opinion), at [39]. 
8 C-53/87 Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di Ricambio per Autoveicoli v Regie Nationale des 
Usines Renault [1988] E.C.R. 6039, at [16]. 
9 C- 322/81 Neverlansche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Commission [1985] 1 C.M.L.R 282, [57]; Joined 
Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Campagnie Maritime Belge Transports v. Commission [2000] 4 
C.M.L.R 1076 [37]; Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige [2011] 4 C.M.L.R 18,  [24]. 
10 C-209/10 Post Denmark A/S v Konkurrenceradet [2012] 4 C.M.L.R 23, [21]-[32] 
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As mentioned above, the determination of an appropriate balance between 
competition law and IP is a challenging task. It has even been argued that this is one of 
its most contentious fields of EU law which might be due to the unclear law and its 
interpretations which makes it difficult for IPR owners to foresee the circumstances that 
could constitute an abuse of dominance.11 Therefore, competition law and IPRs 
commentators have been calling for a more precise guidance on the assessment of 
abuse of dominance.12 The need for a more detailed guidance is because competition 
law intervention in IP-related matters can be unclear, lengthy and uncertain.13  
For the reasons set out above, the research critically analyses this issue and assesses, 
from a rule of law perspective, where and to what extent the EU competition law 
intervention on IP matters lacked, to some degree, transparency, clarity, stability and 
predictability.  As a matter of fact, IP specialists have argued14 that IP owners have been 
facing challenges in predicting, controlling, managing and even understanding how to 
plan for the future which has, thus, led to this research adopting the rule of law doctrine 
to call for a predictable legal system for the sake of right holders so that they can plan 
for the future more effectively.  
                                                          
11 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2014), at p. 271 
12 L. Kjolbe, ‘Rebates Under Article 82 EC: Navigating Uncertain Waters’ (2010) European Competition 
Law Review 6:22-80; B. R. Galindo ‘Prohibition of the Abuse of a Dominant Position’ (2007) the 
International Symposium on Anti-Monopoly Enforcement, p. 11 available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2007_18_en.pdf> last accessed on 1 May 2018 
13 B. Vesterdorf, ‘Article 82 EC: Where do we stand after the Microsoft judgment?’ (2008) 1 Global 
Antitrust Review, 1, 8 and 14. See also S. Fodor ‘Compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement: a 
tool for developing countries’ access to technology transfer’ (2011) Lunds University, Department of 
Business Law < 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.874.5433&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed 
on 8 May 2018. See also J. Atik and H. Lidgard, 'Embracing Price Discrimination: TRIPS and the 
suppression of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals' [2007] 27(4) U Pa J Int'l Econ L 1043-1076, at p. 1049 
14 This is addressed in chapter two, the literature review. For example, F. Fine, ‘European Community 
Compulsory Licensing Policy: Hersey versus Common Sense’ (2004) 24 NW.J.INT’L L.& BUS at 622; J. 
Tudor, ‘Compulsory Licensing in the European Union’ [2008] 4(2) Geo Mason J Int’l Com Law 222-258; 
K. Czapracka, ‘Where Antitrust Ends and IP Begins-On The Roots of the Transatlantic Clashes’ (2007) 9 
Yale Journal of Law and Technology 44, at 47-48 and 72-77 
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The rule of law has been used as a supporting tool to the examination of the 
implementation and interpretations of Article 102 TFEU in the EU legal system. The 
study aims to highlight areas where the essence of IPRs could be strengthened so that 
undertakings with protected IPRs can plan their conducts according to a set of clearly 
defined rules that provide for transparency, predictability and uniformity which better 
adhere with the rule of law core elements.   
The ECJ, GC and EU competition authorities have established in a set of case law15 that 
a refusal to share an IPR by a dominant undertaking could be found unlawful under 
Article 102 TFEU.16 The test used by EU courts and competition authorities to determine 
abuse of dominance is the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test under Article 102 TFEU. In 
other words, an IPR owner would only be found abusing its dominant position in rare 
circumstances. The research aims to portray that the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test 
used to determine abuse of dominance has been, to some degree, inconsistently 
interpreted and has even become progressively more aggressively applied in refusal to 
license cases. This research also argued that the test has become over-inclusive and 
                                                          
15 Case 238/87 Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] C.M.L.R 122; Case C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; 
Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Telivision Publication Ltd (ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-
743; Case  C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & 
Co KG [1998] E.C.R I-7791; C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent 
Telivision Publication Ltd (ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743; Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) 
[2004] C(2004)900 final; Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission [2007] ECR ii-3601 (GC); T-201/04 
Microsoft Corp v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 (General Court) (The Microsoft judgement); C- 170/13 
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14; C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE 
Corp. [2016]  R.P.C. 4 
16 TFEU 2009, Art. 102 states the following: 
 Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may 
effect trade between Member States.  
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) Limiting production, markets or technical transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(c) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts. 
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such over-inclusivity of competition law in refusal to license instances has, arguably, led 
to Article 102 TFEU going beyond its scope to deal with matters that are already covered 
under other areas of law, such as the CFREU.17 
An example of how Article 102 TFEU has become over-inclusive narrates to the recent 
case by the ECJ in Huawei v ZTE.18 It has been indicated by the ECJ here that, in 
exceptional circumstances, the pursuit of IP infringement proceedings by SEP owners 
against ‘infringing’ users could constitute abuse under Article 102 TFEU.19 The ECJ has 
contemplated here that Huawei should not have sought a prohibitory injunction or a 
claim for damages against ZTE as Huawei should not have refused to license its IPR on 
FRAND terms in the first place.  However, the recent limitations regarding access to 
justice under the exceptional circumstances test of Article 102 TFEU is already a matter 
covered under the CFREU. 
Moreover, the research has adopted the rule of law doctrine as the theoretical 
framework of addressing and assessing areas that can lead to inconsistency, legal 
uncertainty and unpredictability in EU case law. In order to highlight the areas of legal 
uncertainty from a rule of law perspective, the research examines the evolution of the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ test in EU case law. It also aims to explore how national 
courts applied and interpreted the application of Article 102 TFEU pre and post the 
recent case of Huawei v ZTE. The UK, Germany and Netherlands are used as examples 
to study the potential implications of the ECJ’s ruling on national courts when they are 
presented with an EU competition law defence.  
                                                          
17  As seen in C- 170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14; C-170/13 Huawei 
Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp. [2016] R.P.C. 4 
18 C- 170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14; C-170/13 Huawei Technologies 
Co Ltd v ZTE Corp. [2016] R.P.C. 4 
19 C- 170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14; C-170/13 Huawei 
Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp. [2016] R.P.C. 4 
 17 
The research has, thus, aimed to emphasise that the application of Article 102 TFEU, 
under the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, must be limited in scope to safeguard that 
the basics of the rule of law are better preserved within the EU legal system. From a 
legal standpoint, the determination of a predictable legal framework provides a higher 
level of IP protection and maintains the incentives to innovate and invest in further R&D 
of future patents or existing ones within the EU market. 
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II. KEY DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
 
This section outlines the central definitions of the main concepts and terms used 
throughout this research. It starts by explaining the meaning of patents and SEPs, as 
well as the essence of IPR and abusive conduct. It then identifies a definition for 
compulsory licensing which is followed by introducing refusal to license as potential 
abuses of EU competition law. It then defines the meaning of SSO and FRAND 
commitments.  
A) Patent and SEP 
 
A patent is granted to protect an invention that is made or used, new and inventive.20 
Some types of inventions cannot be patented, such as literary and artistic works, some 
mobile apps, discovery and more.21 Moreover, a SEP is a patent that is essential to a 
standard set by an SSO.22  
B) The Essence of IPR in the Context of this Project 
 
The essence of IP provides right holders with the exclusive rights and the power to stop 
others from commercialising, using or manufacturing a protected IPR. This has been 
                                                          
20 Gov.uk, ‘Patenting your invention’ (gov.uk) https://www.gov.uk/patent-your-invention accessed 4 
December 2018 
21 Gov.uk, ‘Patenting your invention’ (gov.uk) https://www.gov.uk/patent-your-invention accessed 4 
December 2018 
22 Competition Directorate, ‘Competition policy brief’ (euroa.eu, June 2014) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/008_en.pdf> accessed 4 December 2018 
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called ‘ius prohibendi’ which means that the right holder might acquire monopolistic 
position whilst the right is protected as an IPR.23  
However, the exclusivity of such rights is not absolute, as in some circumstances a 
dominant business’s refusal to license its IP could be deemed unlawful under Article 
102 TFEU. In such cases, the court or relevant authority can decide to issue a 
compulsory licence. It must be highlighted here that time restriction and adequate 
compensation are applicable. Moreover, compulsory licences are non-exclusive, in 
other words, they can be granted to various third parties that can use and utilise the 
protected patent.24 
C) Definition: Compulsory Licences 
 
A compulsory licence25 has been defined as the following: 
‘Authorisation given by a national authority to a person, without or against the consent 
of the title holder, for the exploitation of a subject matter protected by a patent or other 
intellectual property rights.’26  
 
                                                          
23 C. M. Correa, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries’ (1999) South Centre T.R.A.D.E fount at 
<https://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf> last accessed on 
08/03/2018 
24 ‘None-exclusive’ suggests that a compulsory license can be issued to multiple third parties with no 
exclusive right enjoyed using the patent.  
25 Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 1995 [hereinafter 
referred to as TRIPS], Art. 31 refers to compulsory licenses as ‘Other use without the authorization of 
the right holder’ 
26 C. M. Correa, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries’ (1999) South Centre T.R.A.D.E fount at 
<https://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf> last accessed on 
08/03/2018 
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D)  ‘The Exceptional Circumstances’ Test 
The exceptional circumstances test usually indicates that only in rare and specific 
circumstances would the exercise of the exclusive IPR lead to the finding of abuse of 
dominance.27 Sometimes, ‘the exceptional circumstances’ test incorporates the 
essential facilities doctrine. In other words, the patent should be indispensable or 
essential in the market for an authority to determine a compulsory licence. Other times 
the test could incorporate the balancing assessment. In other words, balancing the right 
holder’s incentives to innovate versus the innovation in the whole market. 28 
E) ‘Abusive’ Refusal to License 
In some circumstances, third parties might be interested in using, manufacturing and 
selling the IPR but the patent holder refuses to provide a licence. The court or relevant 
authority usually finds an abuse of dominance when the market economy is hindered 
by the patent owner’s refusal to license to the licence seeker.29 A compulsory licence 
can be decided if the right holder rejects to license altogether or present an offer to a 
licence seeker that is based on unreasonable terms.30  
It must be mentioned here that the interpretation of ‘reasonable terms’ by courts or 
relevant authorities is challenging. Normally, the interpretation of ‘reasonable terms’ 
takes place on a case-by-case basis. The examination of ‘reasonable terms’ comprises 
various elements, such as the nature of the patent, the requirements of already 
                                                          
27 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission [2007] ECR ii-3601 (GC), [6] 
28 These are discussed further in the literature review chapter  
29S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; The United Kingdom Patents Act 1949, S. 37, 48 and 49. This Act is no longer 
in force and has been repealed by the Patent Act 1977 
30 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; British Patents Act 1949, S. 37 (2)(d). This Act is no longer in force and has 
been repealed by Patent Act 1977; Loewe Radio Co. Ltd’s Application [1929] 46 R.P.C. 479, at p. 489-90 
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established licences, the expenses encountered by the patentee during the 
development of the invention, consumer demand and the current state of the market 
in that area of trade.31  
Royalties are usually determined based on market prices of the product as well as 
considerations to the practice in trade. Furthermore, the patent’s costs for marketing, 
R&D must also be reviewed during the assessment of appropriate fees.32 Some 
examples on the terms that are thought to be unreasonable by a relevant authority can 
include royalties that are based on different sale quantities, post-expiration royalties33 
and package licensing that require the licensee to pay fees for patents that are not 
intended for use.34  
It must be mentioned, however, that the courts’ assessment of the ‘reasonable terms’ 
can change with time due to the constant development of antitrust laws.35 The demand 
of royalties and restriction of exports for a product can be thought as reasonable in the 
circumstances of when the patent owner refuses to license one profitable product 
instead of a package licensing.36 Moreover, the terms can be reasonable when they 
maintain competition and do not unreasonably burden consumers.37 Further, it has 
been indicated that a patent holder should enjoy legal rights associated with the patent 
                                                          
31 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; Brownie Wireless Co. Ltd.’s Application [1929] 46 R.P.C. at 453, 457 
32 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; Brownie Wireless Co. Ltd.’s Application [1929] 46 R.P.C. at 453, 457 
33 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; Kamborian’s Patent [1961] R.P.C. 403, at 406 
34 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; Brownie Wireless Co. Ltd’s Application [1929] 46 R.P.C. at 476-8 
35 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190 
36 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; Cooperative Union Ltd’s and Others’ Application [1933] 50 R.P.C. 164 
37 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190 
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and thus, refusal to license based on the reason to give the patent an opportunity to be 
exploited in the initial market in order to recover the costs of R&D can be thought as 
reasonable justifications for its refusal to license the IPR.38   
F) SSOs and the Meaning of ‘FRAND’  
 
The refusal to license patents or SEPs39 can, in exceptional circumstances, be considered 
abusive. This research examines how the courts and EU competition authorities dealt 
with the refusal to license by patent owners, as well as the refusal to license by SEP 
owners on FRAND terms. 
To start with, technical standards are set by specific organisations that approve some 
patents that have been declared essential as SEPs and, in return, SEP owners should 
make their patents available to FRAND licences.40 Nowadays, FRAND licences are 
managed within SSOs due to various reasons. Some of which is the expansion of 
patents, particularly, in the ICT section which has led to ‘patent thickets’. The term 
‘patent thickets’ represents an overlap between the ability to manage intense patents 
and to commercialise the technology.41  
                                                          
38 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; Colborne Enginerring Co. Ltd’s Application [1955] 72 R.P.C. 169, 179 
39 Patents that have been declared essential to standard set by an SSO during the standarising setting 
process 
40 S. Ragavan and R. Dave, 'A comparison of FRAND and Compulsory forms of Licenses' [2015] 35(4) The 
Licensing Journal 10-15 
41 C. Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting’ 
Innovation Policy & The Economy 1, 118-150 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf 
accessed 8 December 2017 
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Accordingly, the SSOs are membership organisations that manage SEPs.42 An Example 
on an SSO includes ANSI43 which is an international SSO that leads patents that influence 
businesses in various sectors, such as dairy and energy distribution.44 Other SSOs 
include the ETSI45 which covers the European telecommunications industry.46  
Patent holders submit their patents to an SSO for an evaluation, and the organisation 
decides as to whether the patent can be recognised as an SEP. The terms for licensing 
are detailed within the policies of an SSO which usually designate that the SEP is to be 
licensed on FRAND terms.47 In other words, FRAND licensing is a practice which allows 
other standard users to use a SEP while having to pay fair and reasonable payments to 
a SEP holder.48  It must be mentioned here that EU competition authorities have 
established FRAND commitments,49 due to the existing challenges in the framework of 
SSOs and patent pools when the SEP holder50 is unwilling to license the IP in question 
                                                          
42A. Updegrove, ‘What and (Why) is an SSO?’ (consortiuminfo.org) available at 
<https://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/whatisansso.php>  accessed on 8 December 2017 
43 American Standard Institute, 'ANSI: About ANSI' (ANSI- American Standard Institute, 2018) 
<www.ansi.org> accessed 22 January 2018 
44 American Standard Institute, ‘ANSI: About ANSI’, (ANSI celebrating 100 years 1918-2018, 2018) 
<http:ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/history.aspx? menuid=1> Accessed 27 November 2017 
45 European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ‘ETSI’s Mission’ (etsi.org) available at 
<http:www.etsi.org/about> accessed on 8 December 2017 
46 A. Updegrove, ‘Laws, Cases and Regulations’ (consortiuminto.org) 
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/laws.php#dell. Accessed on 14 December 2017 
47 R. Brooks and D. Geradin, ‘Taking Contracts Seriously: The Meaning of the Voluntary Commitment to 
License Essential Patents on ‘Fair and Reasonable Terms’’, 
http://www.cravath.com/files/uploads/documents/publications/3233990_1.pdf assessed on 15 
December 2017 
48 R. Brooks and D. Geradin, ‘Taking Contracts Seriously: The Meaning of the Voluntary Commitment to 
License Essential Patents on ‘Fair and Reasonable Terms’’, 
http://www.cravath.com/files/uploads/documents/publications/3233990_1.pdf assessed on 15 
December 2017 
49 There is no unified definition of FRAND commitment, yet it has been highlighted by R Rapp and L 
Stiroh, ‘Standard Setting and Market Power’ (nera.com, 2002) 
www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive1/5156.pdf accessed on 12 November 2018 
‘The typical SSO patent policy mandating that royalty be ‘fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory’ gives 
little guidance for royalty determination because ‘reasonable’ can mean different things to a technology 
owner and a technology buyer’. 
50 J. Turner, Intellectual Property and EU Competition Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2010) 
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without having specified the terms of a licence between both parties. IPR owners in 
FRAND commitments are still not prevented from receiving appropriate royalties.  
Although a FRAND commitment is not a contract as a SEP holder is only expected to 
license its SEP on ex-ante or equivalent terms, the owner can still be considered abusing 
its dominance under Article 102 TFEU when there is a breach of a FRAND 
commitment.51 There is lack of clarity in the approaches adopted when dealing with 
FRAND ‘violations’, and thus, this research aims to examine guidance provided by courts 
in cases of refusal to license IPRs, given that refusal to license patents, and FRAND 
violations are on a similar footing.   
Further to the above, SEP owners are expected to offer similar licensing terms to all 
licensees. While the overall condition is to be fair and reasonable, the actual 
connotation of FRAND terms has been argued to be undefined.52  Mostly, the word ‘fair’ 
narrates to the elimination of licensing terms that are anti-competitive or abusive, while 
‘reasonable’ transmits to an evaluation of the actual significance of the technology 
itself, and ‘non-discriminatory’ is set to guarantee similar licensing terms amongst 
competitors.53  
Typically, patent holders are encouraged to declare their patent as a SEP and engage in 
FRAND licensing practices. This is because it gives them room to have some authority 
as a member of the governing process to influence the course of progress of a 
                                                          
51 M. Marieniello, ‘Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Terms: A Challenge for 
Competition Authorities’ [2011] 7(3) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 525 
52 J. Radcliffe and G. Sproul, ‘“FRAND” and the Smart-phone Wars’, Intellectual Property Magazine, 
Winter 20122/2012 at 45-47 
53 J. Radcliffe and G. Sproul, ‘“FRAND” and the Smart-phone Wars’, Intellectual Property Magazine, 
Winter 20122/2012 at 45-47 
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standard.54 These types of licences lead to the reduction of transaction costs, 
advancement of economy and enhancement of the product’s value to consumers via a 
network facilitated under standardisation.55 This allows consumers to move from one 
product to the other quickly and more easily.56 Therefore, standards have a role in 
harmonising different operational features of the industry and creating a 
comprehensive platform for an effective interface between patent owners.57  
Sometimes, a patent owner might engage in a hold-up of the SEP by, for example, 
refusing to license the SEP on FRAND terms.58 If the SEP holder has been found involved 
in a hold-up matter, then a compulsory licence can come into effect to prevent anti-
competitive or abusive practices, given that FRAND commitments have been seen as 
means for growing and further developing innovation.59 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 J. Radcliffe and G. Sproul, ‘“FRAND” and the Smart-phone Wars’, Intellectual Property Magazine, 
Winter 20122/2012 at 45-47. See also M. Dewatripont and P. Legros, ‘The Essential Patents, FRAND 
Royalties, and Technological Standards’, Working Paper N 6925 (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
2008) 1 
55 M. Mariniello, ‘Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Terms: A Challenge for 
Competition Authorities’ [2011] 7(3) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 524 
56 R. Srividhya and D. Raj, 'A Comparison of FRAND and Compulsory Forms of Licenses' [2015] 35(4) 
Licensing Journal 10-15 
57 M. A. Lemley, ‘Intellectual Property Rights & Standards- Setting Organisations’ 90 [2002] California 
Law Review 1889  
58 S. Ragavan and R. Dave, 'A comparison of FRAND and Compulsory forms of Licesnses' [2015] 35(4) 
The Licensing Journal 10-15 
59 S. Ragavan and R. Dave, 'A comparison of FRAND and Compulsory forms of Licesnses' [2015] 35(4) 
The Licensing Journal 10-15 
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III. THE MAIN AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The overall aim is to portray how the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test falling under EU 
competition law has been inconsistently applied and interpreted throughout EU case 
law, particularly in cases of refusal to license. The research mainly calls for the need to 
ensure consistency in EU decision making; the theoretical framework of the rule of law 
doctrine always stresses the importance of consistency in decision-making and how it 
would strengthen legal certainty and predictability that is provided in any legal system. 
Indeed, it may be crucial for the intervention of competition law in the exclusive rights 
conferred to IP holders, yet the researcher argues that courts and competition 
authorities must only do so in very exceptional and rare circumstances in order not to 
weaken the essence of IPR. It has been stressed in this thesis that the strengthening of 
the essence of IPRs would, in return, strengthen the rule of law within the EU legal 
system. Moreover, the study aims at highlighting that the relationship between IPRs and 
competition law should be viewed as complementary and not antagonistic. The 
researcher also intends to address the treatment of refusal to license resulting in abuse 
of dominance as breach of competition law by identifying the best logical solution for 
legal certainty and in better fulfilment with the rule of law core elements.   
To demonstrate and tackle the highlighted challenges, the project examines the 
international obligations which are followed by an examination of EU case law on 
‘abusive’ refusal to license cases and FRAND ‘violations’ and observes the specific 
circumstances for when a refusal to license has been regarded illegal under Article 102 
TFEU. The research then investigates how the change of priorities throughout EU case 
law has influenced the administration of Article 102 TFEU by the EU Member States, 
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particularly post-Huawei v ZTE.60 The research utilises the investigation of existing case 
law, from the rule of law perspective, to address issues of enforcement under 
competition law for refusal to license and illustrate the implications of the development 
of the  ‘exceptional circumstances’ test throughout EU case law.  
The key research questions can be summarised into four subjects as the following: 
• To what extent are the basic or core elements of the rule of law doctrine met by 
the EU legal system when a dominant undertaking is found to be abusing its 
dominant position under Article 102 TFEU?  
 
To make such as assessment, this project must examine the primary definitions of the 
rule of law, as well as its elements in chapter three of this research. Generally speaking, 
for now, the rule of law has been defined by Raz as the following:  
‘The rule of law means literally what it says: the rule of law. Taken in its broadest sense 
this means that people should obey the law and be ruled by it.’61  
Legal certainty commonly refers to the predictability of the outcome of litigation. 
Conversely, this attitude necessitates the fact that individuals should be aware of their 
rights and obligations. Therefore, this project has adopted the rule of law as the 
philosophical doctrine for assessing the extent under which the elements of the rule of 
law have been met in cases of the ‘exceptional’ EU competition law intervention in IP-
related matters.  
 
                                                          
60 Chapter six of this research 
61 J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’, in J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 
1979, pp. 210-232. 
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• What role do international agreements play with regard to abusive conduct by 
IP holders? What is the position of the EU towards the direct effect of 
international agreements? 
 
The examination of international agreements is an essential element of this research. 
International agreements allow countries to initiate collaborative work and cover vital 
issues that are cross-border or international in scope. The TRIPS Agreement, for 
example, has an integral part in enabling an exchange of knowledge and creativity, in 
settling disputes in trade, as well as, safeguarding WTO Members the room to attain 
their national aims and objectives.62 
For the objective of this research, international regulation of competition law has been 
found to correlate with IP law.63 During the early periods of regulating competition law, 
it was recognised that the protection against abuses of IPR forms an integral part of 
industrial property protection.64 ‘Abusive’ refusals to license IPR can be covered under 
Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention, as well as, mainly Articles 8.2, 13, 31 and 40 of 
the TRIPS Agreement.  
This research aims to explore these provisions and analyse the recommendations of the 
WIPO regarding the conclusion of an abuse of dominance. It then seeks to address the 
position of the EU towards international agreements and then examining the principle 
                                                          
62 WTO, ‘Intellectual property: protection and enforcement’ (wto.org) 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm accessed 13 November 2018 
63 R. W. de very, Towards a European Unfair Competition: A Clash Between Legal Families (1st edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 17 
64 R. W. de very, Towards a European Unfair Competition: A Clash Between Legal Families (1st edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 17 
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of consistent interpretations and hierarchy of norms to assess the obligations of the EU 
towards international agreements. 
• What are the requirements of ‘the exceptional circumstances’ test used by EU 
judicial and competition authorities to determine abusive conduct under Article 
102 TFEU? Is the framework of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test consistently 
applied and interpreted throughout EU case law? 
 
As mentioned earlier, this project aims at demonstrating the challenges and 
implications of EU competition law in refusal to license cases by examining the courts’ 
interpretation and application of Article 102 TFEU. This research aims to assess whether 
EU judicial and competition authorities have been successful in achieving such a balance 
between competition law and IP without undermining, to some degree, the essence of 
IPRs. It also aims to showcase how ‘the exceptional circumstances’ test has been 
inconsistently applied throughout EU case law. The examination of the evolution of the 
test aims to highlight this issue throughout the exploration of some of the prominent 
EU case law in this area. Ultimately, the research aims to eventually address whether 
Article 102 TFEU goes beyond its scope to cover other areas of already established rules, 
such as Article 17(2) and 47 CFREU and the objectives of Directive 2004/944 EC.  
• How do national courts apply and interpret Article 102 TFEU pre and post-
Huawei v ZTE?  
 
The research aims to explore the potential impact of Huawei v ZTE on the 
administration of EU competition law by domestic courts.  It aims first to examine the 
interpretation and application of EU competition law by national courts pre-Huawei v 
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ZTE and then investigate the implications of this decision on domestic courts for finding 
an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU. The research is limited to examining 
the approaches of the UK, Germany and Netherlands as examples to demonstrate the 
potential impact of Huawei v ZTE.  The purpose of reviewing the administration of EU 
competition law by the three named jurisdictions is to identify the best solution for legal 
certainty, given that domestic courts usually contribute and could also significantly 
influence the development of the EU legal system. 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The examination of the effectivity of the aims and objectives of the competition law 
available at a global, regional and domestic level is undertaken in this thesis with 
particular focus on the EU legal system and its administration by national courts. 
Following the examination of the interface of competition law and IPRs at an 
international and EU level, the jurisdictions of the UK, Germany and Netherlands are 
explored to assess the administration of EU competition law by different EU Member 
States and highlight the attention-grabbing differences that exist between them when 
interpreting and applying Article 102 TFEU.  
Additionally, this study mainly utilises the doctrine of the rule of law as a measuring tool 
when investigating the potential gaps and inconsistencies in EU competition law 
intervention.  Therefore, the rule of law is adopted as a theoretical doctrine in this 
research as legal uncertainty in this area of law can be problematic. This is because right 
holders would have been compelled to provide a licence to licence seekers when they 
have already invested in researching and developing their innovations. Accordingly, 
legal certainty should not be undermined when a compulsory licence is to be issued.  
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Indeed, one of the EU’s main fundamental values is the rule of law65 and the accession 
of new Member States is subject to their adherence with the rule of law.66 Nonetheless, 
the adherence to the rule of law is, theoretically, proven difficult in a multilevel context 
due to the wide range of different approaches adopted to monitor the rule of law.67 
Consequently, the aim of this thesis is to address the central question: To what extent 
are the core values of the rule of law met by EU instruments and institutions as they 
monitor the rule of law and its performance in the context of EU competition law and 
its interface with IPRs? 
To tackle the overall objective of this study, it is important first to provide black letter 
methodology by looking into the contributions of scholars and commentators for a 
deeper understanding on the theories regarding competition law and IP-related issues, 
as well as the rule of law doctrine. The black letter approach is a significant method for 
conducting legal research as it focuses on the law in theory rather than in action for the 
formulation of a comprehensive interpretation on the views regarding abusive conduct 
in the case of a refusal to license a patent or SEP. The black letter approach is used also 
to examine contributions to the rule of law doctrine and its principles.  
The black letter methodology was then trailed by the investigation of primary sources 
from the EU, domestic legal systems, and international legal orders, incorporating 
sources of primary and secondary legislation.  The research is carried out with a 
conventional legal approach by looking at EU legal source material, such as legislative 
text, preparatory work, case law, legal doctrine and articles. The EU legal method 
                                                          
65 TEU 2012, Article 2 
66 Elaine Mak and Sanne Taekema, ‘The European Union’s Rule of Law Agenda: Identifying its Core and 
Contextualising its Application’ [2016] 8(1) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 29-50 
67 Elaine Mak and Sanne Taekema, ‘The European Union’s Rule of Law Agenda: Identifying its Core and 
Contextualising its Application’ [2016] 8(1) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 29-50 
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emphasises the importance of case law from the ECJ, GC and the Commission as it 
outlines the general legal principles and its interpretations.  
The case law study is of particular importance as it is a vital methodology that aims to 
give an in-depth analysis and exploration of the law in action and highlight the issues 
that potentially could overlap with the rule of law elements. The case law study aims to 
contextualise and carefully analyse how various cases were solved throughout the 
evolution of ‘the exceptional circumstances’ test. The analysis is performed regarding 
EU case law and its implications on three domestic courts of EU Member States as they 
administer the application of Article 102 TFEU domestically. Additionally, comments 
and case reports are referred to further the critical examination of the judgments 
themselves.  
Accordingly, the study can be described as a combination of black letter methodology 
as well as evaluative68 and qualitative69 research of the exceptional circumstances test 
that has been introduced by EU institutions and is used to examine the relation between 
patents and competition. The qualitative case-based methodology is conducted by the 
critical examination of existing case law by EU courts and competition authorities, as 
well as several national courts. Moreover, the evaluative research methodology is 
conducted by the exploration of the compliance of EU courts and competition 
authorities with the theoretical framework of the rule of law doctrine when applying 
and interpreting the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test falling under Article 102 TFEU.  
                                                          
68   M. V. Hoecke, European Academy of Legal Theory Series, Methodologies of Legal Research, Which 
Kind of Method What Kind of Discipline? (1 edn, Hart Publishing Ltd 2011) p. 1 
69 G. Wisker, Postgraduate Research Handbook: Succeed with Your MA, MPhil, EdD and PhD (1 edn, 
Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 120 
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One of the main challenges for the rule of law evaluative approach is taken in this thesis 
is the potential criticism that could be brought up by some economists. Some could 
argue that the rule of law approach is a ‘rigid’ approach as it could add constrictions 
when restrictions are unfavourable to businesses and their progression. However, one 
of the counter-arguments used is the fact that legal certainty in this field of law is crucial 
for investors. The lack of legal confidence would lead to the risk of investors losing their 
interest in further investing in the EU market which would have a negative impact on 
the economy. Another counter-argument would be that the set-out research design 
and methodology is aimed at supporting the argument that it is, arguably, necessary to 
take further steps towards introducing  a set of rules that provide for the uniformity of 
regulation of refusal to supply or licence as abuse of dominance. Alternatively, at least, 
to provide a more transparent set of standards and guidelines that clearly outline the 
obligations of undertakings, so businesses and courts can follow them.  
V. CONTRIBUTION TO ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
 
The EU legal order and its policies are based and founded on the rule of law as set under 
Article 2 TEU.70 Thus, Member States and their citizens expect that EU institutions 
observe, in their actions, the rule of law. It is, consequently, anticipated that the 
enforcement authorities apply clearly defined rules with adequate predictability, 
transparency and uniformity so that private actors can predict what and when their 
actions are lawful in order to fashion their actions accordingly.  
The rule of law doctrine has been significantly brought into attention in the research. 
This doctrine has been used as a mechanism or a supporting tool to the discussions 
                                                          
70 TEU 2012, Article 2 
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concerning the implementation and interpretation of Article 102 TFEU in the EU legal 
system. In order to do so, the examination of the development of EU case law has been 
undertaken to highlight areas where the rule of law and the essence of IPRs could be 
strengthened so that undertakings with protected IPRs can plan their future 
endeavours according to a set of clearly defined rules that provide for consistency, 
transparency, predictability and uniformity.   
The rule of law approach is the thesis’s main original contribution to knowledge, and as 
far as the writer is aware, no research has ever adopted a rule of law perspective to 
assess areas of inconsistencies or legal uncertainty in EU competition law in IP-related 
matters.  Generally, there is a wide variety of important and significant research on this 
area of law, yet an economic tactic was mainly embraced to support competition law 
interventions as the key to effective competition. Indeed, the economic perspective is 
most definitely a vital factor in this area of law. Nevertheless, the research supports the 
argument that law is supreme and thus, the law must be clear, consistent and 
predictable before any economic advantage can surface.  
Additionally, and undeniably, national courts play a very important role in influencing 
and further developing the enforcement of EU law. As a matter of fact, national courts 
can act as guardians of the EU legal order, given that most EU disputes are resolved 
centrally before national courts. Therefore, the study of the administration of Article 
102 TFEU by three previously named jurisdictions, the UK, Germany and the 
Netherlands, is aimed at identifying areas where more enhanced legal certainty is being 
offered to IP holders at a domestic level, and how this could be echoed at an EU level 
to help influence and shape the advancement of legal certainty and predictability that 
is being offered to such owners.   
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Overall, this project has also contributed to knowledge via the reflection on the 
evolution of EU case law from a rule of law perspective, as well as the examination of 
how the application of Article 102 TFEU has been administered by the three previously 
named national jurisdictions pre-and-post the recent case of Huawei v ZTE.  Moreover, 
this research does not only examine the significant and recent case of Huawei v ZTE, 
but it also explores its implications on consequent cases that have been brought 
forward after the preliminary reference was delivered by the CJEU.  
VI. LIMITATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES  
 
Like any research, this study has faced certain limitations and difficulties. As mentioned 
earlier, the thesis critically analyses the exceptional circumstances test used to identify 
abuse of dominance in cases of refusal to license.  The research is, thus, limited to the 
examination of the compulsory licensing system and competition law intervention as a 
remedy to abusive conduct by dominant undertakings in the context of a refusal to 
license and FRAND violations by dominant firms. Nonetheless, compulsory licences can 
also be granted on other grounds such as public health, emergencies, environmental 
reasons, epidemics, public non-commercial use and other properties deemed suitable 
under national law as the TRIPS Agreement gave much flexibility in that regards.71  
The research has also been limited in the selection of case studies to some of the most 
prominent cases, such as the case of Huawei v ZTE. The evaluation of the chosen set of 
cases has been undertaken to critically examine the development of the conditions of 
‘exceptional circumstances’ throughout years. Therefore, the focus has been placed on 
the test that is used to establish abuse of dominance in order to examine how the test 
                                                          
71 TRIPS Agreement 
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has developed throughout EU case law which help identify the implications of such 
developments. 
Another delimitation is the fact that a lot of significant contributions have been made 
to define and outline the concept and values of the rule of law, but the research has 
only examined some of the most prominent work on the doctrine to incorporate its 
central principles in this research. Various academics and scholars adopted their 
definition of the theory and their viewpoint on the rule of law, and thus, it was 
challenging to choose a definition of the rule of law and contribute to existing academic 
research in that regard. This study had still assessed and summarised the key rule of 
law elements that are relevant to this research to evaluate the areas of inconstancies 
and legal uncertainties in this field of law against these summarised rule of law 
elements which all together brought an original contribution to this research. 
Moreover, competition law is a vast and extensive area of law, and much literature has 
been conducted on this area of law. Therefore, the thesis examined international and 
EU competition law and its impact on domestic courts within the EU. The examination 
of EU administration by national courts has been limited to three EU Member States 
which include German, Dutch and English law due to the remarkable differences in 
interpreting EU case law. The delimitation or challenge particularly faced here is that 
the writer does not speak German or Dutch. If no English translation is available, 
algorithms were used as an initial translation of a Dutch or German case, but these 
algorithms were not relied upon in this research. The project had to, thus, resort to case 
law comments made by commentators and specialists that do speak these languages 
and are available in journal articles, internet sources, blogs and textbooks as a means 
of confirming and formalising the first means of informal interpretation. 
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VII. THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
The thesis has been divided into seven chapters. This chapter is the first chapter, and it 
is the introductory chapter. The second chapter is the literature review, and it 
investigates the approaches taken by various commentators and scholars and their 
contributions in the area of IP-competition law. This is followed by chapter three which 
examines the rule of law doctrine and its fundamental principles. Then, chapter four 
explores international agreements and EU interpretations of international obligations. 
This is followed by chapter five which conducts an in-depth analysis of EU case law to 
assess the development of ‘the exceptional circumstances’ test for finding an abuse of 
dominance in refusal to license cases and FRAND commitments. Following this, chapter 
six examines the admissibility of EU competition law defence in the UK, Germany and 
Netherland before Huawei v ZTE and then goes on to assess case law post-Huawei v ZTE 
in these same jurisdictions to highlight the potential impact of ECJ’s decision on 
domestic courts across EU member states. Finally, chapter seven presents the 
concluding remarks and recommendations for the development of a framework that 
could provide more legal certainty for patent and SEP owners. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is set to inspect some of the most prominent contributions brought by 
scholars and commentators on the intersection of competition laws and IPR. The 
developments throughout EU competition law has sparked the debate on such a 
crossing. This chapter is set to explore the different theories, as well as legal and 
economic perspectives of IP experts and competition law experts in this field of law.  
This chapter studies the recent progress in EU competition law, the idea of EU 
compulsory licensing as a remedy, social obligations and public interest. It also covers 
the legal and economic perspectives of the competition-oriented theory, the essential 
facilities doctrine and the incentives balance test. This is followed by the thoughts as to 
whether the right to grant a voluntary licence is indeed optional and the business 
community perspective. It finally rationalises the rule of law approach and provides 
concluding remarks. 
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN EU COMPETITION LAW 
EU competition law has dramatically changed over the past years. Significant reforms72 
were commenced and completed in regards to the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU 
and merger control.73  Whereas, the calls made for reforms to Article 102 TFEU have 
not received the same enthusiasm by the DG Competition in comparison to Article 101 
TFEU,74 even though competition law academics and practitioners have stressed their 
concerns regarding the adopted standards that deal with anti-competitive or abusive 
practices under Article 102 TFEU.75  
Following the several decisions that dealt with matters of abusive practices,76 
discussions were moved towards the analysis and application of Article 102 TFEU. The 
overwhelming majority of contributions suggest that it is imperative to initiate reforms 
to Article 102 TFEU, particularly given that improvements have been enthusiastically 
undertaken and completed for Article 101 TFEU and the merger control regime.77  
                                                          
72 T. Eilmansberger, 'How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: In Search of 
Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses’ (2005) 42 CML Rev. 129-177. See 
also W. Wils, The Modernisation of EU Competition Law Enforcement in The EU (1st edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2004), p. 661. 
73T. Eilmansberger, 'How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: In Search of 
Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses’ (2005) 42 CML Rev. 129-177; W. 
Wils, The Modernisation of EU Competition Law Enforcement in The EU (1st edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2004), at 661.  
74 T. Eilmansberger, 'How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: In Search of 
Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses’ (2005) 42 CML Rev. 129-177 
75 T. Eilmansberger, 'How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: In Search of 
Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses’ (2005) 42 CML Rev. 129-177 
76 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C (2004)900 final ; Case T-203/01 Michelin v. 
Commission [2003] CFI II-4083; Case T-219/99 British Airways v. Commission [2003], CFI II 5925; C-
418/01 IMS Health v. NDC Health [2004] ECR I 5039; NDC Health v IMS Health: Interim measures (Case 
COMP D3/38.044) [2003] O.J. 2003, L 268/69 
77 T. Eilmansberger, 'How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: In Search of 
Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses’ (2005) 42(1) CML Rev. 129-177. See 
also B. Sher ‘The Last of the Steam-powered Trains: Modernising Article 82’ [2004] 25(5) European 
Competition Law Review 243-246 
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Usually, the courts and relevant authorities had to distinguish between competition on 
the merits and unlawful practice of a dominant undertaking under Article 102 TFEU.78 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU also provide the Commission with authority to apply and 
impose fines on businesses that infringe EU antitrust rules.79 However, it is not easy to 
determine when a refusal to license is unlawful under Article 102 TFEU, and thus, 
debates around the assessments used by courts are inevitable.80 
The above-mentioned has resulted in the wide-ranging academic literature on the 
correlation of competition law and IPR.81 In the EU context, dominant undertakings are 
prohibited from abusing their position under Article 102 TFEU.82 It has been emphasised 
that abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU is only in exceptional circumstances.83  
Mainly, EU competition authorities aim to achieve a balance between IPR and 
competition law through making sure that the conduct of right holders does not hamper 
economic efficiency.84  In such circumstances, considerations to the impact of the right 
holder’s practice in the market are taken into account when analysing static efficiency85, 
whereas considerations to long-term effects of a specific behaviour are taken into 
account when examining dynamic efficiency86. Usually, minimum protection of IPR is 
                                                          
78 Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, [70]. 
79 European Commission, 'Antitrust: Overview' (Competition, 21 April 2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html> accessed 17 May 2018 
80 P. I. Colomo, ‘Intel and Article 102 TFEU Case Law: Making Sense of a Perpetual Controversy’ (2014) 
LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 29/2014 < 
http://awa2015.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/ssrn-id2530878.pdf> accessed on 19 September 2018 
81 V. Korah, Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules (Hart Publishing, 2006). H Ullrich, 
‘The Interaction between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law- An Overview’ in CD 
Ehlermann and I Anastasiu (eds) European Law Annual 2005 (Hart Publishing, 2006). See also I. 
Govarere, ‘The Use and Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in EC Law (Sweet & Maxwill, 1996). See 
also S. Anderman and H. Schmidt, EU Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The Regulation 
of Innovation (2nd edn, Oxford Unversity Press, 2011) 
82 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/01 (TFEU), Article 102. 
83 Such as the cases covered in the following chapters of Magill, IMS Health and Bronner. 
84 L. Kaplow, ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal’ [1984] 97 Harvard Law Review 1813 
85 Static efficiency occurs when the marginal production costs are minimised or when the price 
consumers pay for the goods or services equate to the production cost. 
86 Dynamic efficiency occurs when undertakings have an incentive to invest in innovation 
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required under static efficiency87 whereas predicable IPR protection is necessary under 
the dynamic efficiency as it is considered vital for incentives to innovate, participation 
in the expansion of new products and services as well as technological progress.88 
The Commission has stated that it aims to provide shelter for competitors within the 
EU market as a secondary objective to EU competition law.89 The CFI, at that time, has 
criticised the Commission for the shortage in an economic examination90 in Airtours,91 
Tetra Laval 92and Schneider Electric.93 Nevertheless, the following was stated by the 
Commission’s Competition Commissioner, at that time, Neelie Kroes: 
 ‘[F]irst it is competition, and not competitors, that is to be protected. Second, ultimately 
the aim is to avoid consumers harm.’94 
It has been indicated that such a point of view includes assumptions that may not be 
equally applied by all countries. This includes, for example, the assumption that relates 
to the fact that competition policy aims to boost consumer welfare, but this is a 
complicated matter in some countries. Additionally, there is a debate that has risen in 
some countries about the ability of competition policy to consider political or social 
factors on top of the considerations of economic efficiency.95 
                                                          
87 L. Kaplow,, ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal’ [1984] 97 Harvard Law Review 1813 
88 L. Kaplow,, ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal’ [1984] 97 Harvard Law Review 1813 
89 According to the analysis in chapter five, it appears that competitors are the primary aim for EU 
competition law. 
90 D. Kanter, 'IP and compulsory licensing on both sides of the Atlantic - an appropriate antitrust remedy 
or a cutback on innovation?' [2006] 27(7) European Competition Law Review 351-364 
91 Case T-342/99, Airtours v Commission [2002] 5 C.M.L.R 7 
92 Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] 5 C.M.L.R. 29 
93 C-310/01 Electric v Commission [2003] 4 C.M.L.R 17 
94 N. Kroes, 'Preliminary Thoughts On Policy Review Of Article 82' (2005) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-537_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 9 June 2018. 
95 OECD, ‘ Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights’ (OECD.org, 2006) available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/2376247.pdf> last accessed on 27 May 2018.  
Interestingly, the Commission’s Competition Commissioner noted that the ultimate aim is to prevent 
consumer harm, however, it is portrayed in chapter 5 of this research that the EU case law did not 
particularly thoroughly examine potential consumer harm when deciding for a competition law 
intervention. An example is portrayed in the following paragraph. 
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On the one hand, some commentators have claimed that the compulsory licensing 
system has become easily applied which weakens the value of IPR.96 It has been argued 
that this would significantly dissuade innovation as well as competition.97  Additionally, 
Wurmnest argued that in the light of a decision made by the ECJ98, the Commission is 
not entitled to declare ‘consumer welfare’ which it ought not to be the only objective 
of competition law.99 Instead, he advocated an approach which places welfare 
considerations on an equal footing with other goals, such as the security to economic 
freedom, market integration and the promotion of innovation.100 
On the other hand, some have adopted economic perspectives as seen the conference 
hosted by the Max-Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law 
to bring to light and discuss the impact of the major changes proposed by the 
Commission. The conference brought various academics from all over Europe where Ulf 
Böge who was at that time was the President of the German Cartel Office highlighted 
the importance of considering the possible repercussions on their private enforcement 
of an effects-based style to the application of Article 102 TFEU. Besides the backdrop of 
the analysis presented by Ulf Böge, several academics from different countries filed 
papers on the proposed reforms of Article 102 TFEU based on an economic approach 
as well as the distinct features of private enforcement of Article 102 TFEU. 101 An 
                                                          
96 The case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG  [2004] E.C.R. I-5039; 
[2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28 is discussed later on the research. See also J. T. Lang, ‘Compulsory Licensing of 
Intellectual Property in European Community’, DOJ/FTC Hearing 19 (Washington D.C., May 2002) 
97 J. T. Lang, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in European Community’, DOJ/FTC Hearing 
19 (Washington D.C., May 2002) 
98 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] E.C.R. I-5039; [2004] 4 
C.M.L.R. 28 
99 M.O Mackenrodt and others, Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement 
Mechanisms? (5th edn, Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 
100 M.O. Mackenrodt and others, Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement 
Mechanisms? (5th edn, Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 
101 M.O. Mackenrodt and others, Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement 
Mechanisms? (5th edn, Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 
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example of this can be seen where Wolfgang Wurmnest offered an evaluation of the 
Commission’s Discussion Paper on exclusionary abuses. He criticised the Paper as it has 
given limited guidance as to the economic tools and insights that should be applied 
when assessing alleged abuses. 102 
The DG Competition published the abovementioned Discussion Paper.103 The Paper 
emphasised that, generally, IPR holders are not obliged to licence their IPR. The Paper 
has suggested that refusal to license is only abusive under specific circumstances. For 
instance, refusal to license is considered unlawful if it ‘prevents the development of the 
market for which the licence is an indispensable input, to the detriment of consumers.’104 
The Paper has further suggested that a business must have the intention to create new 
services or goods when it requests a licence from the right owner.105 However, it has 
been advised that the Paper did not address whether a new product must appear in the 
same or the downstream relevant market.106  
The following section of this research examines the contributions of scholars and 
commentators on whether the EU competition intervention is set as an effective 
remedy to achieve a balance between competition law and the protection of IPRs.  
                                                          
102 M.O. Mackenrodt and others, Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement 
Mechanisms? (5th edn, Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 
103 D. Kanter, 'IP and compulsory licensing on both sides of the Atlantic - an appropriate antitrust 
remedy or a cutback on innovation?' [2006] 27(7) European Competition Law Review 351-364; DG 
Competition, Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, 
public consultation, Brussels (December 2005). 
104D. Kanter, 'IP and compulsory licensing on both sides of the Atlantic - an appropriate antitrust 
remedy or a cutback on innovation?' [2006] 27(7) European Competition Law Review 351-364; N. 
Kroes, 'Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review Of Article 82' (2005) at [239] 
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105 D. Kanter, 'IP and compulsory licensing on both sides of the Atlantic - an appropriate antitrust 
remedy or a cutback on innovation?' [2006] 27(7) European Competition Law Review 351-364; N. 
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106 D. Kanter, 'IP and compulsory licensing on both sides of the Atlantic - an appropriate antitrust 
remedy or a cutback on innovation?' [2006] 27(7) European Competition Law Review 351-364 
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III. THE IDEA OF EU COMPULSORY LICENSING SYSTEM AS A REMEDY  
This section first examines the idea of EU compulsory licensing system, in itself, as a 
remedy. It then considers the idea of a compulsory licensing system as an antitrust 
remedy.  
A. The idea of EU Compulsory Licensing System, in itself, as a Remedy 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU provide the Commission with authority to determine not only 
a compulsory licence in itself but also the duration of the compulsory licence, as well 
as, the royalty payment.107 However, given that technology is increasingly developing 
and growing, it has made it difficult to define an appropriate royalty as well as the 
duration for a licence.108 It is important to mention here that the ECJ can alter or reverse 
a compulsory licence decision made by the Commission.109  
On the one hand, some scholars have recognised that the compulsory licensing of 
patents is necessary for protection against abusive practices, but only under specific 
and exceptional circumstances.110 This is because a patent is considered a property 
right111 which was initially granted the patent status with the aim of fostering 
innovation whereby it can be limited by governmental authority when necessary due 
                                                          
107  J. Tudor, 'Compulsory licensing in the European Union' [2008] 4(2) Geo Mason J Int'l Com Law 222-
258; Frank Fine, 'European Community Compulsory Licensing Policy: Hersey Versus Common Sense' 
(2004) 24 NW.J.INT’L L.&BUS, at 629 
108 J .Tudor, 'Compulsory licensing in the European Union' [2008] 4(2) Geo Mason J Int'l Com Law 222-
258; F. Fine, 'European Community Compulsory Licensing Policy: Hersey Versus Common Sense' (2004) 
24 NW.J.INT’L L.&BUS, at 629 
109 J. Tudor, 'Compulsory licensing in the European Union' [2008] 4(2) Geo Mason J Int'l Com Law 222-
258; G. Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008), at 1110 
110 N. Reitz, 'Compulsory Licensing in the Industrial and Commercial Arena: A Compromise' [1966] 54(3) 
California Law Review 1364-1381; G. Stocking and M. Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise (1st edn, 
Greenwood Press, London, 1951) at p. 454-468 
111 N. Reitz, 'Compulsory Licensing in the Industrial and Commercial Arena: A Compromise' [1966] 54(3) 
California Law Review 1364-1381; United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., (1933) 289 U.S. 178, [187]; 
Seymour v. Osborne (1870) 78 U.S. 516, [533]; Brown v. Duchesne (1856) 60 U.S. 183, [195]. 
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to it being ultimately a property.112 Some scholars have even further suggested that the 
mere right given to the holder to use and benefit from the patent has obstructed the 
establishment of a comprehensive compulsory licensing system.113 
On the other hand, some critics have emphasised that they are against the notion of 
the compulsory licensing system as a whole due to the high risk of weakening IPR.114 
Fine, for example, has argued that businesses withdraw their interests in becoming 
innovative with the increased use of compulsory licences.115 Fine has even called for 
early notifications to be given to the innovators, rather than determining a compulsory 
licence on a case-by-case basis.116 It has also been further insinuated that the 
mandatory licensing system can have an adverse effect on incentives to innovate in new 
areas as it can discourage patent holders from making additional investments towards 
a better technology and, in return, this would lead to a negative impact not only on IPR 
but also on public interest as well.117 It has been further stipulated by Monti that there 
is always an assumption that the economy is benefited from a refusal to license.118 In 
other words, Monti argued here that patent holders should not be forced to license 
their inventions because it could harm the economy and consumer welfare, as it 
                                                          
112 N. Reitz, 'Compulsory Licensing in the Industrial and Commercial Arena: A Compromise' [1966] 54(3) 
California Law Review 1364-1381; Crozier v. Fried Krupp (1912) 224 U.S. 290, [305] 
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NW.J.INT’L L.&BUS, at 622 
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118 G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 228 
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undermines the essence of IPR and the creation of incentives to innovate to further the 
economy.119  
Such extreme concerns mainly stem from the arguably unclear substantive and 
procedural tests used by EU competition authorities and courts in determining abusive 
conduct of right-holders. A less intense view to competition law intervention is the 
argument constructed on the need for the courts and relevant competition bodies to 
encourage innovation with a competition law intervention that is carefully measured.120 
It was indicated that this could be achieved by giving the licence seeker the high burden 
of proof in disproving the assumption of otherwise legal conduct of the right holder’s 
refusal to license.121 It must be mentioned here that the EU has made a recent 
development in that regard as it has introduced a new directive which states that the 
party claiming that abusive conduct of an undertaking has resulted in its injury must 
provide proof of the alleged harm and the degree of harm to obtain an award for 
damages.122 This development in EU competition law is indeed significant.  
Regardless, it can be noted from the above that some commentators are entirely 
against the idea of a compulsory licence. This attitude could be because the law and the 
means used by the EU courts and competition authorities in determining abusive 
conduct are unclear and unpredictable which can weaken IPR and the essence of IPR.  
                                                          
119 G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 228 
120 D. Kanter, 'IP and compulsory licensing on both sides of the Atlantic - an appropriate antitrust 
remedy or a cutback on innovation?' [2006] 27(7) European Competition Law Review 351-364 
121 D. Kanter, 'IP and compulsory licensing on both sides of the Atlantic - an appropriate antitrust 
remedy or a cutback on innovation?' [2006] 27(7) European Competition Law Review 351-364 
122 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition 
law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance OJL 359, 
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The following sub-section examines the perspective of the compulsory licensing system 
as an antitrust remedy. 
B. Compulsory Licensing as an Antitrust Remedy 
Some scholars have adopted the theory of compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy 
as Articles 101 and 102 have developed the ‘antitrust’123 policy to deal with anti-
competitive practices and abuse of dominant market positions. For example, Venegas 
has suggested that three different types of approaches should be adopted to tackle 
matters that fall within IP and competition law.124 The first approach is the ‘patent 
scope’ perspective, in which exploitation of the right is subject to antitrust control if it 
exceeds the scope of the patent or the value obtained from its normal use. The second 
approach is the ‘economic balancing’ approach, which weighs the detriments of 
reduced competition and static allocative efficiency against the benefits of inducing 
new inventions and dynamic efficiency. The third approach is ‘dynamic efficiency’ 
approach in which all conduct reasonably necessary to obtain dynamic efficiency is 
permitted. Venegas then concludes that the Commission should incorporate some form 
of ‘economic balancing’ test while still emphasising the protection of product 
market competition and static allocative efficiency.125 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that the doctrine of antitrust remedy interferes with 
the values of the market economy and the freedom of selecting trading partners by a 
                                                          
123 European Commission, 'Antitrust: Overview' (Competition, 21 April 2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html> accessed 17 May 2018 
124 V. Venegas, 'Promoting Innovation: A Legal and Economic Analysis Of The Application Of Article 101 
TFEU To Patent Technology Transfer Agreement' (PhD, Stockholm University 2011), p 3 
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market participant.126 It has been suggested that this contradiction can be mainly seen 
in EU competition law due to the unclear guidelines.127  
Therefore, some have called for clearly defining the circumstances of justifiable 
competition law intervention.128 It has been further indicated that it is essential to 
create a clear structure for implementing competition law with a minimum negative 
impact on innovation.129  It has then been suggested that antitrust law could only be 
justified when a dominant undertaking harms or intends to harm competition with its 
refusal to license essential resources.130 In other words, there must be potential 
consumer harm for a justified competition law intervention. 
The following section assesses the recommendations delivered by scholars and 
commentators as to how competition law intervention can be improved, and examine 
the perspectives and methodologies used to reach their conclusions.  
IV. SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
Kohler has adopted the perspective of social obligation regarding competition law 
intervention. Generally, he has identified that the exercise of an IPR is a social 
obligation. Kohler has also reminded us that the legal principle of competition law 
intervention is relevant when the non-exercise of an IPR has a negative impact on the 
public interest.  He has further discussed that the social obligation principle also applies 
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127 J. P. Choi, 'Compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy' [2010] 2(1) WIPO Journal 74-81 
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to businesses that are in a dominant position because neither the general public nor 
competitors should be denied of the entire ‘legal regime’.131  
Kohler’s observation is exciting as social obligation can be a primary principle of the rule 
of law doctrine. It has been described, for example, by Rachel Belton that the rule of 
law definitions can be categorised into the following: 
‘[T]hose that emphasise the ends that the rule of law is intended to serve within 
society…’ also, ‘those that [focus on the elements] believed necessary to actuate the rule 
of law (such as comprehensive laws, well-functioning courts, and trained law 
enforcement agencies).’132  
Thus, it can be argued that Kohler’s perspective on the competition law intervention 
fits with the former rule of law’s definition as described by Belton. However, it is to be 
argued that to ensure public interest there must be potential consumer harm, 
otherwise competition law intervention is unjustified. Therefore, one of the aims of 
chapter five is to examine whether EU courts and competition authorities have assessed 
consumer harm when determining abuse of dominance. The following sector of this 
chapter discusses the theoretical analysis of a competition-oriented compulsory 
licensing system.  
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V. THE COMPETITION-ORIENTED THEORY  
This theory adopts a dominant complementarity theory which incorporated economic 
perspective on IP-related matters. This section looks into the justifications, 
substantive and procedural tests that fall within the context of such an approach.  
A. Justification 
The dominant complementarity theory has been argued to have become a relevant 
matter due to the economic perspective on IP-related matters.133  This theory stipulates 
that competition law and IP complement each other because both of these areas of law 
aim to promote vigorous competition134 and improve consumer welfare and practical 
resources’ allocation.135 It has been suggested that competition law intervention within 
IP law is essential when dynamic competition is destructed or dismissed by either the 
conduct of right holders or any other market elements such as standards and network 
effects.136  
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2010). 
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B. Substantive Test 
Under the competition-oriented theory, it has been suggested that the substantive test 
in IP-internal compulsory licences should be that of the functioning and preservation of 
market competition.137 The functioning and preservation test falls under competition 
policy. Thus, it has been argued that a dominant business’s refusal to license an IPR that 
is ‘essential’ for consumers could harm competition and public interest, mainly when 
the IPR cannot be used or replicated by competitors. Interestingly, international IP 
conventions and some countries have also adopted this perspective as their reasoning 
test for competition law intervention.138  
C. Procedural Test 
The theory of competition-oriented proposed that the procedural test of competition 
law intervention should first identify whether infringement of an IPR has taken place by 
a licence-seeker. Negotiations between an IP holder and a licence-seeker must take 
place before any application for a compulsory licence, and when negotiations are 
unsuccessful should a licence-seeker then pursue the court. Negotiations must be 
sincere as seen in the German case, examined later in this research, of the Orange-
Book-Standard. Generally, this case has established that the infringer should secure 
sufficient amount of royalty for the use of a SEP, and an unconditional offer must have 
been made to a right holder prior to any competition law claim.139 Nevertheless, the 
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procedural test of negotiations before a request for a compulsory licence is, arguably, 
irrelevant; infringement is highly likely to occur due to a large number of IP users that 
are possibly unaware of the presence of an IPR altogether.140  
Indeed, some economists see patents as a tool to provide a patent owner with market 
power in a given market.141 This perspective, for instance, can be seen in the study 
conducted by Arrow on cost-reducing innovations,142 as well as, the study conducted 
by Demstez.143 Arrow adopted the monopoly doctrine of patents in his research,144 and 
his perspective has also been presented and developed further by other commentators 
such as Demstez,145 Scherer and Ross,146 as well as, Maskus.147  However, it has been 
argued that the doctrine of monopoly is inappropriate within the context of a genuine 
competition law perspective,148 and yet the principle of ‘patent-equals-monopoly’ 
appears to dictate this field. This mainstream theory has been questioned by various 
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commentators,149 following empirical evidence which suggests that patents are not 
generally contemplated as monopolies.150 This is because, in most circumstances, 
hundreds or even thousands of similar patents can be found for one particular product 
which makes it near impossible for one patent to be an actual monopoly.151 
Interestingly, this theory can indicate that we do not need competition law intervention 
in cases of refusal to license, given that competition law comes to play once a ‘dominant 
undertaking’ abused its powers with its refusal to license. However, according to this 
theory, its near, if not, impossible for an undertaking to a monopoly and thus, 
competition law intervention, in this case, is unjustified.  
Additionally, Professor Anderman observed that the function of competition law must 
be applied as a secondary system to IP law or an external regulatory order of abusive 
conduct.152 It has even been indicated that the functions of IP falls under the promotion 
of competition and innovation and thus, it should include the issue of balancing 
different forms of competition.153 The scope of a patent is restricted by competition law 
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and its misuse doctrine under Article 102 TFEU,154 yet competition law expert Ullrich 
has firmly believed that competition law should not be set out to fix failures of the 
patent law system.155 This is because the patent law is ought to effectively regulate 
patents to encourage incentives to innovate as competition law would come too late 
and can only scrutinise the circumstances on a case-by-case basis.156 
The following section examines the compulsory licensing system as an antitrust remedy, 
given that some scholars have adopted such a theory following the development of the 
EU’s antitrust policy to deal with anti-competitive and abusive conduct.  
VI. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE UNDER THE EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST  
This section explores the contributions of scholars and commentators in this field of law 
as to how effective has been the doctrine of essential facilities under the exceptional 
circumstances test to tackle the concerns accompanied by competition law intervention 
A. Competition Law Intervention as an Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine 
The essential facilities doctrine can be applied to assess a competition law intervention 
as an antitrust remedy. The essential facilities doctrine identifies that owner of an 
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essential facility must provide access. Generally, legal scholars and economists disagree 
with the principle of essential facilities as it can create tension in IP laws, given that 
under the general IP law an IPR holder does not have to license its right to others. 
Therefore, the essential facilities doctrine should only be adopted under specific 
circumstances.157  
The business that controls the essential facility must ensure that the facility is available 
to other competitors. The essential facilities doctrine158 under the exceptional 
circumstances test provides the availability of such a facility through the competition 
law interventions. A facility has been contemplated as essential by the ECJ via a 
cumulative circumstances test159 as the following: 
1. The refusal must prevent competition in the market.  
2. The access to the facility must be essential160 
3. There are no objective justifications for the refusal.  
 
The facility is considered essential if it has an impact on effective competition within 
the relevant market.161 Therefore, the exercise of IPR must be limited, under the 
essential facilities doctrine, to their subject matter.162 It must be mentioned that this 
doctrine is only applicable when competitors cannot offer their products due to the 
proprietor’s product being an essential facility and thus, the theory cannot be applied 
when there are other available solutions to bringing new products to the market.163 The 
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essential facilities doctrine has been employed in the case of Magill and further outlined 
in IMS Health, both examined in the following chapters.  
B. Economic rationales for the essential facilities doctrine 
Even though the theory of essential facilities has been controversial, it has still been 
rationalised under specific circumstances. For example, when competition could 
benefit from the removal of any other possible negative impacts on competition and 
the market. Some of the economic recommendations for the essential facilities doctrine 
are as the following: 
1)  The Infant Industry Type Argument 
The international trade literature provides one of the economic arguments relevant to 
the essential facilities doctrine which suggests that national and small businesses can 
be provided with temporary protection to protect them from international competition 
in order give them room to grow and develop in the global market. This economic 
argument is relevant to the essential facilities doctrine because compulsory licensing 
provides access to competitors which gives them room to participate in a relevant 
market to ultimately grow and develop their facilities and thus, achieving dynamic 
efficiency from an economic perspective.164  
2) Second-best Variety Arguments 
Another economic argument pertinent to the essential facilities doctrine is for the 
variations of the second-best argument. The economic theory of the second-best 
indicates the possibility of adding further distortion to the initial state of a somewhat 
distorted economy to enhance the situation. This approach can be relevant to the 
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essential facilities doctrine because an essential facility is initially regulated due to the 
different type of distortions in the economy. Therefore, the additional inefficiency 
might not be needed while promoting competition with the addition of constraints in 
the compulsory sharing of a facility with others via means of a compulsory licence.165 
C. Adverse Impacts on Investment Incentives 
One of the main challenges with the essential facilities doctrine is its negative impact 
on investment incentives for both dominant undertakings and competitors when it 
obliges right holders who are in a dominant position to share their IPR. Therefore, it has 
been claimed that the essential facilities theory can harm the economy and innovative 
markets. It has been further argued that incentives to invest would be negatively 
impacted by the fact that competitors can free-ride and use the advantages of such an 
investment. 166 
Therefore, it was argued by Robert Solow that incentives to innovate must be prioritised 
as the primary objective for antitrust policy.167 However, it has been suggested by 
Arrow that ‘any information obtained, say a new method of production, should, from 
the welfare point of view, be available free of charge’, which ‘[e]nsures optimal 
utilisation of the information.’168  It was argued that Arrow’s welfare perspective does 
not take into account the fact that incentives to innovate would not be available when 
no compensation is paid to the inventor of the new information. 169 Besides, it has also 
been argued that exclusive IPRs provide the society with long-term benefits as they can 
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access and utilise future facilities when the interest of creators and their incentives to 
innovate or invest are maintained. 170  It has been further argued that the society can 
be deprived of new innovative products with the essential facilities doctrine due to its 
impacts on innovation incentives.171 
 As mentioned earlier the essential facilities doctrine can have a negative impact on 
incentives to innovate as well as relevant competitors. This negative impact can be seen 
when competitors are enabled to free ride a dominant undertaking’s incentive or 
investment whereby competitors might be discouraged from creating and establishing 
their innovations.172 
D. The Need for the Supervision by Antitrust Agencies 
The application of the essential facilities theory is faced with another critical challenge 
as it needs constant supervision regarding public utility regulation. It has been 
suggested that the use of the essential facilities doctrine might not necessarily improve 
competition within a given market.173 This concern stems from the fact that the 
essential facilities doctrine requires supervision of antitrust authorities to plan or 
regulate an appropriate access fee when such a role has been supported by existing 
theoretical and empirical findings to be problematic on incentives.174 The 
determination of a proper access fee is complicated and must be assessed by experts 
of the cost structure in a given market. It has been argued that antitrust agencies do 
not have sufficient expertise to make such decisions, particularly in our rapidly evolving 
world with constant innovations and developments.175 Arguably, it would make no 
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sense for an antitrust authority to prepare a licensing contract that shields all future 
aspects that might have an impact on such an agreement.176  
Moreover, it has been seen in the Microsoft case that the Commission has fined 
Microsoft for its excessive licensing fees and its lack of licensing. Nonetheless, it was 
indicated that the Commission’s antitrust intervention undermines the original 
objectives of compulsory licensing.177 This argument has been based on fears of 
influencing the licensees to hold out until they obtain better-licensing conditions while 
they seek antitrust agencies. 178 
Furthermore, the determination of access fee in our rapidly evolving environment leads 
to extra costs of supervisory uncertainty. Economic literature highlights the fact that 
uncertainty reduces investments.179 Therefore, it has been argued that the increase of 
regulatory uncertainty would result in a decrease in incentives to invest. This argument 
can also be supported by a survey conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit and 
Ernst and Young which deliberated the fact that undertakings see the regulatory threat 
as the most significant risk to their business.180  
As can be seen from the above, the essential facilities doctrine has not received much 
welcome by economists as it undermines incentives to invest where it can have a 
negative impact on an economy of a given market.   It is, thus, why the research now 
glances at the legal perspective of such a doctrine.  
 
                                                          
176 J. P. Choi, 'Compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy' [2010] 2(1) WIPO Journal 74-81 
177 J. P. Choi, 'Compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy' [2010] 2(1) WIPO Journal 74-81 
178 J. P. Choi, 'Compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy' [2010] 2(1) WIPO Journal 74-81 
179 J. V. Leahy and T. M. Whited ‘The Effect of Uncertainty on Investment: Some Stylized Facts’ [1996] 
28(1) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 64-83 
180 Surveys available at <http://eiu.com> and <http://www.ey.com>; See also DLA Piper ‘EU Regulatory 
Risk Awareness Survey 2007’ <http://www.dlapiper.com> accessed 2 March 2016 
 60 
E. FRAND Commitment and its link with the Essential Facilities Doctrine  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, SEP patents become essential once they had 
been declared as essential to an SSO. Competition authorities came up with FRAND 
commitment to prevent SEP owners from abusing their dominant position.181 Violations 
of FRAND commitments can be mainly seen when the proprietor refuses to license an 
essential patent.182 The proprietor automatically enjoys a significant advantage in 
comparison to other market participants due to the indispensability of a SEP. Similarly, 
a breach of the essential doctrine covers abusive refusal to license a ‘regular’ IPR by a 
dominant undertaking that is indispensable to other competitors.183 Although 
violations of FRAND commitments can be distinguished from violations of the essential 
facilities doctrine, the indispensability element is crucial for both the standardisation 
process of SEPs and the maintenance or growth of competition in refusal to license 
indispensable IPR.184 
F. Legal Precedents for the Essential Facilities Doctrine 
It appears that legal precedents also agree with the risks mentioned earlier concerning 
essential facilities doctrine. The case of Bronner highlights the following:  
 [T]he incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient facilities would be 
reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to share the benefits. Thus, the mere 
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fact that by retaining a facility for its own use a dominant undertaking retains an 
advantage over a competitor cannot justify requiring access to it.185 
Nonetheless, it can be seen in EU case law that this can be justifiable under the 
exceptional circumstances test. For example, in Magill186 it was highlighted that 
competition authorities should intervene in extraordinary circumstances. The 
exceptional circumstances were also confirmed in following judgements, such as IMS 
Health.187 The list exceptional circumstances signify that the information must be 
critical for competition, refusal to access would block the development of a new 
product that has potential consumer demand and is not delivered by the dominant 
business in that market, and there are no reasonable justifications for the refusal to 
license. The judgements of Magill and IMS Health have stressed that a ‘new product’ is 
one of the primary conditions in order to consider refusal to license as abusive. It was 
highlighted that:  
Only where the undertaking which requested the licence does not intend to limit itself 
essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the secondary market 
by the owner of the intellectual property right, but intends to produce new goods or 
services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer 
demand.188 
It has been stipulated that the essential facilities doctrine provides legal uncertainty. It 
was also stressed that both legal precedents and economic theory appear to agree with 
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the fact that the application of the essential facilities doctrine must be under 
exceptional and specific circumstances.189 It was highlighted that the doctrine should 
only be applied when the practice of a dominant undertaking is unjustifiable, and there 
are no efficiency motives for it, yet whilst taking into account the adverse impacts of 
such a doctrine.   Other than that, the doctrine undermines incentives to invest and 
leads to regulatory uncertainty with excessive supervision costs. The tremendous 
adverse effects associated with such a theory have even led commentators such as 
Areeda and Hovenkamp to argue that the essential facilities doctrine brings 
unnecessary harm and thus, the doctrine must be completely disregarded as a whole.190 
While some have supported the essential facilities doctrine, others have disapproved 
of it as can be noted from above. The following section examines the incentives balance 
test to explore what has been contemplated regarding the adoption of such a doctrine 
and the reasons as to why it has, or it has not been supported by academics, as well as 
legal or economic scholars.  
VII. THE INCENTIVES BALANCE TEST UNDER THE EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST 
The EU competition law, as indicated earlier, does not have a list of detailed provisions 
on the compulsory licensing system as it is mainly founded on case law. The Commission 
introduced its incentive balance test in the case of Microsoft. The Commission can 
decide a compulsory licence under this test. It measures the negative impact of a 
compulsory licence on the incentive to innovate by a dominant business and whether 
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it outweighs the positive effect on innovation within the relevant market.191 This 
balancing test is sometimes used because competition law intervention can have an 
impact on the incentives to innovation due to its complexity. 
A.  The Incentives Balance test: An Economic Approach 
The incentives balance test has sparked debate from both economic and legal 
perspectives. For example,  it has been argued that the economic theory does not 
specify if innovation is driven by competition in itself or by dominant undertakings that 
enjoy market power.192 There is even an economic theory that argues that IPRs are not 
tools for innovation and that the presence of strong IPR can discourage innovation.193 
Moreover, it has been confirmed by findings conducted on the incentives balance test 
that it is problematic and complicated to apply; different efficiencies must be balanced 
via means of a case-by-case assessment.194 It was further argued that the evaluation of 
a compulsory license under this test leads to legal uncertainty.195  
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The Commission in the Microsoft case has described the balancing test as an 
assessment of ‘whether Microsoft’s arguments regarding its incentives to innovate 
outweigh these exceptional circumstances’.196 Nonetheless, the Commission has 
demonstrated that a compulsory licence can be granted when its negative impact on 
Microsoft’s incentives to innovate is overshadowed by the positive effect on the 
industry’s innovation as a whole.197 It can be seen here that there are two steps for the 
assessment of the incentive balance test. The first step is determining the negative 
impact on the incentives to innovate with a compulsory licence. The second step is 
assessing whether the positive impact outweighs the adverse effect of a compulsory 
licence on the industry as a whole.  
Some commentators such as Geradin have criticised the incentives balance test198 as 
he has suggested that the balancing tests are unpredictable and unreliable. Geradin 
further argued that economists might think of the balancing test not as valueless but 
more as a complicated method of balancing ex-ante against ex-post efficiencies. 
Additionally, Assistant Professor Mariateresa Maggiolino has deliberated different 
economic theories of competition and economic policy as part of her survey. The survey 
concluded that a final and unanimous microeconomic theory that clarifies change 
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economic growth and the interface between competition and innovation does not 
exist.199 Indeed, the economic perspective in the patent system is increasingly growing.  
However, a ‘new system for intellectual property rights’ has been called out by Thurrow 
as he suggested that the economic perspective is insufficient without a new system.200 
It was also argued that the mainstream economic theory is not persuasive and is for a 
matter of fact disappointing due to its vagueness on this matter.201 For example, it was 
stipulated by Killick202 that the balancing test brings legal uncertainty as the Commission 
did not provide guidance on the assessment of a compulsory licence via means of 
balancing incentives to innovate against the positive impact on a relevant market. Killick 
further argued that it is tough for expert economists to identify an appropriate 
balancing test; it is challenging for the test to predict the balancing of IP incentives to 
innovate within the short and long term.203 Therefore, Killick argued that the 
Commission’s balancing test appears not to take into consideration the main aim of IPR 
which is to safeguard the moral rights for the protected right and to guarantee reward 
to the right-holder for the creative efforts made to obtain such a right.204  
Professor Lévêque conducted a comparative economic study205 on the incentives to 
innovate test with the new product test based on the ECJ’s decisions in Magill and IMS 
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and the incentives balance test that was initiated by the Commission in the Microsoft 
case. It was suggested that it is challenging to apply the new product test206 which was 
set out to establish if a refusal to license would harm consumers and deprive them of a 
new product. The application of the new product test has been considered challenging 
because there is no legal or economic definition of the ‘newness’ test. It was further 
argued that the newness test leads to uncertainty because the demand of the 
consumers is impossible to test as this new product is only in its initial stages of the 
innovative process. Therefore, it was suggested that the courts should avoid evaluating 
a compulsory licence with the newness and the loss of consumers tests in the case of 
the refusal to license a product.207 
On the other hand, Lévêque argued that the incentives balance test is a much better 
method for determining the benefits to consumers. It was suggested that the theory of 
economics highlights that consumers benefit from valued developments by businesses 
when incentives to innovate are present. Usually, businesses aim to expand their profit 
with R&D investments when an opportunity arises. It was further argued that courts 
are not as aware as businesses of how essential new products are to consumers. 
Accordingly, companies would hesitate to develop an existing product if they are 
uncertain whether there would be consumer demand for it.208 The economic theory has 
seen IPR as an effective mechanism that provides incentives to innovate. Nevertheless, 
recent economic views suggest that IPRs can hinder innovation. Therefore, it was 
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argued that the incentives balance test is essential from an economic perspective to 
examine whether or not an IPR is, in fact, hindering innovation. 209 
B. The Incentives Balance: A Legal Outlook 
The relation between competition and IP law focuses on innovation, and thus, the 
incentives balance test has been suggested to be relevant from a legal perspective.  This 
relevancy is because the two legal systems aim to encourage innovation and 
technological development, as well as to enhance consumer welfare. It has been 
suggested that the Lisbon Strategy and the Commission acknowledge the significance 
of promoting innovation and maintaining the incentives to invest in the relevant market 
via means of granting exclusive IPRs.210  
The incentives balance test adopted by the Commission appears to focus on examining 
the best mechanism to encourage innovation as well as to enhance consumer welfare. 
Nonetheless, it was highlighted that it is tough to establish a coherent and predictable 
structure that is used to decide the circumstances of which right-holder can be found 
in abuse of its dominant position. Therefore, commentators examined the incentives 
balance test from a legal perspective to establish whether or not it provides an 
adequate framework to determine such circumstances. 211 
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It was highlighted that the Commission in its Microsoft’s judgement has diverted from 
the ECJ’s previous decisions. The ECJ had used the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test in 
previous case law, whereas the Commission shifted towards an ‘entirety of the 
circumstances’ test and undertook an incentives balance test. It has been argued that 
the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test makes better sense than the ‘entirety of 
circumstances’ test, and thus, the Commission’s decision must be based on an 
assessment of all aspects and circumstances of the case.212 Moreover, the Commission 
did not provide any guidelines for dominant businesses so that they can test whether 
or not their conduct is indeed abusive and identify when they are under an obligation 
to license their IPR. It was even suggested that the Commission’s legal analysis made 
the situation even more unclear due to shifting its investigation from the conditions 
seen in previous case law such as Magill and IMS.213 
Either way, it is clear that there is inconsistency in EU case law which can make the 
outcome of planned conduct unpredictable for businesses. The Commission’s 
judgement was unpredictable as its approach to the matter was relaxed. However, it 
was still claimed that the Commissions’ lenient approach does not suggest that the ECJ’s 
criteria in previous case laws were either any clearer or more precise.214 Indeed, 
innovation has also been considered as a vital element especially in the new product’s 
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requirement as seen in both Magill and IMS. The court adopted a new product test to 
examine the balance between the owner’s right to exclusive IPR and the advantages of 
a new product where there is possible consumer demand. Nonetheless, as mentioned 
earlier and as argued by professor Lévêque, it is not easy to define what is exactly a 
‘new product’. It is important to highlight here that it has been considered problematic 
that the incentives balance test set in the Microsoft case is a predominant criterion that 
outweighs the standards set in previous case law as the Commission still ordered a 
compulsory licence without fulfilling the standards set in Magill.215  
Certainly, the ECJ has acknowledged the significance of innovation as seen in previous 
case law and before the incentives test was adopted by the Commission. The concept 
of innovation and its importance makes the incentives balancing test indeed valuable, 
primarily due to directing most of its attention on the examination of innovation. As 
mentioned earlier, Lévêque has compared both of the new product test and incentives 
balancing test and has reached to the conclusion that the incentives balancing test is a 
suitable way of examining the advantages to the consumers whilst appreciating IPRs. 
He then compared this to the fact that the newness element in the new product test is 
challenging and most certainly hard to define or even to evaluate consumer loss with 
the deprivation of a ‘new’ product. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, this does not 
mean that the incentives balance test is a better method that provides clearer or more 
consistent evaluation of incentives to innovation, because such a test is mainly based 
on economic theory making it contradictory, as well as challenging.  
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Moreover, it has been suggested by Kallaugher disagrees with the economic approach 
used to determine the boundary between core intellectual property rights, whose 
existence is not, impacted by competition law and the non-core exercise of IPR, which 
is subject to competition law. Kallaugher argued that an economic appraisal of core IPR 
is undesirable given their function of promoting dynamic rather than static efficiencies 
and their operation by generalised incentives rather than case-specific economic 
analysis; and that it is also inconsistent with the concepts of existence, specific subject-
matter and essential function developed in the case laws of the EU Courts. On 
Kallaugher’s analysis, cases of abusive refusal to license have been concerned with 
exceptional circumstances where IPRs restrict dynamic efficiencies.216 
In addition to the above, empirical evidence regarding identifying the exclusionary 
practices that are harmful is essential for the sake of legal certainty. It was indicated 
here that economic theory would be useful when there is no empirical evidence.217 It 
was further argued that both economic theory and empirical evidence on the incentives 
balance test are essential for the sake of legal certainty.218 However, it is not easy to 
gather such evidence as it is a complicated matter with an inconsistent set of theories 
and analysis. The fact that the Commission did not provide any guidance makes it even 
more difficult to interpret the test transparently.  
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Moreover, Ezrachi covered matters related to market power and abuse. The 
developments of case laws of the EU Courts on refusal to licence were summarised, and 
a study was conducted on the Commission’s Guidance on enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct. The article 
identified some requirements, like consumer harm and anti-competitive foreclosure, to 
be used to help determine the outcome when examining the priorities. However, it has 
been argued that this approach is irrelevant as these requirements do not create 
criteria of infringement to the substantive prohibition. Further, the remark that a 
refusal to license will only be abusive in exceptional circumstances is a consequence of 
the requirements applied to determine infringement rather than an independent 
criterion of infringement. Although, it is true that the ECJ’s decision in IMS Health said 
that a refusal to license was only abusive if it prevented the emergence of a new 
product not supplied by a dominant undertaking, a less restrictive approach was 
adopted in Microsoft and followed in the Commission’s Guidance.219 
Further, antitrust intervention here can be applied as per legal precedent or economic 
justifications. The ECJ has used a ‘checklist’ flexible approach to help identify some of 
the conditions that have to be available in a particular case. This approach, arguably, 
has provided legal certainty to some degree for businesses in identifying the 
circumstances for antitrust intervention. Nonetheless, the incentives balancing test 
used by the Commission in the Microsoft case had a negative impact on antitrust 
intervention approach. The case-by-case examination of the positive and negative 
implications of antitrust intervention and the balancing of advantages to competition 
with incentives to innovate can be seen as a challenging task. In the practical sense, it 
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could be feared that such an assessment can shift the attention from the prohibition of 
abusive practices towards an examination of the markets. Such a shift can lead to the 
court finding a business in abuse of its dominant position whenever a market can be 
more competitive even when there is no visible abusive conduct.  
Even though the case-by-case evaluation of the positive and negative impacts on 
incentives to innovate by antitrust intervention is not attractive in the practical sense 
due to the unpredictability and uncertainty of such an assessment as it can lead to 
inconsistent findings, it still appears to be appealing in theory.220  The following section 
searches whether the right to grant a voluntary right has now become an obligation, 
especially following all the new tests introduced to determine abuse of dominance, 
such as the incentives to innovate and the essential facilities doctrine which both fall 
under the exceptional circumstances test.   
VIII. THE RIGHT TO GRANT VOLUNTARY LICENCES- A RIGHT OR OBLIGATION?  
 
A compulsory licence is meant to operate as a last resort as its mere existence 
encourages the patent holder to work and voluntary licence its patent. It was suggested 
that the existing compulsory licensing system had accelerated voluntary licences,221 
such as those that fall under FRAND terms. Right holders appear to be more willing to 
sign a licence agreement so that they escape the risk of a compulsory licence. Some 
may favour the compulsory licensing system as it adds pressure on the right holder to 
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voluntary licence. Although such a pressure deters any delays and costs of prolonged 
negotiations,222 it is critical for the law to be clear on the determination of compulsory 
licences in order not to unnecessarily force and pressurise a patent holder into 
voluntary licensing. 
Moreover, it has been suggested by Minn223 that the balance between competition law 
and the patent law is challenging as seen, for example, in IMS Health224 when it assessed 
whether a dominant patent holder must grant a voluntary licence to its competitor 
following Article 102 TFEU. It has been highlighted that Article 28 of the TRIPS 
Agreement identifies rights to conclude voluntary licence agreements, and, as a general 
rule, it does not oblige dominant undertakings to grant voluntary licences.   
The essential facilities doctrine225 obliges a business that is in control of the essential 
facility to make the facility available to competitors via means of a compulsory licence.  
It was stipulated that the essential facilities doctrine is essential for a valid patent 
system that balances private and public interests. 226It has been further suggested that 
it is important for the compulsory licensing system of the TRIPS to include the 
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consideration of public policy.227 Lui reasoned that competition and IP authorities 
should enforce the compulsory licensing system under a well-defined essential facilities 
doctrine, so that market competition is maintained by preventing a dominant 
undertaking from extending its dominance to other markets when it refuses to license 
on reasonable terms.228 
On the other hand, Minn argued that the essential facilities doctrine should be limitedly 
applied in cases of compulsory licences. The limited scope of its applicability is because 
compulsory licensing under this doctrine is only relevant when a ‘new’ product is 
provided by the competitor in a secondary market whereby the patent could be 
measured as an essential facility. In other words, it would be challenging for the 
competitor to bring a patented product in a market without the infringement of the 
patent holder’s exclusive rights.229 
It has been highlighted that the IMS Health led to questioning whether Article 102 TFEU 
benefits or undermines the IP system.230  Minn argued that the compulsory licensing 
system had been seen to serve as an alternative remedy to the challenges of the patent 
system. Nevertheless, the judgement of the case has also resulted in questioning 
whether it is necessary or even desirable for Article 102 TFEU to be a built-in remedy 
for the IP system.231 
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Ultimately, competition law intervention is essential when the conduct of right holders 
lead to adverse effects on competition. However, it has been debated by Minn that it is 
essential to establish what is unlawful conduct through differentiating between 
competition on merits232 and anti-competitive practice that destructs competition. 
Accordingly, it was argued that the court could only enforce liability and grant a 
compulsory licence when the harmful effect on the competition process has been 
underlined.233 
In the following section of the literature review, a business community perspective has 
been explored to address the discouragement of the over the top competition law 
intervention. 
IX. A BUSINESS COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE  
This section examines the business perspective on matters related to innovation, 
patents and competition. It first covers IP corporate management perspective and, 
second, it examines BIAC’s perspective which is followed by an exploration of potential 
prospects for patent and competition officials to work together at the early stages and 
then to underline the need for a predictable legal system. This section finally raises the 
question of harmonisation as a potential remedy. 
A) IP Corporate Management Perspective 
Denoncourt has called for the incorporation of IP corporate perspective utilising IP 
rights in business management in order to understand and better manage them. This 
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utilisation would require IP owners to embed an IP corporate management system that 
helps determine existing IPRs, prevent duplications and infringements, identity market 
movements, keep a record of potential competitors and spot possible collaborators.234 
B) BIAC’s Perspective 
The Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the OECD usually provides a 
business community perspective on matters related to innovation, patents and 
competition. It has been previously noted that one of the main concerns of competition 
is ensuring that competition law does not negatively affect IPR and innovation.235 It has 
been highlighted that patent laws should protect businesses and allow them to 
innovate and invent freely. Moreover, such rights must not be weakened by excessive 
restriction of competition laws. The following has been conveyed, for instance, in 
communication by Thomas O. Barnett, an Assistant Attorney General from the Antitrust 
Division Department of Justice: 
[S]trong intellectual property protection is not separate from competition principles, but 
rather, is an integral part of antitrust policy as a whole. Intellectual property rights 
should not be viewed as protecting their owners from competition; rather, IP rights 
should be seen as encouraging firms to engage in competition, particularly competition 
that involves risk and long-term investment. Properly applied, strong intellectual 
property protection creates the competitive environment necessary to permit firms to 
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profit from their inventions, which encourages innovation effort and improves dynamic 
efficiency.236 
The abovementioned discourages extreme intervention and overregulation to tackle 
market imbalances. Thereby, restrictions on patents and innovation must be carefully 
applied with particular attention on issues related to compulsory licencing as well as 
the intervention with licencing terms that are based on FRAND conditions.  
It has been suggested that competition law authorities must tackle such concerns in a 
policy perspective and should deal with this matter with great caution and eliminate 
any uncertainties in this area of law.  Without a doubt, clarity in the law would boost 
the confidence of investors to invest in innovation.237 Accordingly, it was argued that 
the notion of private property rights allows the right to exclude others from enjoying 
the property and thus, IPRs fall in the category of private rights and should be treated 
similarly to any other property. It was claimed that competition laws must, to some 
extent, deal with IPRs the same way they would deal with other types of property. It 
was argued that this approach would provide businesses with some level of 
predictability and certainty, as well as ensuring consistency with IP laws in this matter. 
For instance, the US Licensing Guidelines also states that IPRs are regarded as any other 
form of property.238 Likewise, the Canadian IPEGs  claims the following: 
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 [T]he analytical framework that the Bureau uses to determine the presence of anti-
competitive effects stemming from the exercise of rights to other forms of property is 
sufficiently flexible to apply to conduct involving IP, even though IP has important 
characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of property.239 
 Such a standard that deals with IPRs as other types of property is titled as the ‘bedrock 
principle’ of competition enforcement policy,240 which suggests that IPRs are not 
protected from competition examination and neither should they be exceptionally 
questioned by competition laws.241 
C) Prospects for Patent and Competition Officials to Work Together at the Early 
Stages 
Numerous experts, some of which mentioned in this chapter, have provided different 
possible remedies to improve the correlation of patent and competition law. 
Improvements to the patent ‘quality’ have been the main focus of some experts, as 
suggestions were made to ensure that patents meet the legislative standards for 
patentability via means of a thorough examination at the early stages of patents’ 
applications.242  
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In addition to the above, suggestions relevant to the patent system have been made in 
a 2004 roundtable, which highlighted the lack of resources and technical expertise. It 
was also advised that competition authorities must have some authority in IP granting 
and helping IP offices in improving such a process. It has been further suggested that it 
is imperative to assign experts to study the patenting system of a specific country, as 
well as holding hearings with academics, industry participants, and practitioners. It was 
suggested this could provide a greater understanding of both fields of law and thus, 
improve IP policies.243 Supplementary, it has also been proposed that officials in the 
fields of both patents and competition law should meet regularly to share their ideas 
on patents, and discuss how patent policies could be further improved. 244 
However, it has been argued that competition agencies do not have the required 
expertise to plan or apply patent policy, yet their participation and comments could be 
helpful.245 It has been further argued that this approach will also benefit society as a 
whole, because patent organisations are usually attentive to their clients’ interests, 
whereas competition organisations aim at improving the economy.246 Additionally, 
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various competition agencies have attempted to portray how they contribute to 
developing the patent policy further. For instance, joint hearings on patent policy and 
competition were held by the US Federal Trade Commission and Department for 
Justice. It was followed by a report directed to the courts, Congress, and Patent and 
Trademark Office. This report contained proposals on how competition authorities can 
progress patents’ quality and how to decrease the effects of competition law on the 
patent system.  
Indeed, the early intervention of competition laws in the patent system has been 
argued by some to be the best method to reduce or eliminate market power enjoyed 
by patent holders in a relevant market. The reason for this direct intervention approach 
is because there are numerous instances where businesses have been compelled to 
licence their IP due to infringing competition law. Nonetheless, Shapiro argued that 
compulsory licence might not be the ideal method of dealing with this issue, especially 
if a right holder does not want to licence its patent;  
When a private party is granted a patent . . . giving the owner exclusive rights over 
certain intellectual property, and then antitrust rules are interpreted to require that 
these rights be licensed to others, public policy and the law are confused and 
contradictory. Apart from undermining precisely the exclusive rights that were granted, 
compulsory licensing raises the thorny issue of the terms and conditions on which such 
licences must be granted.247 
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It has been argued that granting compulsory licences of patents that have critical 
economic roles does not make sense. In other words, imposing compulsory licences on 
patent holders who acquire market power would weaken inventors’ rights when their 
innovations are the most valuable. It has been further suggested that patents and 
competition are best supported by cautiously outlining the property rights conferred by 
the patent system, in order to ensure patent rights are just provided for real 
innovations.248  
Thus, Shapiro concluded that it best to remedy the issues such concerns by revisiting 
the patent system, contrary to using competition laws to solve such matters. The 
Competition Committee has also supported this point of view.249  
D)  A Predictable Legal System is Necessary for Investments in Innovation 
We have been reminded by Denoncourt that individuals have been facing challenges in 
predicting, controlling, managing and even understanding the future.250  The urgent 
need for a transparent and predictable IPRs system is mainly because the market 
possesses many innovations that create dynamic competition and technological 
advances.251 Thus, the protection of IPRs has rapidly increased within the past twenty 
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years.252 Usually, patent owners enjoy the freedom of deciding if and how they want to 
licence their patents. This freedom can be restricted with the controversial use of 
competition laws on patents and various experts agree on the fact that the use of 
competition laws must not be broadly applied as it can have an adverse effect on 
innovation.253  
Accordingly, competition law intervention must be carefully measured following an 
extensive review of the specifics of a case, and only with the presence of explicit abusive 
conduct of significant market power.254 Nevertheless, specialists and scholars disagree 
on the means that should be used by the courts for evaluating abuses of innovation and 
competition by dominant undertakings. Such varying opinions are mainly due to the 
challenging task of anticipating when patents would possess an abuse to innovation and 
completion.255 Few commentators stressed that it is best if the intervention of 
competition laws on competitive harm is based on facts, instead of relying on mere 
predictions of competitive harm, yet others have disagreed with this approach as 
intervention would come too late leading to long-term damage to the market. 
Therefore, conservative measures must be adopted, especially in regards to the 
effectiveness of interventions to eliminate competitive harm. 
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E)  Is There a Need to Encourage Harmonisation?  
Not only has it been encouraged to harmonise competition law at an EU level, but also 
an international level. The potential need for international harmonisation is mainly due 
to businesses increasingly operating on an international level. Therefore, the 
harmonisation of competition laws is deemed necessary.256 The international 
harmonisation in the context of competition law and patents is challenging and possibly 
impossible.257 For example, different approaches are adopted by the EU and US 
competition authorities, and this can be seen in claims brought against Microsoft for its 
abusive behaviour. It has been argued that the Commission has interfered with the 
sharing of IP rights more than the courts in the United States would have interfered258.  
Nonetheless, it has been debated that it is essential for businesses to have consistency 
in the decisions of authorities worldwide. Efforts to arrive at some level of 
harmonisation of competition law principles and their interpretation are needed to 
encourage businesses to invest and adequately protect patent rights. 
At an EU level, the common law Member States such as the UK and Ireland,259 have not 
been enthusiastic about the harmonisation of competition laws, particularly in the 
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context of anti-competitive practices.260 In addition to the statutory objectives, the 
harmonisation of competition law is not accepted also due to political reasons as it is 
believed to have a negative impact on competition as well as the economy. For instance, 
governments, businesses, trade unions and consumer organisations took advantage of 
their political authority to prevent or put an end to the harmonisation process that had 
started in the 1960s. It has been argued that ‘in a way the world is divided over how far 
it is legitimate to extent civil obligations which inevitably inhibit the freedom of traders 
to compete in the course of competition.’261 It has been even further stipulated that 
competition law signify ‘an area in which pitfalls, obstacles, snares and traps abound.’262 
In another study conducted by Kamperman Sanders, it was deliberated that ‘despite 
these different legal views there are clear indications that the desire of a system of 
minimum intervention on the field of competition law features high on the policy 
agenda’.263 It was added by Schricker that ‘many have doubted whether legal 
harmonisation is necessary at all.’264 Nevertheless, it was still argued that it is ‘in no way 
appears to be a lost, but a real chance to consolidate the internal market.’265 
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According to the arguments above, it appears that the developments that recently took 
place in the EU Market are also in favour of harmonising the laws of competition 
particularly in the context of anti-competitive conduct of dominant undertakings. This 
new attitude is mainly due to the growing exchange of goods and services between the 
Member States. Therefore, the harmonisation of the law has been indicated to aid in 
addressing the matter of compulsory licensing.266 On the other hand, it has been 
highlighted by Hickman267 that the harmonisation of IPRs in the EU would be highly 
challenging for successful dominant businesses. The interface of broad EU competition 
law with domestic IPRs could lead to patent holders having limited power over how 
they wish to license or use their IPRs.268 
X. RATIONALISING THE RULE OF LAW APPROACH 
This section aims to rationalise the rule of law approach as a means of assessing the 
degree of predictability, legal certainty and consistency that is being offered to patent 
holders during an or a potential competition law intervention. 
As addressed in this chapter, the evaluation of IPRs is not easily identified under Article 
102 TFEU. It was, thus, argued by Hull that relation between competition law and IP is 
‘hazardous’269 as competition law appears to take a holistic approach concerning abuse 
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of dominance. This approach could be due to the lack of particular laws set to deal with 
the different types of IPRs or their relevant market.270 
The determination of abusive conduct has been outlined under the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ approach.271 Nonetheless, the competition law intervention has been 
expanded over the years as can be seen in the Commission’s  2005 decision where it 
found that  AstraZeneca (AB) and AstraZeneca Plc (AZ) had infringed Article 102 TFEU.272 
AZ decided to appeal the judgement before the GC, and the fine has been successfully 
reduced to €52,500 million. The GC found that Commission was unsuccessful in 
demonstrating how AZ’s conduct impacted parallel imports to both Norway and 
Denmark.273 AZ decided to appeal further to the ECJ in 2012, but the appeal was 
dismissed.274  
The abovementioned case is important for various reasons. The assessment of 
dominance, for instance, was set against a narrow market.275 However, market 
dominance is more easily established in a narrow market definition. Moreover, it was 
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suggested that the earlier cases of ‘exceptional circumstances’ was not applied and 
instead the court had resorted to the ‘essential facilities doctrine’. 276 Hull suggested 
that broad language was used in that case will probably have a negative impact on the 
innovation purpose of patents.277 
The doctrine of the rule of law and legal certainty and consistency in the decision-
making is essential for dominant undertakings as it provides them with the necessary 
degree of clarity and predictability to make well-informed decisions as to whether or 
not their practices are abusive.  
Indeed, competition law appreciates the fact that predictability is essential. The ability 
to run a successful business and make the informed decisions concerning investments 
require the ability to predict its outcomes. Increased uncertainty would not only lead 
to extra costs, but it can also affect the survival of a business in a relevant market, and 
it can have a negative impact on the economy. Thus, it is of great importance to have 
clear guidelines, guidance and standards that provide predictability and legal certainty.  
Given the fact that, businesses must assess its incentives to innovate against the 
possible positive effect of a compulsory licence in a relevant market. A business must, 
therefore, examine whether or not a compulsory licence has a negative impact on the 
business itself regarding its incentives to innovate. If it has a negative impact, the 
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business must then compare the negative impact on its incentives to innovate with the 
negative impact on the market as a whole to determine which outweighs the other.   
 However, the Commission did not provide clear guidelines for businesses to evaluate 
the outcomes of a compulsory licence in its balancing test.278 This is worrying as the 
Commission have left the matter open for broader interpretations leading to legal 
uncertainty and unpredictability for businesses to foresee its outcome. Commentators 
have highlighted the need for the Commission and the ECJ to provide further legal 
certainty, predictability and consistency in their decision making concerning the 
determination of a compulsory licence. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
 All in all, it can be noted that there are a variety of views on the difficult issues which 
arise in the application of competition law to IP. As arguments and references are 
available to support different propositions, nonetheless, it there is no single, systematic 
exposition or a grand, unifying theory.  
The following chapter examines the rule of law doctrine and explores the main 
contributions delivered by different scholars in order to help shape the elements of the 
rule of law doctrine that are to be adopted throughout this research. Accordingly, this 
research examines the legal system and the effectiveness of competition law 
intervention from a rule of law perspective. The rule of law approach is used to highlight 
and assess the extent of uncertainty and unpredictability in available case law and how 
effective has been competition law in achieving its aims and objectives without 
jeopardising and undermining the essence of IPRs.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RULE OF LAW DOCTRINE   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dominant undertakings can find it hard to predict the outcome of their planned conduct 
when there are existing inconsistencies in EU case law. Arguably, the uncertainties in 
this area of law could be due to the existing differences between the economic and 
legal understandings of IPRs.279  However, innovation is encouraged by a high level of 
IPRs protection, as well as a compelling mix of freedom and competition.280 
Undoubtedly, legal certainty, predictability and consistency compromise some of the 
elements of the rule of law doctrine. Therefore, the research stresses that undertakings 
must enjoy the right to predict and anticipate when their practices could be unlawful.  
Regulatory uncertainties make it extremely difficult for successful businesses to make 
plans for investments and predict the outcome of their decision making. Moreover, 
regulatory certainty, predictability and consistency could be beneficial not only to 
patent holders but also to the economy as a whole. Although EU competition 
intervention can sometimes be necessary, it should still aim to provide a high level of IP 
protection for IP holders by facilitating a higher degree of legal certainty and 
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predictability. This approach would avoid potential and unnecessary adverse impacts 
on economic development.  
The rule of law is a broad topic as it can, in itself, form a part of an extensive study.  This 
chapter mainly focuses on some of the most prominent definitions, formulations and 
principles of the rule of law that respond to the concerns of this thesis regarding legal 
uncertainty with competition law’s retroactive intervention. The overall research aim is 
to identify whether competition law intervention achieves its desired outcomes in 
coherence with the concept of the rule of law.  To do so, it would be relevant to address 
some of the most prominent definitions and principles of the rule of law, incorporating 
its formal and substantive perspectives, as well as its application in a legal system that 
follows the doctrine.  The contributions to the definitions and values of the rule of law 
are used throughout the thesis, in particular, the concluding chapter, to assess the 
compliance with the doctrine in circumstances of competition law intervention.  
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II.  DEFINITIONS AND SOME THEORIES ON THE DOCTRINE 
There is no definite or uniform description of the rule of law and its principles, yet the 
doctrine features a vital role in both modern law and politics as it has been considered 
as ‘the most important political ideal today.’281 Some scholars have included elements 
of predictability and legality in their formal perspective, and others have included 
elements of human rights and democracy in their substantive perspective.  
Generally speaking, the rule of law ensures that the law is supreme.282 The supremacy 
of law has been linked with both formal and substantive formulations of the doctrine. 
Some commentators have indicated that institutional structures must follow formal 
procedures to the rule of law in order to safeguard that the law is supreme. The rule of 
law’s formal principle covers matters related to how society should be administered, 
such as generality, predictability, consistency, clarity and prospective law. The 
procedural characteristics of the rule of law include the functioning of the norms and 
independent judicial system.283 Others have determined that the doctrine must also 
comprise different substantive elements that ensure such a supremacy.284 The 
doctrine’s substantive approach has been controversial, particularly concerning liberty 
and private property rights.285 It has been debated, for instance, that the rule of law 
concept should remain formal and separated from democracy and human rights.286 This 
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viewpoint is because a nation might adhere to the rule of law as one element of the 
social-political complex, but still have flaws regarding poverty, public health and more. 
287 The formal interpretation of the doctrine does not include any obligations as to the 
content of the law.288 It does, nevertheless, stress on the importance of having clear, 
well-known, specific, prospective, general and equal law.  
The rule of law has been described in the Oxford English Dictionary as the following: 
The authority and influence of law in society, esp. when viewed as a constraint on 
individual and institutional behaviour; (hence) the principle whereby all members of 
society (including those in government) are considered equally subject to publicly 
disclosed legal codes and processes.289 
Similarly, Tamanaha has expressed that the rule of law ensures ‘government officials 
and citizens are bound by and abide by the law. I repeat: government officials and 
citizens are bound by and abide by the law.’290 Tamanaha has suggested that this 
definition provides the ‘minimum content of the rule of law’  and some might insert 
further aspects to this definition, yet no one will disagree with a rule of law that does 
not consist of any less than this basic definition.291 Similarly, Raz defined the rule of law 
as the following: 
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‘The rule of law means literally what it says: the rule of law. Taken in its broadest sense 
this means that people should obey the law and be ruled by it.’292  
Another central input to the formal formulation of the doctrine has been made by 
Dicey’s293 which indicates the following:  
No man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a 
distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary 
courts of the land. In this sense [,] the rule of law is contrasted with every system of 
government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or 
discretionary powers of constraint.294 
Some have not welcomed Dicey’s definition of the rule of law. It has been argued by 
Craig, for example, that Dicey had underestimated the impact of discretionary power,295 
even though discretionary power existed during the writing of his study as it was 
considered essential for the development of governmental power.296 Craig also 
indicated that Dicey’s viewpoint on the rule of law could be seen as a substantive one 
due to his use of the word ‘arbitrary’ which has substantive content.297 However, the 
word arbitrary could have a substantive element only if Dicey had intended to use it to 
reflect on a law that infringes fundamental rights. Regardless, Dicey’s approach is 
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formal as the use of the word arbitrary was not meant to examine whether the content 
of law is just or not.298   This argument can be further supported by the fact that Dicey 
has expressed the following: 
We mean… when we speak of the ‘rule of law’ as characteristic of our country, not only 
that with us no man is above the law, but (what is different thing) that here every man, 
whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.299 
The content of the law itself is not a matter of concern to the formal formulation of the 
rule of law as it is more attentive on fulfilling the formal principles.300 It is, thus, clear 
from the above that Dicey did not include elements of substantive equality as he mainly 
tackled the means of passing the law and the clear subsequent norms. 
Other notable contributions have been made by many economists that have identified 
that the rule of law mainly signifies ‘the protection of property rights’.301 For example, 
F. A. Hayek recognised the doctrine as the following:  
Stripped of all technicalities this means that government in all its actions is bound by 
rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair 
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certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to 
plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.302   
As can be seen from the above, Hayek’s substantive viewpoint of the rule of law calls 
for economic freedom as it adds restrictions on governmental interference and 
discretion.303 Hayek considers that the rule of law should guarantee certainty so that 
individuals can plan their future and make contracts in a free market.304 Hayek stressed 
the importance for individuals to have the confidence and trust in the legal system 
when making plans and investment decisions. Hayek further suggested that: 
 Under the Rule of Law [,] the government is prevented from stultifying the individual 
efforts by ad hoc action. Within the known rules of the game [,] the individual is free to 
pursue personal ends and desires, certain that the powers of the government will not be 
used deliberately to frustrate his efforts. 305  
It can be argued that Hayek’s formulation of the rule of law is well supported; 
investments are discouraged when the rule of law is fragile and when there is a rise in 
discretionary regulatory enforcement. An empirical study has showcased that US firms 
left international investments due to an increase in discretionary regulatory 
enforcement.306 
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Other definitions of the rule of law have included elements of human rights and 
democracy, such as the definition provided by the UN as the following: 
‘A principle of governance’ in which everyone is ‘accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standard.’ Moreover, the legal 
system must ensure ‘supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the 
law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency.’307 
The abovementioned definition includes a substantive approach to the doctrine as it 
incorporated the protection of individual rights. There are also substantive approaches 
to the rule of law that compromise elements of democracy in its interpretations.308  
Martin Krygier and Philip Selznick309 have quite similar perspectives on the rule of 
law.310 According to Selznick ‘only the analysis of particular institutions or social spheres 
will tell us what rules and procedures are appropriate, and only then can we take into 
account special needs and circumstances without perverting more standards of legality 
and morality.’311 Mutually Selznick and Krygier maintain that the doctrine is a distinctive 
‘master ideal’ for the practice of law.312 Further, Selznick identified that the rule of law 
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should reduce arbitrariness in positive law.313 Selznick emphasises that this perspective 
link the positive and negative notions of the rule of law.314 Although Selznick connects 
other values to the rule of law, Krygier had outlined the values that are derived from 
the rule of law.315 Krygier highlights that there some values are a vital part of the rule 
of law, while others can be eminent from it. All in all, both of these legal theories cover 
moral and legal value.316  
Furthermore, there are functional definitions to the rule of law which can be 
comparable to the substantive deliberations.317 The functional approach usually 
focuses on the performance of the legal system, the predictability of decision-making 
and limitations to administrative discretion. The functional attitude suggests that the 
rule of law could be stronger in countries where governmental authorities are given 
little discretion.318  
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Hayek, for example, has adopted a definition that combines both substantive and 
functional definitions to the doctrine.319 It has been contended, nevertheless, that this 
approach is flawed mainly since government discretion is sometimes necessary.320 In 
some circumstances, maintaining the rule of law might mean that government officials 
might need to resort to natural law to prosecute individuals who committed offences 
that are not covered in statutory law.321  Consequently, it was suggested that non-
arbitrary flexibility is sometimes needed to uphold the rule of law.322 It has even been 
stipulated that although the doctrine and flexibility are at odds with one another, 
sometimes flexibility is preferred.323  
Nonetheless, Li Shuguang has distinguished ‘rule by law’ and ‘rule of law’ in his 
definition as the following:  
 ‘The difference… is that, under the rule of law, the law is preeminent and can serve as 
check against the abuse of power. Under the rule by law, the law is a mere tool for 
government, that suppresses in a legalistic fashion.’324 
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As can be noted from above, there are different formulations to the rule of law with no 
uniform definition to the doctrine.325 The rule of law is not easy to define as many 
scholars endeavoured to identify the meaning of the doctrine and its central values.326 
The two main formulations of the rule of know known as ‘thick’ and ‘thin’, and are also 
referred to as the ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ are discussed further below.  
III. FORMAL, PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS 
Many theorists have stipulated the principles of the rule of law. As mentioned above, 
these principles can be divided into formal, procedural and substantive principles.  327 
A. Formal Aspects 
The eight formal elements of the rule of law as highlighted by fuller can be summarised 
as the following328: 
1. Generality 
2. Congruence 
3. Consistency 
4. No retroactive law 
5. Promulgation 
6. Intelligibility 
7. Predictability 
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8. Stability  
The abovementioned principles are considered as formal ones to the rule of law 
because they have to be incorporated into any system of rules that governs the conduct 
of its individuals.329  
It has also been highlighted that officials must not settle all matters on a case-by-case 
basis as it is inadequate from a rule of law approach. 330 Bentham has even criticised 
customary and common law since judges were the ones to make many of rules as they 
were presented with a new matter331 which makes the source of law unclear.332 This 
point is interesting as it appears, following the case study conducted in later chapters, 
that the courts introduce new competition law intervention tests as they go along which 
could be concerning from a rule of law perspective. 
Inevitably, the rule of law suggests that the law has to be general, stable and available 
to the public. The law must not only be public, but it must also be publicised before 
making it necessary for individuals to adhere by them. They must also be accessible and 
intelligible to provide a reasonable degree of clarity. Any system of law that governs the 
conduct of its individuals must be consistent, realistic and straightforward as 
highlighted in Fuller’s formal features of the doctrine.  Fuller has indicated that 
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sometimes not all of these elements can be met due to moral, ethical or economic 
reasons. However, Fuller suggested that the need to resort to corrective retroactive 
legislation should be reduced to the minimum in order to safeguard clarity and publicity 
of the law and to provide sufficient guidance to the public in respect of their obligations 
and rights.333 
Fuller has also suggested that a whole legal order is achieved once all eight formal 
elements of the rule of law are, at least, reasonably met. If this is not achieved, it ‘does 
not simply result in a bad system of law’, but it actually ‘results in something that is not 
properly called a legal system at all’.334 Bentham has also highlighted that rules that are 
retroactive or secret fail to provide sufficient guidance unless officials are provided with 
a clear set of instructions as to how to operate in case of noncompliance.335  
Retroactive legislation connects new legal obligations to past conduct. The retroactive 
statute has received criticism because individuals may find it challenging to plan or 
predict the consequences of their conduct within a reasonable degree of certainty.336 
The legislation has been considered by Craies as retrospective when it is enacted 
following a matter that was there before its enactment.337 Similarly, a retrospective law 
has been defined by Sampford as the law that has legal consequences on the future of 
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past events. 338 The retroactive penal legislation is prohibited in some nations.339 Other 
constitutions prohibit any retroactive legislation.340 Whereas, some countries do not 
provide any limitations on legislative power in enacting retroactive legislation.341  
For this research, it is must be noted that competition law intervention is retroactive in 
nature. In other words, patent holders that have already protected their inventions as 
patents lose the exclusive right conferred under patent law with a competition law 
intervention.342 The private investments have already been made on the patent prior 
to a competition law intervention, and such investments cannot be returned.343 The 
attitude of the courts towards retroactive legislation and its implications must be 
considered, specifically in the light of the retroactive effect of competition law 
intervention. The main issue here is the fact that future incentives to invest are reduced 
with aggressive competition law interventions. It has, thus, been discussed that the 
reduction in future investments could have a significant impact on the market economy 
due to the retroactive force of a competition law intervention.344 
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B. Procedural Aspects 
The formal features of the rule of law do compliment the procedural aspects to the 
doctrine. Raz’s theory on the doctrine covered the fundamental principles and 
procedural formulation of the rule of law.345 Tashima had also prepared a list of 
minimum standards of procedural justice as the following: 
1. Impartial and independent judges in hearings. 
2. Hearings must provide: 
a) Right to counsel and representation.  
b) Right to be present in all important stages of the hearing. 
c) Right to provide evidence. 
d) Evidence must be reliable to be considered admissible in court.  
3. The right to appeal to an impartial tribunal in accordance to pre-established 
rules.346 
4. Hearings should be subject to judicial review.347 
5. The guarantee that courts and judges to be independent of other sectors of the 
government. In other words, separation of powers is another procedural 
requirement for the rule of law.348 The separation of powers was achieved in 
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England and Wales in 2009 as judiciary departed from the House of Lords and 
thus, now judges of the Supreme Court are separated from the House of 
Lords.349 
The procedural elements above aim to achieve fair and impartial hearings without the 
presence of rules that are vague, constantly changing or that are kept secret.350 It has 
been argued that ever since 2002 there has been a ‘black hole’351 regarding the legality 
of the American detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, mainly due to the lack of 
procedural rights.  The detainees claimed that the rule of law procedural principles have 
to be fulfilled by allowing them to appear before a legal tribunal to present their side in 
order to respond to evidence that had been presented against their favour. 352 
Certainly, procedural elements of the doctrine deserve as much attention as the formal 
principles.  
C. Substantive Theories 
Some theorists add substantive elements to the rule of law. It is believed by some that 
political ideals cannot be as sharply separated as Raz’s perspective.353 Clear, stable, 
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general, prospective and public rules link the doctrine with the conditions of liberty, yet 
the substantive features of the rule of law are to be distinguished from those 
specifications that provoke the formal and procedural conceptions of the doctrine.354  
 
Rawls has formulated four simple substantive elements. These principles first include 
that individuals should be capable of following the laws that are made by good faith. 
Second, situations that are similar should be similarly handled. Third, for an offence to 
exist, it must be previously outlined by the law and finally, principles of the independent 
and impartial judiciary.355 Rawls has also highlighted that designated and accessible 
institutions must manage equality and liberty, as well as economic and social 
matters.356  
Laws has also identified the content of constitutional rights,357 as well as the substance 
and meaning of fundamental rights. He has expressed that the courts have a crucial part 
in protecting fundamental rights.358 Laws’ formulation of the rule of law had included 
features of certainty, freedom and fairness. The freedom aspect of his formulation is a 
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substantive one, whereas certainty and fairness are associated with the formal 
principles of the doctrine.359  
Other substantive perspectives to the doctrine have stipulated that the protection of 
private property and clear legal policies for property rights constitute an essential 
aspect of the doctrine, such as Cass.360 Cass has also mentioned that ‘[a] critical aspect 
of the commitment to the rule of law is the definition and protection of property 
rights.’361 However, it has been stipulated by Epstein that ‘the rule of law is … a separate 
conception from private property.’362 It was also indicated that the connection of the 
doctrine and private property could be recognised via fundamental human rights and 
not the doctrine, in itself, yet the rule of law severely prohibits conduct that fails to 
respect fundamental human rights.363  
 
The connection of the rule of law and fundamental human rights has been highlighted 
by in the World Justice Project of 2011. It has been suggested that a substantive aspect 
of the doctrine is absent. It has also been argued that due to this absence, fundamental 
rights are not adequately protected with the vast discretionary power and 
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institutionalised discrimination. Thus, it was identified that a substantive view to the 
doctrine could respond to the criticism of ‘an empty vessel into which any law could be 
poured’ that the rule of law has received. 364 
Moreover, it was stipulated again in the World Justice Project of 2017-2018 that efforts 
must be made to 
[S]trike a balance between what scholars call a “thin” or minimalist conception of the 
rule of law that focuses on formal, procedural rules, and a “thick” conception that 
includes substantive characteristics, such as self-governance and various fundamental 
rights and freedoms.365 
 It has been even further stipulated the following: 
A balance between “thin” and “thick” conceptions of the rule of law’ enables the 
application of the doctrine to ‘different types of social and political systems, including 
those that lack many of the features that characterize democratic nations, while 
including sufficient substantive characteristics to render the rule of law as more than a 
system of rules.366 
The substantive formations of the doctrine aim to ensure the protection of core human 
rights. Without such protection, the rule of law would not be present whereby that 
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system of law can only be referred to as a ‘rule by law’ system.367 The following section 
of this chapter examines some of the challenges faced between the thick and thin 
theories of the doctrine.  
IV. SOME CHALLENGES WITHIN THE FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS 
On the one hand, the ‘thin’ theory on the rule of law is adopted by Raz as he firmly 
believes that ‘the rule of law is just one of the virtues which a legal system may possess 
and by which it is to be judged.’368 Although Raz has stressed that the objectives of the 
doctrine can be integrated into any political system, he has maintained that 
considerations of human rights, democracy and social justice should be separated from 
the formulation of the rule of law.369 Raz’s perspective aims to detach the idea of the 
rule of law from substantive elements that have already been established in the various 
literature.370 It has even been further argued that the incorporation of substantive 
principles would deprive the independence of the rule of law from political theories.371  
On the other hand, this viewpoint on the rule of law has received some criticism. It has 
been implied that the doctrine and supremacy of law can only be maintained when 
other fundamental standards, besides political objectives, are incorporated into the 
rule of law.372 Bingham, for instance, has embraced human rights as an integral element 
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of the rule of law and has disagreed with Raz’s ‘thin’ definition. Bingham has argued 
that a country that oppresses human rights cannot be seen as a country that adheres 
to the doctrine.373 Bingham indicated that he would like to see human right aspects 
linked with both formal and procedural conceptions of the doctrine.  
The above mentioned does not mean that the substantive approach to the doctrine has 
not been subject to criticisms. 374 For instance, it has also been maintained that the 
association of the rule of law with a substantive element of democracy as stipulated by 
Chaskalson is problematic.375 The incorporation of democracy is seen as an issue as it 
leaves a door open for favoured political opinions that can be integrated as substantive 
elements to the rule of law, such as favoured property rights, economic standards, 
human rights, democratic participation, social justice and civil liberties. The integration 
of political opinions could lead to a decline in political coherence.376 
Indeed, the rule of law ensures equality377 and predictability in order to make the 
procedures concerning rule-making transparent and its content adhere to the rule of 
law basic principles.378 It must also guarantee the right to access justice, the right to 
challenge a judgement made by public authorities and the right to challenge actions 
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made by private parties.379 An impartial institution or court must always administer the 
law-making and enforcement. These institutions will develop methodologies used in 
their decision making, but they must still comply with the elements of the rule of law.380 
The question that could be raised here is whether such institutions can diverge from its 
existing interpretations within its methodology in certain situations.  
Although specific values are central principles of the doctrine, the rule of law can still 
be comprehended into a broader standpoint. Undoubtedly, different shapes of the rule 
of law cannot be formulated appropriately unless the basics are included. Therefore, 
there could be room to inherent standards of the rule of law that include economic, 
social, political and cultural preferences. The following section of this chapter addresses 
why the rule of law should not be separated from the substantive values. 
V. THE VALUES UNDERLYING THE RULE OF LAW  
The formal approach to the rule of law does not suggest that the doctrine is formal in 
its value. The primary underlying values to the rule of law is that it guarantees more 
predictability and less arbitrary power while the law rules individuals.381 It is important 
to mention here that Raz has acknowledged that a negative value is linked with the rule 
of law; the law provides governments with a significant amount of power to mandate 
all sort of matters, and the rule of law aims at reducing the risks that have already been 
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created by the law.382 The reduction of such risks has been covered by the formal 
conceptions of the rule of law. The formal principles of the doctrine have a positive 
value even when the content of the law is morally unacceptable. Such a positive value 
can be seen when adherence with the rule of law mandates individuals to fulfil their 
obligations as set by the law.383 
Moreover, the substantive theory on the doctrine encourages liberty. An example of 
this can be seen in Hayek’s argument that predictability that is advanced with clear and 
prospective rules make contributions to an individual’s freedom.384 Bingham has also 
expressed that predictability is essential so that individuals can plan their lives and 
businesses. Bingham has also highlighted no one would want to invest in a country 
where the rights and obligations of individuals are uncertain.385  The consequences of 
legal uncertainty will thus have an impact on businesses and the economy.  
Further, legal certainty is essential for the freedom of individuals. Freedom in that sense 
is achievable only if individuals are aware of how the law functions and identify how 
they can act to evade breaches of the law. It is vital for individuals to be aware of the 
possible consequences of their conduct so that they can make fitting plans as to the 
obligations that can be derived, in advance, from the law.386  
Bentham has expressed the importance of legitimate expectations. Bentham has 
mentioned that legitimate expectations connect the existence of both our present and 
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future as it enables us to formulate our plan of conduct.387 Individuals need to be 
assured that they can count on the legal certainty of law concerning the protection 
offered to both property and personal rights so that individuals can plan their 
transactions. The rule of law could be hindered when authorities do not adhere to 
established norms or when they use their discretion, rather than the existing norms. 
The economic activity of people will decrease if they cannot form expectations to 
depend on as they do their planning or even when their expectations are not met. 388 
The above mentioned appears to be similar to Raz and Fuller’s perspectives on the rule 
of law. For instance, it has been indicated by Raz that freedom is an element of dignity 
as ‘respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning 
and plotting their future.’389 Additionally, Fuller has stipulated that the dignity must be 
respected through the principles of the inner morality of law. Fuller expressed that the 
dignity of people is insulted without the availability of public and prospective law.390 
This outlook stipulates that the law should govern individuals, but it must also treat 
them in a way that would fulfil their expectations via the application of the norms.  
 
The rule of law doctrine disagrees with many forms of arbitrary power, such as general 
rules that are established to serve self-interest. A government that embraces the rule 
of law doctrine does not alter the law for when it is best suited for them to do so as the 
doctrine values the ability to depend on stable law. The rule of law also aims to 
eliminate arbitrary power within the judiciary system so that individuals can trust the 
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law that is being applied by the relevant authorities.391 Furthermore, the importance of 
the rule of law has been outlined by Hayek as an umbrella to the freedom of individuals. 
Hayek’s standpoint on the doctrine values the importance of respecting human dignity, 
as well as, their right to control their life.392 
It can be noted from the above that the doctrine in the substantive sense is significant 
as it allows individuals to have a stable, consistent, non-arbitrary law that must respect 
human rights and human dignity.  Nevertheless, full adherence to the rule of law 
doctrine could be highly challenging. Whole conformity could be impossible due to 
some degree of inevitable vagueness in the law. Consequently, it has been indicated 
that general compliance with the rule of law is more feasible and more realistic than 
full conformity.393 The research, thus, does not argue the need for total compliance with 
the doctrine. Instead, the research assesses the areas where general conformity with 
the rule of law can be improved to achieve more legal certainty and predictability in EU 
competition law intervention. 
VI. CRITICISMS OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Unavoidably, the doctrine has received some criticism. Horwitz has been suggested that 
the law can be manipulated through the system of the rule of law. Horwitz highlighted 
that the promotion of procedural justice through the rule of law makes it possible for 
some to manipulate the law to their benefit.394 He argued that the law could not 
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prevent abuse of government’s power, as the structure of society provides such power 
and not the law.395   
Other concerns have also been highlighted by Plato in regards to the fact that people 
are different from one another, and their circumstances also change with time.396 
Therefore, sometimes the change in the circumstances might lead individuals having no 
other possible way but to breach some of these established rules.397 Posner has also 
highlighted such concerns, yet he has placed more trust in the capability of the legal 
systems to apply established rules and ancient precedents.398 We have also been 
reminded that the emphasis put on the rule of law can be problematic. It is feared that 
such emphasis can have an impact on the independence of the legal system and its 
moral judgement.399 The legal system may become focused and worried about the 
impact of their judgement on legal certainty and the criticism it might receive.400  
 
Additionally, the rule of law ideal could, arguably, lead to over-formalising matters that 
are best kept informal. For instance, it has been highlighted by Simon that it can be 
harmful if informal rules are replaced with rigid ones.401 This point of view can be 
understood, particularly, in the context of this research as innovation and technology is 
evolving day after day, and thus, it is becoming more challenging for the law to keep up 
with these changes. Arguably, rigid rules might not allow the law to develop and grow 
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as innovation develops and grows progressively. Nevertheless, case law, at least, must 
remain as consistent as possible in order to eradicate legal uncertainty as much as 
possible in order to remain consistent with the rule of law. Further, it is argued in this 
research that it is best to clearly highlight and state in case law why deviations have 
taken place if it was indeed necessary to deviate in order for the law to keep up with 
the changes introduced by the development of innovation and so on.  
 
VII. DEBATES AROUND THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
 
The application of the doctrine and what it requires have also received criticism. Some 
of which are mentioned below: 
A) Discretion 
On the one hand, both Dicey402 and Hayek403 argue, to some extent, that discretion by 
authority does not conform with the doctrine. On the other hand, it has been argued 
by Davis404 that discretion is unavoidable in modern administrative authority. It has 
been further indicated that the model of the rule of law does not exclude discretion, 
but it guarantees that such discretion is adequately regulated and outlined.405  
Raz has also voiced that the doctrine is only one aspect of the whole legal structure and 
thus, it could be waived when other projected goals outweigh the rule of law. For 
instance, Raz highlighted that, in some circumstances, more discretionary power is the 
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better or the only available method of achieving specific aims.406 Thus, according to Raz, 
sacrificing or making alterations to the doctrine and its principles, in such 
circumstances, are not indeed outlawed or prohibited.407 
B) Rules and Standards 
There are concerns about the use of norms that are more of a standard than a set of 
rules.408 Both types of norms are used within most legal systems.409 For example, 
outcomes may differ in some cases due to the context of a particular case. Thus, some 
rules are not laid down in advance. Instead, standards are used to decide on cases on a 
case-by-case basis. Indeed, it makes it hard for the concerned individual who is trying 
to adhere with the norms and predict the outcome of a conduct that it undertakes if it 
was brought before a court or an authority. Therefore, the use of standards can 
sometimes lead to legal uncertainty. Hayek has also conveyed that it is problematic that 
vague formulas are introduced into legislation as well as jurisdiction. Hayek has, thus, 
questioned the connection of the rule of law and predictability.410 
It must be mentioned here that EU competition law intervention is usually determined 
on a case-by-case basis which gives room for new formulas to be introduced in these 
cases. Indeed, the case-by-case assessment can be necessary for the discretion of 
authorities to conclude when a business had abused its market position depending on 
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the circumstances of the case at hand. Nevertheless, this can sometimes lead to legal 
uncertainty and questions that arise regarding a judgement’s connection with the rule 
of law and its elements of legal certainty, predictability and uniformity. 
 
C) Law and Social Norms 
In some circumstances, matters can be resolved via means of informal social norms and 
without having to resort to positive law.411  
On the one hand, there have been some debates as to whether this is acceptable from 
a rule of law perspective. For example, it has been argued that the application of 
informal social norms is acceptable from a rule of law standpoint.412 It has been even 
further implied that the enforcement of norms, fairness and common-sense fits 
perfectly with the rule of law. 413 It has been further insinuated that the careful 
enforcement of informal social norms can provide further guidance to existing legal 
knowledge.414 
On the other hand, it has been stipulated that modern law is unavoidably technical and 
thus, it exceeds the potentials of spontaneous understanding.415  It has been further 
argued that the enforcement of informal social norms can lead to an increase in 
unpredictability which is inconsistent with the conception of the rule of law.416 
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D) The Case of Emergencies 
Another matter of concern is the method used by a society to tackle matters of 
emergencies. In case of an emergency, it is usually believed that it is necessary to take 
immediate and more flexible procedures than those used in regular periods.417   
Indeed, legal rules must be laid down in advance that tackle matters of emergencies-
for example, rules that hold usual guarantees of civil liberties or rules that highlight the 
discretion given to officials to commence actions that are usually overseen by general 
rules of law.418 However, it has been argued that this approach may provide more 
predictability, yet it can weaken the ideal of the doctrine into a thin one called the rule 
of law elite. 419 
E) International Law 
The international rule of law has also been subject to some criticism. Chesterman has 
implied that various studies on the international rule of law adopt similar national 
elements of the doctrine such as predictability and clarity.420 It has been argued that 
the liberty of an individual is far more vital in comparison to the liberty of a state. 
Nonetheless, the principles that concern individuals can be undermined as opposed to 
the context of states in international law.421  
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It appears to be unclear whether countries require protection from international law 
more than the protection offered to individuals against political power in a society.422 
It has also been argued that there can be a disadvantageous impact on the liberty of an 
individual when the rule of law is used to the advantage of the liberty of states, for 
example, in fields of international human rights. Therefore, it was highlighted that the 
adoption of the international rule of law must not weaken the values and principles of 
the national rule of law. 423 
F) Contributions of National Courts in International Law 
Indeed, international law is enhanced when domestic courts interpreted it. It is a 
common practice for national courts to contribute to the development of international 
obligations.424 National courts can make significant inputs to advance the fulfilment of 
the rule of law doctrine, even at an international level.425 It must be mentioned here 
that some EU countries have administered and interpreted the application of Article 
102 differently from one another.426 Such interpretations can help develop and 
enhance legal certainty at an EU level. The least it can be argued if national 
interpretations provide further legal certainty to the subject matter, then the European 
Commission should circulate an updated Guidance Paper on the application of Article 
102 TFEU in order to help advance the EU legal system. 
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However, it has been argued that the function of national courts in the international 
legal system should be limited only to the enforcement of the law.427 Regardless, it has 
been well recognised that national courts play a vital role in settling international claims 
between private parties.428 National courts, for example, can decide international 
claims that are in whole or in part based on a rule of international law.429 Thus, there is 
also always a possibility for international disputes to be settled with a decision made by 
national courts.430 Moreover, the legality of national acts is reviewed against 
international obligations by national courts in order to guarantee conformity.  The 
function of legality review is broad, but constitutional review allows national authorities 
to review the validity of legislation in comparison to international law outside specific 
claims or disputes.431   
G) Development of Democracies and Nations 
The importance of developing democracies and nations is regularly stressed under the 
doctrine of the rule of law. An example on this can be seen by Barro, as he suggested 
that the rule of law helps stress the importance of developing operative courts and 
commercial rules that provide better protection to property rights.432 It has been 
stipulated that confidence and stability in the legal system to further investments 
cannot be achieved in a nation that is governed by legislative action without democracy 
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as an integral aspect of the doctrine.433 
Following the exploration of the formal, substantive and procedural features of the 
doctrine, the subsequent section of this chapter now examines property rights under 
the substantive approach to the rule of law. 
VIII. THE RULE OF LAW, COMPETITION AND PROPERTY PROTECTION 
This section examines the substantive aspect of the doctrine in ensuring a high level of 
property protection and effective competition. 
A.  Tangible and Intangible Property  
IPRs generally provide the holders with an exclusive right as to exclude others from the 
use of their protected rights.434 IPRs are different from those tangible property rights. 
Tangible rights provide an owner possession of the good and the right to exclude others 
from possessing it.435 Accordingly, tangible rights are mainly described as rights to 
exploit and use. Usually, the law does not have to mention such exclusivity of tangible 
rights as it comes as a natural outcome of such a possession.436 
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Whereas, IPRs are considered intangible goods. The possession of intangible goods does 
not particularly stop others from possessing the good.437 The essence of intangible 
goods is the owner’s right to exclude others from using the IPR. Nonetheless, different 
approaches can be seen between the various WIPO Member States within their 
national statutes, decisions of the courts as well as relevant authorises.438   
B. Property Rights and Rule of Law 
The reduction of uncertainties regarding how patent law is enforced, and its 
implications would not only allow undertakings to plan their future in the market better, 
but it will also encourage investment and economic growth. The rule of law will be 
strengthened when the legal consequences of any conduct can be predicted.439  
It has been suggested that IPRs should be given similar protection and security as any 
other property right as can be seen by the following argument:  
 Holders of valid letters-patents enjoy… the exclusive right and liberty of making and 
using the invention therein secured, and of vending the same to others to be used…: and 
the rule of law is well settled, that an invention so secured is property in the holder of 
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the patent, and that as such the right of the holder is as much entitled to protection as 
any other property, during the term for which the franchise or the exclusive right or 
privilege is granted.440 
Hayek has emphasised that private rights make up one of the elements of freedom.441 
The protection of property rights and its value safeguards the value of civilisation.442 
Hayek has also quoted Malinowski’s definition of modern anthropology as the following 
 The roots of property as a legal principle which determines the physical relationship 
between man and his environmental setting, natural or artificial, are the very 
prerequisite of any ordered action in the cultural sense.443 
Nonetheless, Hayek has highlighted that the definition of liberty is achieved once the 
meaning of coercion is defined, and in particular arbitrary and general rules.444 Indeed, 
the government may need to delimit the private spheres of some individuals, but 
conditions must be created so that an individual can rely on them to decide the scope 
of the designated private sphere and to expect the outcome of its conduct.445 
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Moreover, coercion rules must be general and must be reduced to the minimum and 
applied to those individuals who had placed themselves in the position to be coerced.446 
Additionally, the freedom can also be enjoyed by an individual without any owned 
property so long as the care of the property is adequately dispersed so that a person is 
not dependent on a specific individual for such needs.  Hayek has mentioned that this 
can be avoided through the enforceability of contracts.447 Hayek mentioned the 
following: 
The decisive condition for mutually advantageous collaboration between people, based 
on voluntary consent rather than coercion, is that there be many people who can serve 
one’s needs so that nobody has to be dependent on specific persons for the essential 
conditions of life or the possibility of development in some direction. It is competition 
made possible by the dispersion of property that deprives the individual owners of 
particular things of all coercive powers.448 
Hayek has emphasised that the view on the famous maxim has been commonly 
misunderstood.449 The providers of services are not usually concerned with how we 
make use of what they provide. Therefore, we must remain independent in the sense 
that we are the ones who approve of their services as per our needs, regardless of their 
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objectives.450  Accordingly, Hayek has stressed that contracts are essential in order to 
delimit a person’s private scope.  Hayek did not intend to include here some services 
that are provided to the public, such as roads, which must be shared between those 
who wish to use them. The impact of the threat of coercion is different from the definite 
and inevitable coercion. Sanctions of the law do not constrain an individual from 
performing particular actions. Instead, they either prevent an individual from partaking 
some actions, or they require the implementation of set obligations.  A government can 
force its citizens to perform their obligations through the general rules of unavoidable 
and predictable coercion, such as compulsory military services and taxation.451 
However, Hayek noted that that unpredictable and unavoidable coercive power of 
governmental intervention is extraordinarily alarming and does not comply with the 
doctrine.452 
 The competition law intervention is implemented on any dominant business that 
participates in anti-competitive or abusive practices. Therefore, the use of competition 
law is indeed general given that any dominant undertaking that is participating in any 
anti-competitive or abusive conduct are subject to governmental intervention with the 
possibility of issuing a compulsory licence. However, patent holders should be able to 
predict whether their practices are indeed anti-competitive or abusive. They should be 
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provided with a clear set of guidelines as to what is considered anti-competitive and 
abusive so that they can predict a possible competition law intervention. 
 
C. The EU and the Rule of Law 
The doctrine is of great weight to the EU,453 and the accession of a new country as a 
Member State requires the independence of the country’s legal order, as well as the 
quality of its law.454 The rule of law is covered in different EU treaties.455 For instance, 
it is mentioned in the preamble of the TEU, 456 Art. 2 of the TEU,457 and CFREU in its 
preamble.458 EU case law must also reflect on the rule of law.459  
However, it has been indicated that the measures adopted to observe the adherence 
with the doctrine in the EU Member States are sometimes unclear.460 The pursuit for 
the rule of law has set its most ambitious aim for the realisation of the doctrine beyond 
the nation-state. Although the hunt for an international rule of law has been there for 
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some time, it has never been expressed by the Member States to the extent it has been 
stressed in 2005 World Summit and later in the United Nation’s General Assembly 
resolutions.461 Moreover, international legal scholarship reflects the momentum of the 
topic.462  
The rule of law aims to tackle the matter of ‘who guards the guardians?’ So that power 
is used in a fair manner. Regarding this research, competition authorities are provided 
with both power and discretion in determining matters related with abuse of dominant 
position. Such powers have raised concerns over accountability, independence and 
fairness.  For instance, concerns have been highlighted in regards to the courts’ 
independence and compliance with the concept of the doctrine in their decision-making 
as competition authorities are provided with a high degree of defence.463 
Usually, the team of lawyers and economists in the EU’s Competition’s DG-Competition 
examine and review case facts in order to ensure that evidence is consistent with one 
of the theories of harm. The report is then sent for review to the Office of Chief 
Economist for their analysis on the matter. Meanwhile, oral proceedings are monitored 
by Hearing Officers to ensure the protection of the rights of defences as well as the 
process. Draft decisions are then thoroughly examined by the Legal Services as the court 
might ask them, if necessary, to defend their decision. It must be mentioned that 
complex decisions are sent to the College of Commissioners for additional examination 
and review. It must also be taken into account that, there is always the possibility of 
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appeals to the courts, courts of public opinion, in addition to the opinions of the 
academic community and reporters.464 
It does initially appear from the above that there is an adequate review process that 
ensures that decisions are fair and reasonable within the EU competition system, but is 
it sufficient from a rule of law perspective? To make such as assessment, chapter five 
examines the development of EU case law. 
D. Legal Uncertainty in Competition Law Intervention 
The courts, policymakers and regulators have been regularly faced with challenges in 
finding the appropriate legal measures to mediate the intersection of patents and 
competition law. In particular, the challenge of finding appropriate guidelines that 
manage abusive refusal to license cases. Ideally, such guiding principles should aim to 
minimise legal uncertainty and increase economic advantages.465 Many competition 
systems, particularly the EU competition regime, aim to balance these challenging aims. 
The interface of abusive refusal to license with patents highlight such issues to the 
internal coherence of competition law.466 It can be argued that the EU competition law 
intervention lacks, to a certain degree, legal certainty. Therefore, the research attempts 
to identify how we can apply such rules whilst providing as much legal certainty and 
predictability possible as per the doctrine.  
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As mentioned earlier, the doctrine can be understood in a formal or a substantive form. 
The formal legal certainty is the customary legal certainty where fairness and 
predictability are considered vital elements. Concerning legal certainty in the traditional 
sense, the EU competition law intervention should be predictable and applied in a 
uniform and systematic order. In other words, competition law must avoid intervening 
retroactively. On the other hand, substantive legal certainty suggests that the legal 
order must be ethical and moral.467 The EU competition law intervention can also be 
challenged under the substantive legal certainty as depriving right-holders, in certain 
circumstances, of all economic utility which can harm their business.  
The Commission has highlighted its interest in improving the doctrine in its substantive 
sense.468 The Commission has described the meaning of the rule of law at an EU level 
as follows: 
 Those principles include legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic 
and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of 
the executive powers; independent and impartial courts; effective judicial review 
including respect for fundamental rights and equality before the law…469 
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of Law, COM (2014) 158 final 11.3.2014 
469 A.  Souminen ‘What Role for Legal Certainty in Criminal Law within the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justive in the EU?’ [2014] 2(1) Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Justice, 1-31 available at 
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7d0cc5/pdf/ accessed on 24 June 2018; Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule 
of Law, COM (2014) 158 final 11.3.2014, p.4 
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The Commission further stated the following:  
[T]his means that respect for the rule of law is intrinsically linked to respect for 
democracy and for fundamental rights: there can be no democracy and respect for 
fundamental rights without respect for the rule of law and vice versa. Fundamental 
rights are effective only if they are justifiable.470  
It can be noted from those mentioned above that the Commission had addressed the 
significance of legal certainty as to the new EU framework for the doctrine.471 The 
Commission referred to legal certainty as a fundamental right for freedom, security and 
justice.472 Article 17(2) CFREU supports the right to property and protection of IPRs.473 
The Commission’s approach to the doctrine is interesting as one of the significant 
elements of the free market is the freedom of a property owner to select the licensees.  
Usually, undertakings should have the right to refuse to license a technological or 
commercial advantage that the undertaking has established on its own. Nonetheless, a 
market must be competitive. Competition law can intervene when the market is not 
effectively competitive. It must be mentioned that the regulatory aim of competition 
                                                          
470 A. Souminen ‘What Role for Legal Certainty in Criminal Law within the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justive in the EU?’ [2014] 2(1) Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Justice, 1-31 available at 
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7d0cc5/pdf/ accessed on 24 June 2018 
471 A. Souminen ‘What Role for Legal Certainty in Criminal Law within the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justive in the EU?’ [2014] 2(1) Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Justice, 1-31 available at 
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7d0cc5/pdf/ accessed on 24 June 2018; these are the infringement 
procedure in art. 258 TFEU and the preventive and sanctioning mechanisms in art. 7 TEU. See also the 
Annexes to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council a 
New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM (2014) 158 final, annexes 1 and 2 11.3.2014 
472 A.  Souminen ‘What Role for Legal Certainty in Criminal Law within the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice in the EU?’ [2014] 2(1) Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Justice, 1-31 available at 
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7d0cc5/pdf/ accessed on 24 June 2018 
473 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000, Article 17states the following: 
‘Intellectual property shall be protected’. 
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law intervention is limitedly defined and thus, as mentioned earlier, it appears that it 
deprives the right holders of all economic utility.474  
Indeed, courts try to minimalise the interface with the dominant undertaking’s 
practices. Some have argued that ‘under-regulation is always better than over-
regulation’, yet it has been indicated that this statement is empirically unsupported.475 
E. The Rule of Law Principles Used to Assess Competition Law Intervention’s 
Compliance with Rule of Law throughout this Research 
In the EU system, there is a chance of conflicting decisions between different cases 
which leads to inconsistency in EU decision-making as addressed later on in this 
research. It is believed that the Commission has taken a soft approach as its decision-
making in this matter is only broadly consistent with EU standards.476  It has also been 
questioned whether EU competition law fully adheres to some of the principles of the 
rule of law. Such questions were raised due to the level of discretion given to 
competition authorities. Such a level of power given to competition authorities in this 
area has raised concerns over the actual interpretation and enforceability of law by the 
courts themselves.477 
                                                          
474 I. Eagles and L. Longdin, Refusals to License Intellectual Property: Testing the Limits of Law and 
Economics (1st Edn., Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), p.10-20 
475 I. Eagles and L. Longdin, Refusals to License Intellectual Property: Testing the Limits of Law and 
Economics (1st Edn., Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), p10-20 
476 P. Marsden ‘Checks and Balances: European Competition Law and the Rule of Law’ [2009] 22(1) 
Competition Law International  24-28 available at 
https://www.biicl.org/files/4080_checks_and_balances_(marsden).pdf accessed on 4th July 2018; K 
Wright, ‘European Commission Opinions to National Courts in Antitrust Cases: Consistent Application 
and the Judicial Administrative Relationship’, CCP Working Paper 08-24 
477 P. Marsden ‘Checks and Balances: European Competition Law and the Rule of Law’ [2009] 22(1) 
Competition Law International  24-28 available at 
https://www.biicl.org/files/4080_checks_and_balances_(marsden).pdf accessed on 4th July 2018 
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Moreover, some EU countries have different enforcement priorities, functions, 
resources, economic development and concentration. Therefore, a divergence exists 
between the Member States in competition law intervention, the definition of the 
market and the identification of anti-competitive or abusive practices. This sort of 
variance is expected as each country has a different economy. However, when it comes 
to the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU, efforts of consistency and transparency are 
needed also to highlight the divergences between the Member States. Businesses and 
domestic courts can also indirectly benefit from more substantial amount transparency 
via publications, public speeches to highlight the reasoning behind each decision in this 
area of law, rather than a decision made via internal reviews.478 
The principles of the rule of law that are adopted in this research will include a 
combination of formal and substantive elements in order to ensure the supremacy of 
the law a high level of IPRs protection. These principles can be summarised as the 
following:  
1. Respect for fundamental rights and adequate protection of IPRs. 
2.  Access to courts and justice. 
3. Equality before the law; for example, equality of law between patent holders 
and their competitors. 
4. The law must be clearly defined and enforceable by the relevant courts; for 
example, the interpretations of Article 102 TFEU must be clearly defined so that 
the Article is not interpreted in a way that goes beyond its scope to cover other 
areas of established law. 
                                                          
478 P. Marsden ‘Checks and Balances: European Competition Law and the Rule of Law’ [2009] 22(1) 
Competition Law International  24-28 available at 
https://www.biicl.org/files/4080_checks_and_balances_(marsden).pdf accessed on 4th July 2018 
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5. Legal certainty. 
6.  Legal predictability. 
7.  Consistency in law; for example, in the tests used throughout EU case law to 
determine abuse of dominance and a high level of IPRs protection without 
undermining the essence of IPRs. 
8. Prospective law. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The role of the doctrine is an integral part of this research, particularly given that some 
commentators have questioned the constitutionality and the fairness of competition 
law intervention.479 The compulsory licensing of IP rights is retroactive by nature. 
Therefore, it is essential to give particular attentiveness on legal certainty and 
foreseeability to, at least, provide a sufficient degree of predictability. 
As indicated earlier, the doctrine has many definitions and conceptions. The EU legal 
system aims to advance the rule of law with the creation of predictable laws and the 
use of balancing tests to determine competition law intervention.  Indeed, the law 
integrates economic considerations in its decision-making. However, the rule of law 
guarantees the fact that the law is supreme and thus, economic considerations must 
not be prioritised over the law and norms.  This research aims to address the scope of 
the doctrine incorporated by the courts and how the courts respond to the doctrine 
regarding legal certainty, predictability, consistency and transparency.   
The research also takes a substantive approach to the doctrine, given that patents are 
private properties. Patent holders should enjoy the freedom of utilising their patents 
                                                          
479 G. E. Hartman, ‘Compulsory Licensing: A Controversial Topic in the Latest Revision of Our Copyright 
Law’ [1964] 33 U. CiNc. L. REv. 83, 94-98 
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and must be given the opportunity to plan their future investments. The doctrine and 
the use of competition law intervention should aim to fulfil the expectations of 
undertakings. It is important to have a clear set of guidelines so that businesses can 
anticipate the consequences of their actions and how to avoid competition law 
intervention. Therefore, the decision-making process must aim to be as consistent as 
possible. It must be highlighted that individuals could lose their interest in investing in 
a market if the rules governing their practices are unclear. Almost all businesses aim to 
become successful, and with success, a business can become dominant in that market.  
All in all, competition law intervention must ensure that rules that govern this matter 
are clear, consistent, predictable and meets the expectations of successful undertakings 
in order to respect their rights and freedom to effectively operate in the market without 
undermining the essence of IPRs. The following chapter examines international 
obligations and the protection offered for patents at an international level which is 
followed by an examination of the regional EU legal system. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND EU COMPETITION LAW 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The essence of IPRs has been based on the principle that right holders have an exclusive 
right to use and benefit from their protected rights. However, monopolistic powers 
provided to right-holders can have a direct effect on competition. Therefore, it is vital 
that international, regional and domestic law ensures that such exclusivity of the rights 
conferred to right-holders is not misused.480 This chapter is set to examine the global 
responsibilities before an exploration of the substantive and procedural elements 
adopted by the EU judiciary and competition authorities when dealing with competition 
and IP-related matters. 
Limitations to the patent monopoly exist within the international context so that 
patents are efficiently exploited. Such barriers include the endorsement of patents to 
‘license as of right’481, the system of compulsory licensing and the revocation of 
patents.482 The limitation of the exclusive right under compulsory licensing is meant to 
ensure that patents are not abused and that they do not hinder social or economic 
platforms.483 
                                                          
480 M. Z. Abbas and S. Riaz ‘Evolution of the Concept of Compulsory Licensing: A Critical Analysis of Key 
Developments before and after TRIPS’ [2013] 4(2) Academic Research International 482-498  
481 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; J. W. Baxter, World Patent Law and Practice (2nd edn. Sweet &Maxwell 1968) 
at 122 
482 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190 
483 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190 
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This chapter mainly assesses Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention, as well as Articles 
7,8, 13, 31 and 40 of the TRIPS Agreement. It then analyses the recommendations of 
the WIPO in regards to dealing with abusive refusal to license and then assesses the 
relationship of international treaties and the EU, as well as, the rules governing refusal 
to license of IPRs within the context of EU competition law. 
This chapter fits into the context of this research as it explores the EU’s duties under 
the TRIPS Agreement. This chapter aims to examine the expectations of undertakings 
that can be derived from international agreements. Microsoft has claimed, for example, 
in the Microsoft case that EU competition law remedies that concern abusive refusal to 
supply could breach the EU’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. According to 
Microsoft, the remedy ‘implicates various intellectual property rights protected by the 
TRIPS Agreement’.484 Microsoft here has supported its argument by reference made to 
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.485  
The Commission has disregarded Microsoft’s claims as it has been found that the TRIPS 
Agreement permits embracing obligations that prevent abuses of dominance,486 yet 
clearly, undertakings have expectations that are derived from the TRIPS Agreement. 
From a rule of law perspective, it can be argued that it can be essential to examine in 
the following chapters whether EU competition authorities have met such 
expectations. 
 
                                                          
484 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para 1050 
485 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 13 states ‘Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive 
rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.’ 
486 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para 1052 
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II. INTERNATIONAL RULES ON COMPETITION AND IP-RELATED MATTERS 
The correlation between IP and competition law has been seen in the global regulation 
of these two systems of law.487 At the early stages of regulating competition law, it was 
recognised that the protection against abuses of IPRs forms an integral part of industrial 
property protection.488 The abusive refusals to license IPRs can be covered under Article 
5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention, as well as Articles 8.2, 31 and 40 of the TRIPS Agreement 
as discussed further below. 
A. The Paris Convention 
The UK Statute of Monopolies introduced the ideal of compulsory licences in 1623 to 
work a patent locally,489 and this concept was then acknowledged during the 19th 
century by various national patent law.490 France, for instance, introduced the forfeiture 
of patents as a remedy to the non-working of patents.491 The UK has also adopted a 
system of compulsory licensing in the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act 1883 to 
                                                          
487 R. W de very, Towards a European Unfair Competition: A Clash Between Legal Families (1st edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 17 
488 R. W de very, Towards a European Unfair Competition: A Clash Between Legal Families (1st edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 17 
489 C. M. Carlos, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries’ (1999) South Centre T.R.A.D.E fount at 
<https://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf> last accessed on 
08/03/2018 
490 C. M. Carlos, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries’ (1999) South Centre T.R.A.D.E fount at 
<https://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf> last accessed on 
08/03/2018 
491 C. M. Carlos, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries’ (1999) South Centre T.R.A.D.E fount at 
<https://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf> last accessed on 
08/03/2018 
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protect against the non-working of patents.492 This provision greatly influenced patent 
law as it aided in the progress of the International Paris Convention.493  
The system of compulsory licensing has been first established at the Vienna Convention 
of 1873 to regulate matters related to public interest, but the working obligation was 
only accepted in the Conference of 1883. Further, the Conference held in The Hague in 
1925 had embraced compulsory licensing as the chief method of protection against 
non-working of patents. The Hague in 1925 had also established that the system of 
compulsory licensing is set to protect against abuses that can surface following the 
exclusive practice of the conferred right. The compulsory licensing system has then 
been integrated into the law of most Member countries as a less drastic measure to the 
revocation through nullity.494  
The majority of countries still used revocation of patents when compulsory licensing 
fails to remedy insufficient working.495 The compulsory licensing system has developed 
over time, and the conditions for granting such a licence have extended over the 
                                                          
492 Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883, S. 22 which states the following:  
If on the petition of any person interested it is proved to the Board of Trade that by reason of the default 
of a patentee to grant licenses on reasonable terms— 
(a.) The patent is not being worked in the United Kingdom; or 
(b.) The reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the invention cannot be supplied; or 
(c.) Any person is prevented from working or using to the best advantage an invention of which he is 
possessed, 
the Board may order the patentee to grant licenses on such terms as to the amount of royalties, security 
for payment, or otherwise, as the Board, having regard to the nature of the invention and the 
circumstances of the case, may deem just, and any such order may be enforced by mandamus. 
493 C. M. Carlos, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries’ (1999) South Centre T.R.A.D.E fount at 
<https://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf> last accessed on 
08/03/2018 
494 C. Gontigo, ‘Changing the Patent System from the Paris Convention to the TRIPS Agreement: The 
Position of Brazil’ (2005) Heinrich Boll Stiftung Global Issue Paper No. 26 
https://eprints.qut.edu.au/90061/6/90061.pdf accessed on 27 August 2018 
495 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 
1883 as revised at Brussels on December 14, 1990, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on 
November 6, 1924, at London on June 2, 1943, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T No. 6923, Article 5A [Hereinafter cited as The Paris Convention] 
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years496 to include matters related to public interest, anti-competitive practices and 
governmental uses.497 The compulsory licensing system can, thus, be used by the state 
to control a patent monopoly. It permits others to use the patent with a remuneration 
that is decided by the State. 
However, an amendment has been made in the Stockholm Revision of 1976 of the Paris 
Convention which made it more challenging for authorities to grant a compulsory 
licence.498 The Revision of 1976 established that a compulsory licence should be non-
exclusive and a compulsory licence is inapplicable when the right holder can provide 
reasonable justifications for the refusal to license.499 The Revision of 1976 further 
established in Article 5(A)(3) of the Convention that nullity should only be applied two 
years following the grant of the first licence which makes nullity more laborious and 
rarer to apply. 
With regards to the non-exclusive requirement mentioned above, it has been argued 
that a licence seeker that has been granted the requested compulsory licence would be 
less inclined to invest in the patent if there are doubts as to the exclusivity of a licence 
in the relevant market.500 This is because the right holder in a non-exclusive licence can 
                                                          
496 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190. For example, the Patent Act of 1883, Section 22 have established that 
compulsory licenses can be granted when a patent is abused due to various reasons such as not 
meeting the demands of public or blocking another patent 
497 C. M. Correa, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries’ (1999) South Centre T.R.A.D.E 
http://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf accessed on 
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GIP26.pdf> accessed on 27 August 2018 
500 C. Gontigo, ‘Changing the Patent System from the Paris Convention to the TRIPS Agreement: The 
Position of Brazil’ (2005) Heinrich Boll Stiftung Global Issue Paper No. 26 
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decide to locally produce or determine a voluntary license to other third parties. It 
would become more challenging for the licence holder to compete with others within 
the relevant market. Therefore, a non-exclusive compulsory licence has been argued 
not be useful in the circumstances of when a compulsory licence is issued to prevent 
abuses by right holders.501  
It must be mentioned that the Paris Convention has provided ‘failure to work’ in Article 
5(A)(2) as an example for granting a compulsory licence and thus, other abuses can also 
be established without breaching this provision.502 The compulsory licensing system has 
been adopted by the majority of countries that are signed to the Paris Convention503 in 
order to discourage abuses of the exclusive rights conferred to right holders and 
encourage incentives for licensing on fair and reasonable terms.504  It has also been 
indicated that patent rights should maintain competition and protect consumers and 
thus, dominant undertakings must not engage in anti-competitive practices.505  
                                                          
<https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/assets/boell.de/images/download_de/internationalepolitik/
GIP26.pdf> accessed on 27 August 2018 
501 C. Gontigo, ‘Changing the Patent System from the Paris Convention to the TRIPS Agreement: The 
Position of Brazil’ (2005) Heinrich Boll Stiftung Global Issue Paper No. 26 
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502 The Paris Convention, Article 5 (A) (2) states that ‘Member states may legislate measures providing 
for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, 
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503 S. Cohen, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patents- The Paris Convention Model’ [1979] 20(2) Journal of Law 
and Technology 153-190; United Nations, The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries: Report to the Secretary General of the United Nations. (United Nations 65 UN 
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and Technology 153-190 
 141 
The Paris Convention has covered principles and rules that apply to all sorts of industrial 
property with explicit provisions concerning patents.506 The incorporation of the Paris 
Convention’s patent-specific provisions into the TRIPS Agreement suggests that 
elements of the present patent system have become incorporated in the international 
structure. However, the articles of the Convention are subject to and may be thought 
to be outdated or partly altered by the new standards that are set by the TRIPS 
Agreement. An example of this is Article 5quarter of the Convention507 which is 
surpassed by Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement as it compels extending the protection 
to products that are directly attained via a protected process.508 
The following sub-section analyses the chief articles of the TRIPS Agreement that aim 
to govern the anti-competitive and abusive practices of IPRs.  
B. TRIPS Agreement  
The negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement have been explicitly aimed to supplement the 
Paris Convention.509 The approach of the ‘Paris-Plus’ is set out in Article 2(1) of the 
Agreement, as it has obligated all WTO members to submit to the Paris Convention’s 
Articles 1 to 12, as well as, Article 19. All WTO members have to apply these provisions 
even the countries that have not joined the Paris Convention. Moreover, the 
                                                          
506 C. Correa and A. Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2008), 228 
507 The Paris Convention, Art.5 Quarter states the following: 
 When a product is imported into a country of the Union where there exists a patent protecting a 
process of manufacture of the said product, the patentee shall have all the rights, with regard to the 
imported product, that are accorded to him by the legislation of the country of importation, on the basis 
of the process patent, with respect to products manufactured in that country. 
508 C. Correa and A. Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2008), 229 
509 C. Correa and A. Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2008), 228 
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identification of the Stockholm Act has given a uniform platform of protection while 
taking into account that various aspects of the Convention are still in force.510  
The TRIPS Agreement has aimed at offering minimum protection to IPRs and 
guaranteeing that the means used to impose IPRs do not overlap or become obstacles 
to trade.511 The Agreement’s primary target is to decrease distortions and obstacles to 
trade at an international level, whilst taking into consideration the promotion of the 
efficient protection of IPRs. The TRIPS Preamble has specified that IPRs are private rights 
and the underlying aim for the protection of IPRs revolves around the ‘development 
and technological’ purposes.512 The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated in the Uruguay 
Round of GATT, and it is administered by the WTO Agreement.513 Indeed, one of the 
three pillars of the WTO is the TRIPS Agreement.514 The main international agreements 
on IP  law, such as the Paris Convention, are referred to in the TRIPS Agreement.515 The 
Agreement has compelled its Members to provide a ‘give effect’ of TRIPS in their 
domestic law.516  
The TRIPS Agreement has made limited reference517 to the role of competition law on 
IPR policy.518 The Agreement’s Articles of significance to this research are mainly 
                                                          
510 C. Correa and A. Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2008), 228 
511 Preamble, TRIPS Agreement 
512 Preamble, TRIPS Agreement 
513 R W de Vrey, Towards a European Unfair Competition: A Clash Between Legal Families (1st edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) at 17; The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, as a result 
of the Uruguay Round negotiations of 1986-94 
514 WTO, ‘Frequently asked questions about TRIPS [trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights] 
in the WTO’ (wto.org) < https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm> accessed 11th 
November 2018 
515 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 2 
516 R W de Vrey, Towards a European Unfair Competition: A Clash Between Legal Families (1st edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) at 18 
517 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (2005), at 543-546 
518S. D. Anderman (ed), The Interface Between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy 
(Cambridge University Press 2007), at p. 7 
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Articles 7, 8, 13, 31 and 40. Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement was mainly set to control 
anti-competitive practices in contractual licences,519 as well as licensing arrangements 
which can also include refusal to license.  
Generally speaking, the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement are used to achieve 
competitive balances. The Agreement has established that Members can adopt 
appropriate measures in their lawmaking order to prevent abuses of IPRs, and 
limitations to the transfer of technology or trade.520 Moreover, Members can adopt 
necessary procedures to prevent abuse of dominance by right holders, as well as anti-
competitive licensing arrangements as per Article 40 of the TRIPS which can be read 
                                                          
519 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 40 states the following: 
1. Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights 
which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and 
dissemination of technology. 
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation licensing 
practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights 
having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. As provided above, a Member may 
adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or 
control such practices, which may include for example exclusive grant back conditions, conditions 
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and 
regulations of that Member. 
3. Each Member shall enter, upon request, into consultations with any other Member which has cause 
to believe that an intellectual property right owner that is a national or domiciliary of the Member to 
which the request for consultations has been addressed is undertaking practices in violation of the 
requesting Member’s laws and regulations on the subject matter of this Section, and which wishes to 
secure compliance with such legislation, without prejudice to any action under the law and to the full 
freedom of an ultimate decision of either Member. The Member addressed shall accord full and 
sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for, consultations with the 
requesting Member, and shall cooperate through supply of publicly available non-confidential 
information of relevance to the matter in question and of other information available to the Member, 
subject to domestic law and to the conclusion of mutually satisfactory agreements concerning the 
safeguarding of its confidentiality by the requesting Member. 
4. A Member whose nationals or domiciliaries are subject to proceedings in another Member concerning 
alleged violation of that other Member’s laws and regulations on the subject matter of this Section 
shall, upon request, be granted an opportunity for consultations by the other Member under the same 
conditions as those foreseen in paragraph 3. 
520 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 8.2 states ‘Appropriate measures, provided they are consistent with 
the provisions of the Agreement, may be needed to prevent abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology.’ 
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alongside Article 8.2 of the same Agreement.521 Moreover, Article 31(k) has established 
that compulsory licences could be issued to remedy anti-competitive practices.522 
1. Article 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement  
Articles 7523 and 8.2 of the TRIPS Agreement have sought to set the framework for 
achieving competitive balances between Member countries. It has been indicated that 
the term ‘should’ that is used in Article 7 of the Agreement makes it confusing as to why 
this provision has been included in the substantive text, rather than the perambulatory 
clause of the Agreement.524  Nevertheless, it has been suggested that Article 7 of the 
Agreement has provided significant context for the interpretation of the other Articles 
and their intended purposes as per the duties set in the WTO jurisprudence.525  
Additionally, Article 8.2 of the TRIPS Agreement has stated some of the objectives and 
principles related to competition law. The Article has highlighted that Member 
countries can adopt appropriate measures to stop abuses of IPRs, as well as conduct 
that add unreasonable restraint on trade or that have an adverse effect on knowledge 
transfer.526 This Article is essential as it has provided leeway for competition law 
                                                          
521 T. Thnah Nguyen and H, H, Lidgard, ‘TRIPS Competition Flexibilities’ (Unpublished contribution to 
Journal, Lund University Libraries) < https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/publication/516c1376-0c85-4217-bfc8-
ab63c4e98dff> accessed on 7 September 2018 
522 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(k) 
523 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 7 states the following: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage 
of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance or rights and obligations. 
524C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 93 
525 D. Shanker, ‘The Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, the Dispute Settlement System of the 
WTO and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS’ [2002] 36(4) Journal of World Trade 721-772, at p. 721 
526 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 8.2 states the following: 
Appropriate measures, provided they are consistent with the provisions of the Agreement, may be 
needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices 
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. 
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intervention in circumstances of abuse of dominant position by right holders.527 
However, one significant limitation is the fact that this Article did not oblige WTO 
countries to include competition policies in their jurisdictions.528  
Moreover, it can be suggested by the title ‘Principles’ of Article 8(2)  that the main 
objective of treaty-makers was not to extensively regulate competition law matters as 
they have left the regulation of anti-competitive or abusive conduct to the Member 
countries’ discretion.529 This argument is evident by the content of the Article itself 
which states that ‘appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of IP rights by right 
holders.’530 The choice of words is interesting, for example ‘may be needed’ reveals the 
non-exhaustive factor of this provision.531 Furthermore, the expression of ‘appropriate’ 
measures that deal with ‘unreasonable’ trade practices portrays that the TRIPS 
Agreement considers ‘weighing and balancing’532 as a way of ensuring the  ‘clearly 
excessive remedies, which unnecessarily put the intellectual property altogether in 
                                                          
527 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer International 
Law, 2001), at p. 293 
528 C, Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 111 
529 Abbott, ‘Are the Competition Rules in the WTO TRIPS Agreement Adequate?’, 7 J Int'l Economic L 
(2004) 692; see also UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (2005), at 541, 546; 
Anderson, ‘The Interface Between Competition Policy and Intellectual Property in the Context of the 
International Trading System’, 1 J Int'l Economic L (1998) 661, at 662; Nguyen, ‘Competition Rules in the 
TRIPS Agreement - The CFI's Ruling in Microsoft v. Commission and Implications for Developing 
Countries’, 39 Int'l Rev IP and Competition L (2008) 561 
530 The TRIPS Agreement, Art 8(2) 
531 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (2005), at 546 
532 WTO AB Reports, Korea - Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 11 Dec. 2000, at para. 164: the 
Appellate Body stated that every appraisal of whether a measure was ‘necessary’ would involve a 
process of weighing and balancing a series of legal and factual factors. See Trade Barriers Reg. 356/95 
amending Reg. 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of the Common Commercial 
Policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, in 
particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, OJ (1995) L 41/3, 
Preamble: ‘[w]hereas it is appropriate to confirm that the Community must act in compliance with its 
international obligations and, where such obligations result from agreements, maintain the balance of 
rights and obligations which it is the purpose of those agreements to establish’. 
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jeopardy’533 are prevented or stopped. Therefore, it seems that the TRIPS Agreement 
has depended on the Members States to link the proportionality of the procedures 
adopted with the unlawful conduct in question.534  
2. Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement 
The title of Article 40, in itself,535 has addressed issues which relate to practices and 
conditions of anti-competitive licensing. This Article has indicated that it has been 
commonly agreed between WTO members that some licensing conduct can be anti-
competitive. This joint agreement is due to such practices that may have various 
negative impacts on trade and could obstruct technological transfer and distribution.536 
Article 40.2537 has established that Member countries can identify in their law abusive 
licensing conduct. As mentioned earlier, Article 8(2) of the Agreement has further 
implied the fact that WTO members could implement appropriate measures to stop 
and govern practices that abuse IP rights.538  
Generally, licensing must be seen as pro-competitive to the level that it legalises third 
party’s access and use of proprietary technology.539 Nonetheless, there are specific 
                                                          
533 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (2005), at 554. 
534 D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (2008), at para. 2.126; S. Ricketson, 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886-1986 (1987), at 211. The 
Berne Convention is available at: <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html> 
535 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 40 ‘control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licences’ 
536 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 40(1) states the following: ‘Members agree that some licensing practices 
or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may have adverse 
effects on trade and may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology.’ 
537 The TRIPS Agreement, Art 40(2) states the following:  
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation licensing practices 
or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an 
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. As provided above, a Member may adopt, 
consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or control 
such practices, which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing 
challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of 
that Member. 
538 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 8(2) 
539 C Correa and A Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2008), 295; Paragraph 5 of the introductory text to Commission Regulation 
(EC) No. 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the [EC] Treaty to categories of 
technology transfer agreements (Official Journal of the European Union 2004 L 123/111) 
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kinds of licensing arrangements that are likely to be used in abusive means, such as 
grant back obligations.540 The TRIPS Agreement has allowed Members countries to 
‘adopt, consistently with the other provision, appropriate measures to prevent or control 
such practices…in light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member.’541 The 
requirement of appropriate measures that must be consistent with the other Articles 
of the Agreement suggests that any TRIPS-mandated control of restricting practices 
should not be considered as an exclusion to the IP protection’s substantive minimum 
standards. In the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, this qualification was not agreed 
by the 1991 Dunkel Draft,542 which was mainly comparable to the final text of the 
Agreement. Prior drafts including the Brussels Draft of December 1990543 and the Anell 
Draft of 23 July 1990544 did not cover the requirement of such consistency.545  
Regardless, international law was further enhanced by the enactment of Article 40 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, given that the discussion on anti-competitive conduct during the 
start of the Uruguay Round was pushed aside.546 Competition law and IPRs can be read 
within Article 40 as complementary to one another, whereby both aim to achieve a 
balance of rights.547 Additionally, Article 40 has added further elements to international 
                                                          
540 OECD, ‘Intellectual Property and Competition policy in the biotechnology industry’, (Policy Brief, 
June 2005), p. 4 http://oecd.org/daf/competition/42334730.pdf accessed 30/11/201; a grant back has 
been identified here as a ‘provision in a licensing agreement that requires the licensee to grant  a 
licence on any improvements its patents related to the original invention back to the licensor’  
541 The TRIPS Agreement, Ar. 40(2) 
542 Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNG/W/FA, 20 December 1991 
543 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
revision, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 
MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev. 1, 3 December 1990 
544 Chairman’s Report to the GNG, Status of Work in the Negotiating Group, Negotiating Group on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Group on 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76, 23 July 1990 
545 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (2005), Chapter 29, p. 556 
546 H. Ullrick, ‘Technology Protection According to TRIPS: Principles and Problems’ in F.K. Beier and G. 
Schricker (eds), From GATT to TRIPS- the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (Wiley-VCH, 1996), at p.407 
547 C. Correa, ‘Review of the TRIPS Agreement: Fostering the Transfer of Technology to Developing 
Countries’ [2005] 2 The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 939-960  
 148 
law as it was the first to introduce provisions related to international businesses’ 
licensing arrangements.548 Nevertheless, Article 40 did not specify conditions that are 
to be considered as anti-competitive and thus, lacks any substantive indicators as to 
what conditions are to be considered unlawful.549 Further, Article 40 of the Agreement 
is not mandatory in character, rather an advisory provision. However, it has been 
suggested that public international law would be fulfilled when WTO law is read in good 
faith.550 Thus, it has been indicated that the term ‘anti-competitive practices’ must be 
read broadly to adhere to public international law.551   
Indeed, Member countries can embrace ‘appropriate measures’ under Article 40 of the 
TRIPS Agreement in order to control anti-competitive practices.552 However, such 
flexibilities raise concerns over matters related to access in the circumstances of 
absolute refusal to transfer technology. Although the outright refusal to license is not 
necessarily considered abusive,553 it was held by the ECJ in the RTE case that outright 
refusal to license can be considered as abusive conduct.554 Regardless, this matter is 
more complex in information-based industries such as IT and telecom as the creation 
of blocks for additional innovation that is covered by IPR’s protection is important to 
                                                          
548 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer International 
Law, 2001), at p. 305 
549 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer International 
Law, 2001), at p. 304-305 
550 WTO, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline-Report of the Appellate 
Body (29 April 1996) AB-19996-1 and WT/DS2/AB/R 
551 The TRIPS Agreement did not define ‘Anti-competitive practices’ and the WTO Reference Paper on 
Basic Telecommunications only listed three anti-competitive practices as seen in WTO, WTO Reference 
Paper on Basic Telecommunications (Reference Paper,1996) 
<http:www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm> accessed on 7th September 
2018 
552 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer International 
Law, 2001), at p. at 304-305 
553 The US Supreme Court held in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas [1980] 448 US 175, at 215 that 
refusal to license as patent abuse would essentially deprive the patent holder of the right to exclusively 
exploit the patent.  
554 RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718, at [49]. The ECJ held that, in some instances, a refusal 
to license IPRs may actually be an abuse of dominant position if it can be shown that the refusal was 
unjustified 
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create a larger economy in these sectors.555 It can be seen in countries of stronger 
economies that licensing issues can usually be resolved under voluntary licences, yet it 
has been suggested that resolving such issues in countries of weaker economies is near 
impossible.556 Accordingly, the existing flexibility of ‘appropriate measures’ has been 
argued to be a significant tool for countries with weak or relatively weak economies to 
challenge standards adopted in countries of stronger economies.557  
Moreover, Article 40.1 of the Agreement has been considered to have a valuable direct 
application to Article 8.2 of the same Agreement. Nonetheless, Article 40.1 seems to 
add further restrictions as seen in the used term ‘impede’ as opposed to the less 
restrictive term ‘adversely affect’ used in Article 8.2 of the Agreement.558 Indeed, Article 
40 has added more restrictions to licensing. Nevertheless, the terms ‘practices or 
conditions’ appear to indicate clauses of a contract and situations that involve the 
licensing arrangements such as its conclusion can fall under Article 40.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Therefore, the Article can also include matters related to refusal to 
license.559  
The phrase used in Article 40.1 TRIPS Agreement should be comprehended broadly, as 
it implies that the provision is not only concerned with the licence itself, but also the 
entire conduct concerning the granting and execution of licences. Therefore, Article 
40.1 did not only cover bilateral licensing agreements, but it also has included 
                                                          
555 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer International 
Law, 2001), at p. 308 
556 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer International 
Law, 2001), at p. 308 
557 UNCTAD, The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, (UNCTAD/ITE/1), Geneva (1997), at para 
268 
558 Article 40 is one of the few provisions in WTO agreements that specifically deals with some types of 
restrictive practices. See C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary 
on the TRIPS Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 398 
559 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2007), at p. 399 
 150 
plurilateral agreements like unilateral conduct and refusals to license.560 Furthermore, 
Article 40.1 has been set to control matters related to restraint of competition, given 
that it also has covered matters that have ‘adverse effects on trade and possibly 
impeding the transfer and dissemination of technology.’561 It has been, thus, suggested 
that impending competition is an unnegotiable condition under Article 40.1 of the 
Agreement.562 
There are two possible views as to the legal impact of Article 40.1 provision. The first 
interpretation can suggest that the provision is a directory and non-committal 
provision.563 Nevertheless, it offers protection to Member countries from breaches 
under the TRIPS when they control restrictive practices in licensing agreements, given 
that Article 40.2 of the Agreement is fulfilled.564 The second interpretation can imply 
that Article 40.1 and Article 7 of the Agreement, read together, impose an obligation 
on Members to address the exact and specific types of anti-competitive practices.565 
This is mainly since the TRIPS Agreement did not cover all aspects of IPRs’ misuses. 
Examples on misuses of IPRs that are not subject to Article 40 include restrictive 
conduct or conduct that affect technology transfer which falls outside the context of 
                                                          
560 C Correa and A Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2008) 317; UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (2005), 
Chapter 29, p 556.  With respect to refusal to license, it needs to be borne in mind that in most 
jurisdictions there is no general antitrust obligation on the part of the IP holder to license his exclusive 
rights; E. M. Fox, ‘Can Antitrust Policy Protect the Global Commons from the Excesses of IPRs?’ 
International Public Goods & Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (J. 
Reichmann & K. Maskus, eds, Cambridge University Press, 2005 
561 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 40(1) 
562 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2007), at p. 399 
563 A. Heinemann, ‘Antitrust Law of Intellectual Property in the TRIPS Agreement of the World Trade 
Organisation’ in F.K. Beier and G. Schricker (eds) From GATT to TRIPS: The Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (VCH Publishers 1996); H. Ullrick, ‘Technology Protection 
According to TRIPS: Principles and Problems’ in F.K. Beier and G. Schricker (eds), From GATT to TRIPS- 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Wiley-VCH, 1996), at p.245 
564 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p. 399-400 
565 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (2005) at 555-556 
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licensing, like delimitation agreements, clauses on IP in R&D contract, also all unilateral 
practices by undertakings that are in a dominant position.566 
Article 40.2 did not specifically oblige Members to employ necessary measures to 
control anti-competitive practices, yet it did explicitly refer to ‘adverse effect on 
competition’.567 Therefore, the control of licensing arrangements is within the realm of 
competition law whereby considerations of the impacts on the transfer of technology 
are inadequate grounds to decide a compulsory licence when the practice is not abusive 
or does not have an adverse effect on competition.568 It has been suggested that 
standards must be applied here to the examine the adverse effects of licensing 
arrangements on competition, such as the US rule of reason doctrine used to measure 
whether the circumstances of the licensing arrangements have an adverse impact on 
competition in the relevant market,569 as well as other standards or tests mentioned in 
the literature review. 570 
Article 40.3 has referred to the consultation system to help determine anti-competitive 
licensing arrangements. However, the second country is not obligated to commence an 
examination of conduct that is considered as anti-competitive in the first country.571 
Therefore, the WTO Dispute Settlement body cannot be activated by a Member under 
Article 40.3 unless the anti-competitive conduct in question was proven to have a direct 
effect in the second country as seen in WTO panel reports of Argentina-Hide and 
                                                          
566 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (2005) Chapter 29, p 556 
567 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 401 
568 Herbert J.  Hovenkamp, Antirust (2nd edn.m MN: West Publishing 1993), at 336 
569 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2007), at p. 402 
570 Such as the exceptional circumstances test or the essential facilities test 
571 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p. 404-405 
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Leather572 and Japan-Film.573 Additionally, Article 40.4 has permitted Members of the 
Agreement to seek consultation if their residents are subject to measures in other 
Member states, whereby Members can demand from the host Member to respect the 
freedom of the home country and its authorities as per Article 40.3.574  
Interestingly, it has been suggested that Article 40 is only fully implemented when all 
Member countries include sufficient measures, guidance and adequate procedures for 
competition disputes.575 The following section examines Articles 13 and 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement which can be used as a corresponding provision to Article 40 as it further 
establishes that compulsory licences could be granted as a remedy to anti-competitive 
practices. 
3. Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement 
Article 13 of the Agreement has highlighted that the legitimate interests of right-holders 
must not be unreasonably met in special cases that add restrictions or exceptions to 
exclusive rights conferred to right holders.576 This Article has indicated that the 
legitimate expectations of right-holders must be met and thus, countries must not 
impose unreasonable limitations on their exclusive rights.  
It can, thus, be argued that EU judiciary and competition authorities must aim to 
safeguard the legitimate expectations and interests of right holders when interpreting 
EU competition law to find an abuse of dominance. Despite the consistent application 
                                                          
572 WTO, Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hide and the Import of Finished (Argentina-
Hide and Leather)- Panel Report (February 2001) WT/DS155/R, paras 11.49 and 11.51 
573 WTO, Japan- Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan-Film)- Panel Report 
(April 1998) WT/DS44/R, para 10.41 
574 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2007), at p. 406 
575J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer International Law, 
2001), at p. 309 
576 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 13 
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of the international obligation falling under Article 13 TRIPS by the Commission in the 
Microsoft decision,577 this does not mean that there is no such risk in future cases. 
4. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 
Article 31 of the Agreement has expanded the exceptions which have been established 
in Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention.578 Article 31 TRIPS Agreement has permitted 
countries to embrace measures which block the conduct that have an adverse impact 
on competition.579 The typical form of remedial action is compulsory licensing, whereby 
the implementation of Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention must comply with the 
requirements recognised in Article 31 of the Agreement. Resorting to compulsory 
licensing to prevent abuses can be supported by both the exception of public interest, 
as well as, the measures that have been covered in Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.580 
 
Article 31 of the Agreement has referred to the non-exhaustive list of circumstances 
under which compulsory licences can be issued.581 The different grounds said in Article 
31 of the Agreement mainly refer to anti-competitive practices, public non-commercial 
use and the case of an emergency.582 This Article has just set out the requirements that 
should be met ‘where the law of a Party allows for the other use’583 and exclusive of the 
                                                          
577 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final 
578 C Correa and A Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2008), 314; UNCTAD, 1994 
579 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 31 
580 C Correa and A Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2008), 314; UNCTAD, 1994 
581 An administrative or judicial body can decide to grant a compulsory license to a third party to exploit 
an invention without the authorisation of the IRP owner. This type of license is usually non-voluntary; it 
is obtained without the IPR holder’s consent. At the international level, compulsory licences have been 
formally established as early as Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention of 1883. Compulsory licensing 
aims to achieve balance of rights and obligations set by the TRIPS Agreement, particularly through 
speeding the process of transfer and dissemination of technology. 
582 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 31 
583 TRIPS Agreement, Article 31 
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approval of the relevant IP owner. Therefore, compulsory licences can be granted for 
other grounds than those explicitly referred to in Article 31 of the Agreement.584 
Article 31(k) has referred explicitly to competition law matters585 in order to balance 
strong IPRs that can have an adverse impact on competition.586 However, the TRIPS 
Agreement did not indicate any specific standards to govern anti-competitive practices. 
The Agreement has allowed its Members to implement legislative structures within 
their jurisdictions that govern anti-competitive practices that stem from abusive and 
restrictive uses of IPRs. Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement has stipulated that relevant 
authorities are to be excused from the requirement of negotiating with the patent 
owner before the granting of a compulsory licence. Additionally, relevant authorities 
have not been required to safeguard that the IPR in question is mainly for a national 
market if an administrative authority found that the practice of right holders is, indeed, 
anti-competitive.587 
Indeed, a patent-holder must be paid compensation with licences that are issued to 
remedy anti-competitive practices. Nevertheless, a reasonable reward given to an IP 
holder could be lessened when anti-competitive abuse is found.588 It has been 
suggested that national authorities may also interpret Article 31(k) in a way that would 
                                                          
584 TRIPS Agreement, Article 31 
585 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(k) states the following: 
Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is 
permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in determining 
the amount of remuneration is such cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse 
termination of authorisation if and when the conditions which led to such authorisation are likely to 
recur. 
586 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer International 
Law, 2001), at 380-381 
587 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 31(k) 
588 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 31(k) 
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lessen the cost of reimbursement to be paid to the patent-holder or even provide 
‘royalty-free’ licences. 589  
Furthermore, the TRIPS agreement did not contain any procedural standards that 
control restrictive conducts or subsequent solutions that could be applicable against 
these types of behaviours.590 The varying interpretations of the wording of the 
Agreement can indicate that disputed matters can sometimes be left with vague 
answers.591 It may not have been possible to take into account the changing political, 
scientific, technological and economic landscape by the drafters of the Treaty.592 This 
could be evident by the fact that definitions of ‘anti-competitive practices’ and ‘abuse’ 
are not mainly a matter of focus in the Agreement, as it leaves it to domestic systems 
to deal with these matters.593  
It has also been suggested that compulsory licencing Articles under the TRIPS 
Agreement have contained various vague terms which are most likely intentional for 
different reasons. Indeed, these ambiguities make it harder to determine valid 
circumstances for compulsory licensing.594 Arguably, the lack of specificity was meant 
to provide countries with some room to decide the grounds for granting compulsory 
licencing. From a rule of law perspective, decreasing these ambiguities would progress 
                                                          
589 C. Correa, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for Developing 
Countries’ (1999) South Centre T.R.A.D.E fount at < 
https://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf> last accessed on 
08/03/2018; In the US various compulsory licenses have been determined as a remedy to anti-
competitive conduct. In some circumstances, such licenses have been determined as ‘royalty free’.  
590 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 40(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of restrictive practices. 
591 S. Subramanian, ‘EU obligations to the TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft Decision’ [2010] 21(4) 
European Journal of International Law 997-1023 
592 Chayes and Chayes, ‘On Compliance’, in B. Simmons and R. Steinberg (eds), International Law and 
International Relations (2006), at 77, 78. 
593 WTO Panel Report, Mexico - Telecoms, WT/DS204/R, 2 Apr. 2004, at para. 7.230: ‘the word “anti-
competitive” has been defined as ‘tending to reduce or discourage competition.’ On its own, therefore, 
the term ‘anti-competitive practices’ is broad in scope, suggesting actions that lessen rivalry or 
competition in the market’. 
594 V. Gupta, ‘A Mathematical Approach to Benefit-Detriment Analysis as a Solution to Compulsory 
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS Agreement’ [2005] 13 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L, 631 
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the effectiveness of utilising compulsory licencing, and could also reassure WTO 
Members that decisions of compulsory licences have based on fairgrounds. The 
decrease in vagueness could also reduce the pressure and time on countries deciding 
whether granting compulsory licencing is indeed diplomatic.  
Therefore, it has been argued that a WTO clarification on the exact scope of Article 31 
is needed.595 Such clarifications can prevent or decrease concerns of dispute settlement 
proceedings.596 
5. The Conditions of Compulsory Licences under Article 31 
As indicated above, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health has affirmed that 
WTO members can conclude their measures for compulsory licences,597 yet Article 31 
of the Agreement has still established various conditions for the granting compulsory 
licences. All compulsory licences must adhere to the set of requirements established in 
Article 31. Some of these conditions incorporate the circumstances of a voluntary 
licence whereby the anticipated licensee must have made ‘efforts to obtain 
authorisation from the right holder on reasonable terms and conditions’598 and that 
‘such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time.’599 Therefore, 
a compulsory licence could be issued if an individual applied for a licence and following 
efforts made to discuss a voluntary licence with the right-owner on reasonable terms 
                                                          
595 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer International 
Law, 2001), at 381 
596 M. Stillwell and E. Turek, ‘Towards a Full Review of the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1’ 
(CIEL, April 2001), at 8 < https://www.ciel.org/wp-
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QUESTIONS, 2006) <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm> 
accessed 18 February 2018; Article 31 (b) 
598 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 31 (b) 
599 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(b) 
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and they have failed to reach an agreement. 600 This Article has obligated a licence 
seeker to attempt to commence negotiations for a licence with the right holder. In 
addition, a proprietor should be made alert of the use of the IPR as soon as it is within 
the reasonable practice of public non-commercial use.601 It must be mentioned, 
nevertheless, this condition could be neglected in situations of public interest, national 
emergency and other events of great urgency or ‘public non-commercial use’.602 This 
exception has been set out in that Article 31(c) which relates to ‘semi-conduction 
technology’, whereby a compulsory licence can be granted only for public non-
commercial use and to remedy anti-competitive practices.603  
The Agreement has also established that the extent and length of authorisation are 
limited to the reason under which it has been approved.604 This condition has indicated 
limitations that can relate to both the scope and length of the licence. Nevertheless, a 
possible licensee can still request a comprehensive licence that extends until the expiry 
period of a patent.605 In reality, up until now, this has been common under the Paris 
Convention. It has been indicated that the commencement of investments would 
usually be necessary for the licensee, to obtain a licence that would last throughout the 
existence of a patent.606 
Another condition relates to the fact that any authorisation should not be exclusive and 
assignable so that the patent owner can also use and benefit from the patent even in 
                                                          
600 WTO 'Compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and TRIPS (TRIPS AND HEALTH: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS’ (wto.org, 2006) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm> accessed 18 February 2018 
601 The TRIPS Agreement, article 31 (b) 
602 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(b) 
603 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(c) 
604 The TRIPS Agreement. Article 31c 
605 C Correa ‘The GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: new 
standards for patent protection’ [1994] 16 (8) European Intellectual Property Review 327-335 
606 C Correa ‘The GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: new 
standards for patent protection’ [1994] 16 (8) European Intellectual Property Review 327-335 
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the circumstance of a compulsory licence. This condition also suggests that more than 
one compulsory licence could be issued for a particular patent.607 
Moreover, a significant alteration is presented in the case of compulsory licensing which 
is now commonly applied to the term of the licence. Article 31 (g) has set out the 
standard for the dismissal of a compulsory licence which includes ‘the circumstances 
which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur’.608 Thus, authorities can review, 
when requested, the continual presence of such situations. Nonetheless, the final 
dismissal must still provide appropriate protection of the legitimate interests of the 
individuals609 that are allowed to use the patent. In other words, the protection of the 
licensee’s interests cannot be disadvantaged when genuine arrangements have been 
made to use the invention. This requirement makes sense, given that no one would be 
interested in applying for a licence that may be terminated at any given moment 
without justifiable reasons.   
Another condition set under Article 31 of the Agreement is that a right holder should 
be rewarded appropriate remuneration whilst taking into consideration the economic 
value.610 This clause can be applied to any type of compulsory licence.611 The need to 
remedy anti-competitive practices can also be taken into consideration when deciding 
a value of remuneration in such circumstances.612 It must be mentioned here that a 
                                                          
607 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(d) and (e) 
608 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(g) 
609 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(g) 
610 The TRIPS Agreement, Article Article 31(h) 
611 In the case of licences to remedy anti-competitive practices, the need to correct them ‘may be taken 
into account in determining the amount of remuneration’ (Article 31k). As the objective is to restore 
healthy competition, this provision would allow for a reduced remuneration or even for a ‘free-royalty’ 
licence as granted under US anti-trust law. See P. Mendes da Costa, ‘Patent Harmonization through 
GATT: TRIP or Trap?', Patent World, September 1992; and W. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and Antitrust 
Law, Vol. II, 4th edn, Little, Brown & Co., 1991. 
612 C. Correa and A. Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd 
edn, Kluwer Law International 2008), 315; UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 
(2005) Chapter 29, p 557 
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significant level of independent interpretation is left at the national level to determine 
when a reward is ‘adequate’.613 Indeed, the Article has indicated that the adequacy is 
to be judged in the circumstances of each case whilst taking into consideration ‘the 
economic value of the authorisation’.  However, various factors can have an impact on 
the circumstances of each case, such as the country where the patent operates and the 
purpose of the licence. Moreover, the ‘economic value’ can depend on multiple 
elements such as the market’s size, the length of technology’s age, the rate of 
desirability in the relevant division, the exposure, and the level of competition of 
alternative products.614 
From a rule of law perspective, the word ‘adequate’ could be further explained to 
provide some defined guidance to domestic judicial systems. There are different 
potential understandings of the word ‘adequate’. One potential interpretation of the 
word ‘adequate’ could indicate the compensation that the right holder must attain 
within the length of the transaction.615 Another possible interpretation could take into 
consideration elements like the aids that the right holder finally obtained to grow the 
patent, the R&D duty of the right holder and the level to which development costs have 
been repaid.616 Nevertheless, the TRIPS Agreement has ascertained that the right 
holder should be capable of requesting a review of the ‘legal validity’ of any judgement 
                                                          
613 C. Correa, 'The GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: new 
standards for patent protection' [1994] 16(8) European Intellectual Property Review 327-335; This is 
the only provision in the draft Agreement that refers to ‘adequate’ remuneration. Whereas, Articles 
14.4 and 70.4 use ‘equitable’ remuneration instead. 
614 C. Correa ‘The GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: new 
standards for patent protection’ [1994] 16 (8) European Intellectual Property Review 327-335 
615 H. Small, ‘The EEC Draft Directive on Rental Rights and Other Rights’,[1991] 3(4) Intellectual Property 
in Business, at 21. 
616 C. Correa ‘The GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: new 
standards for patent protection’ [1994] 16 (8) European Intellectual Property Review 327-335 
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by a judicial authority regarding a decision made for a compulsory licence, as well as 
the decided remuneration.617 
As indicated above, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement controls anti-competitive 
practices in non-voluntary licences.618 Article 31 of the Agreement supplements the 
substantive provision provided in Article 5(A) in the Paris Convention619, as it has 
recognised the authority of Member countries to adopt legislative measures that are 
set to prevent abuses resulting from the exclusivity of the rights conferred under patent 
law, such as failure to work.620  Nevertheless, it can be noted that the TRIPS Agreement 
is generally broad in dealing with anti-competitive practices.  
WTO Members are permitted, under the TRIPS Agreement, to embrace measures to 
control anti-competitive conduct. The Agreement did not define the term of abuse as it 
leaves it for each Member to decide its definition.  Therefore, differences could arise 
between national laws as they deliberate what is to be considered as an abusive 
practice. National rules can be consistent with the Agreement and can be suitably 
modified to meet the set conditions when the broad standards existing under the TRIPS 
Agreement provide a better comprehension of the underlying concepts and 
standards.621  
 
                                                          
617 The TRIPS Agreement, Articles 31(i) and (g) 
618 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 31 
619 C. Correa and A. Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd 
edn, Kluwer Law International 2008), 314 
620 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883, WIPO (1979), available 
at <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=287556> accessed on 6th December 
2017 
621 C. Correa and A. Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd 
edn, Kluwer Law International 2008), 326 
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III. REFUSAL TO LICENSE IN DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS, BOTH INTERNATIONAL 
AND COUNTRY SPECIFIC REGIME 
At an international level, the TRIPS Agreement has indicated that WTO Member 
countries have to adhere to the requirements of the main conventions of WIPO. This 
principle includes the adherence to the Paris Convention, as well as, the Berne 
Convention on Copyright.622 Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement can be referred to as 
‘Berne and Paris Plus Agreement’.623 In principle, the integration of WIPO into the TRIPS 
Agreement would indicate a successful combination of IP standards with trade goals 
that lacks any conflicts.624 However, this may not always be as straightforward as it may 
appear to be.  An example on this can be in Havana Club625 where the Appellate Body 
had indeed highlighted the primacy of the WIPO instrument over the TRIPS 
Agreement,626 yet it can be noted that sometimes conflicts could be raised by a 
concerned party regarding a potential conflict between the TRIPS and WIPO 
instruments.  
In addition, the WIPO have conducted a survey on the treatment of refusal to license 
by various countries in order to highlight the differences between country specific 
regimes.  
                                                          
622 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 2(2) states the following: ‘Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall 
derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, 
the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits.’ 
623 WTO, ‘Frequently asked questions about TRIPS [trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights] 
in the WTO’ (wto.org) < https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm> accessed 11th 
November 2018 
624 Graeme Dinwoodie, ‘Designing a Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The 
WTO, WIPO and Beyond (with R. Drefuss) [2009] 46 House Law Review 1188-1233, at 1201 
625 WTO AB Reports, U.S-Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 WT/DS176/AB/R 2nd 
Jan 2002 
626 WTO AB Reports, U.S-Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 WT/DS176/AB/R 2nd 
Jan 2002, at 333-41 it was stated by the Appellate Body the following: ‘To adopt the Panel’s approach 
would be to deprive Article 8 of the Paris Convention… of any and all meaning and effect.’ 
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The following section examines the WIP’s development agenda and aims to highlight 
some of the different jurisdictions on refusal to license by both international treaties 
and country specific regimes, in order to position the relative importance of any 
differences or similarities. 
A. WIPO’s Developmental Agenda 
This section examines the WIPO Development Agenda in providing further clarifications 
to the link between competition law and IPRs. The development of pro-competitive IPRs 
licensing, exchange of information and further clarifications have been highlighted in 
the 7627, 23628, and 32629 Recommendations of the WIPO Development Agenda.630 
The twenty-first session by the CDIP has presented a document in May 2018 which 
summarised the implementation of the Development Agenda by WIPO and programs 
within the Organisation.631 The CDIP have outlined the status as of the end of December 
2017 of the implementation of the Development Agenda’s 7, 23 and 32 
Recommendations in the twenty-first session as the following:  
                                                          
627 General Assembly for Immediate Implementation, ‘The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the 
WIPO Development Agenda’ (wipo.int, 2007) < http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf> accessed 15 August 2018. Recommendation 7 states: 
‘Promote measures that will help countries deal with intellectual property-related anti-competitive 
practices, by providing technical cooperation to developing countries, especially LDCs, at their request, 
in order to better understand the interface between IPRs and competition policies.’ 
628 General Assembly for Immediate Implementation, ‘The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the 
WIPO Development Agenda’ (wipo.int, 2007) < http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf> accessed 15 August 2018. Recommendation 23 
states: ‘[T]o consider how to better promote pro-competitive intellectual property licensing practices, 
particularly with a view to fostering creativity, innovation and the transfer and dissemination of 
technology to interested countries, in particular developing countries and LDCs.’ 
629 General Assembly for Immediate Implementation, ‘The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the 
WIPO Development Agenda’ (wipo.int, 2007) < http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf> accessed 15 August 2018. Recommendation 32 
states: ‘To have within WIPO opportunity for exchange of national and regional experiences and 
information on the links between IPRs and competition policies.’ 
630 F. Gurry, ‘Successful Technology Licensing’ (wipo.net, 2015) 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/licensing/903/wipo_pub_903.pdf accessed on 15 August 2018 
631 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP) ‘Twenty-First Session’ (wipo.net, 18 
May 2018) http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=46438 accessed 15 August 2018 
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1. Recommendation 7 has been under implementation since it has been 
introduced in the Development Agenda of 2007.632 The Recommendation was 
also tackled in a ‘Project on Intellectual Property and Competition Policy’,633 and 
an Evaluation Report has been submitted in the ninth session to the CDIP.634   
2. Recommendation 23 has commenced implementation in January 2010. This 
Recommendation was also attended in the same Project mentioned above and 
Evaluation Reports.635 Moreover, the Recommendation is currently being 
presented by the project on ‘Intellectual Property Management and Transfer of 
Technology: Promoting the Effective Use of Intellectual Property in Developing 
Countries, Least Developed Countries and Countries with Economic in 
Transition’ which has been accepted to commence implementation in 2018.636  
                                                          
632 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Twenty-First Session: Director General’s 
Report on the Implementation of the Development Agenda’ (CDIP_21_2, 2018) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_21/cdip_21_2.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018 
633 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property ‘Twenty-First Session: Director General’s 
Report on the Implementation of the Development Agenda’ (CDIP_21_2, 2018) 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_21/cdip_21_2.pdf accessed on 30 August 2018. For 
further information, see Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Fourth Session: Project 
on Intellectual Property and Competition Policy (Recommendations 7, 23 and 32) (CDIP/4/4, 2009) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_4.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018 
634 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property ‘Twenty-First Session: Director General’s 
Report on the Implementation of the Development Agenda’ (CDIP_21_2, 2018) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_21/cdip_21_2.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018. 
For further information, see Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Ninth Session: 
External Independent Evaluation Report of the Project on Intellectual Property and Competition Policy’ 
(CDIP/9/8, 2012) http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_9/cdip_9_8.pdf accessed on 30 
August 2018 
635 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property ‘Twenty-First Session: Director General’s 
Report on the Implementation of the Development Agenda’ (CDIP_21_2, 2018) 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_21/cdip_21_2.pdf accessed on 30 August 2018. For 
further information, see Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Fourth Session: Project 
on Intellectual Property and Competition Policy (Recommendations 7, 23 and 32) (CDIP/4/4, 2009) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_4.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018. 
See also Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Ninth Session: External Independent 
Evaluation Report of the Project on Intellectual Property and Competition Policy’ (CDIP/9/8, 2012) 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_9/cdip_9_8.pdf accessed on 30 August 2018 
636 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property ‘Twenty-First Session: Director General’s 
Report on the Implementation of the Development Agenda’ (CDIP_21_2, 2018) 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_21/cdip_21_2.pdf accessed on 30 August 2018. For 
further information, see Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Nineteenth Session: 
Project on Intellectual Property Management and Transfer of Technology: Promoting the Effective Use 
of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries, Least Developed Countries and Countries with 
Economies in Transition Proposed by South Africa’ (CDIP/19/11 Rev., 2017) 
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3. Recommendation 32 has also been under operation as of early 2010. The 
Recommendation was tackled in the aforementioned ‘Intellectual Property and 
Competition Policy’ document637 as well as ‘Enhancing South-South Cooperation 
on IP and Development among Developing countries and LDCs.638 Moreover, an 
Evaluation Report for these two projects was provided in the ninth and 
thirteenth sessions of the CDIP.639 
The project on ‘Intellectual Property and Competition Policy’640 has emphasised the 
WIPO’s intention to undertake various activities and licence training programmes to 
promote an enhanced understanding of IP and competition policy. This project was 
undertaken nine years ago, yet the suggested activities derived from the report are still 
ongoing as of the end of 2017. Such activities mainly entail a set of surveys, seminars 
                                                          
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_19/cdip_19_11_rev.pdf> accessed on 30 August 
2018 
637 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property ‘Twenty-First Session: Director General’s 
Report on the Implementation of the Development Agenda’ (CDIP_21_2, 2018) 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_21/cdip_21_2.pdf accessed on 30 August 2018. See 
also Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Fourth Session: Project on Intellectual 
Property and Competition Policy (Recommendations 7, 23 and 32) (CDIP/4/4, 2009) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_4.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018. 
638 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property ‘Twenty-First Session: Director General’s 
Report on the Implementation of the Development Agenda’ (CDIP_21_2, 2018) 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_21/cdip_21_2.pdf accessed on 30 August 2018. See 
also Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Seventh Session: Project Proposal from the 
African Group on Enhancing South-South Cooperation on Intellectual Property (IP) and Development 
Among Developing Countries and Least Developed Countries (CDIP/7/6, 2011) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_7/cdip_7_6.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018 
639 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property ‘Twenty-First Session: Director General’s 
Report on the Implementation of the Development Agenda’ (CDIP_21_2, 2018) 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_21/cdip_21_2.pdf accessed on 30 August 2018. See 
also  
 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Ninth Session: External Independent Evaluation 
Report of the Project on Intellectual Property and Competition Policy’ (CDIP/9/8, 2012) 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_9/cdip_9_8.pdf accessed on 30 August 2018 and  
Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Thirteenth Session: Evaluation Report on the 
Project on Enhancing South-South Cooperation on IP and Development Among Developing Countries 
and LDCs’, (CDIP 13/4, 2014) < http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_13/cdip_13_4.pdf> 
accessed on 30 August 2018 
640 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, ‘Fourth Session: Project on Intellectual 
Property and Competition Policy (Recommendations 7, 23 and 32) (CDIP/4/4, 2009) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_4.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018 
 165 
and Geneva-based conferences which enable the exchange of knowledge in this area.641 
A survey, for example, has been conducted in 2011 following its approval during the 
Fourth Session of the CDIP in 2009 on ‘Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member 
States to Address Anti-Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights’.642 Most 
countries in the questionnaire have implied that compulsory licences are not mainly 
established to tackle anti-competitive practices of IPRs as it has been highlighted that 
the majority of domestic laws that address compulsory licensing do not contain 
language that particularly addresses anti-competitive practices of IPRs. 643 Following the 
project’s examination of different domestic law, it was generally understood that 
compulsory licences are not particularly used to remedy, correct, repress or prevent 
anti-competitive practices of IPRs per se, but are instead used to achieve specific 
objectives and aims such as the public interest and failure to work a patented 
invention.644  
The UK had expressed that the IP Office does not receive many requests for compulsory 
licences. It can, thus, be safe to assume that the system of compulsory licensing acts as 
a preventive measure to anti-competitive or abusive practices, as it appears that IP 
owners prefer to enter into negotiations to decide for themselves the terms of a 
licensing agreement under a voluntary one. Similarly, it was indicated by Hungary that 
                                                          
641 Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP) ‘Fourth Session’ (wipo.net, November 
2009) http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_5/cdip_5_ref_cdip_4_4_rev.pdf accessed on 
15 August 2018 
642 WIPO Secretariat ‘Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address Anti-
Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights’ (CDIP/4/4 Rev./Study/INF/5,  2011) 
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=187423> accessed on 30 August 2018 
643 WIPO Secretariat ‘Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address Anti-
Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights’ (CDIP/4/4 Rev./Study/INF/5,  2011) 
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=187423> accessed on 30 August 2018 
644 WIPO Secretariat ‘Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address Anti-
Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights’ (CDIP/4/4 Rev./Study/INF/5,  2011) 
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=187423> accessed on 30 August 2018 
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the existence of the compulsory licensing system, in itself, allows for disputes to be 
resolved under voluntary licences.645 
Other WIPO Member States such as Austria, Belgium, Ukraine and Finland have advised 
that the absence of precedents makes it impossible for them to advise whether 
compulsory licences in the form of antitrust law interventions are suitable means to 
deal with anti-competitive practices of IPRs. France, however, has expressed that 
compulsory licensing is a suitable means of dealing with anti-competitive practices of 
IPRs despite the absence of practice. Germany indicated that compulsory licences are 
suitable on a case-by-case evaluation to attain a balance between IPRs and 
competition.646 
The UK, Germany, Sweden and France referred to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and 
previous case laws to tackle matters related to competition and antitrust cases. Those 
Member States conveyed that a compulsory licence could be issued to provide access 
to an IPR in the circumstances of abuse of dominance under EU competition law and 
the essential facilities doctrine. Interestingly, it was indicated by Spain that the 
effectiveness of compulsory licences is unidentified due to the lack of its application.  
Germany highlighted that the respondent could present the of compulsory licences as 
a defence against patent infringement claims brought by a right holder. In other words, 
the ‘infringing’ user in patent infringement cases can claim that the right holder’s 
refusal to license was anti-competitive or abusive. The consideration of refusal to 
license as anti-competitive by the German courts is dependent on the fact that access 
                                                          
645 WIPO Secretariat ‘Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address Anti-
Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights’ (CDIP/4/4 Rev./Study/INF/5,  2011) 
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=187423> accessed on 30 August 2018 
646  WIPO Secretariat ‘Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address Anti-
Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights’ (CDIP/4/4 Rev./Study/INF/5,  2011) 
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=187423> accessed on 30 August 2018 
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to the patent is essential. If access is essential, then it provides the defendant with 
defence against any use of the IPR undertaken before the grant of a compulsory 
licence.647 The UK also highlighted that an infringer may be permitted to file a counter 
action for a compulsory licence against the patent infringement proceeding brought by 
the right holder. Nonetheless, the grant of a compulsory licence by UK courts, 
interestingly, would only provide the infringer with defence for future uses of the IPR 
in question, instead of uses before the infringement proceeding.648 
Moreover, Hungary and Poland have suggested that compulsory licence defences due 
to allegations of anti-competitive practices as counter-actions against infringement 
proceedings are not to be permitted in their jurisdictions. Whereas, Germany, as 
indicated above, has stressed that compulsory licences are necessary to cover anti-
competitive practices on a case-by-case basis. Germany has rationalised its approach 
by stating that the mere existence of IPRs is protected without restrictions, however, 
its exercise is restricted by competition law as any other type of property.649 
It can be noted from above that the motives and objectives of the compulsory licensing 
system are different from one WIPO State to the other. Moreover, such differences also 
exist between one EU country to the other. Therefore, it can be presumed that the 
exchange of knowledge in this area is necessary in order to understand why such 
significant differences exist, at least for the purpose of this research, why such 
differences exist between the EU Member States in the application of EU competition 
                                                          
647 WIPO Secretariat ‘Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address Anti-
Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights’ (CDIP/4/4 Rev./Study/INF/5,  2011) 
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=187423> accessed on 30 August 2018 
648 WIPO Secretariat ‘Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address Anti-
Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights’ (CDIP/4/4 Rev./Study/INF/5,  2011) 
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=187423> accessed on 30 August 2018 
649 WIPO Secretariat ‘Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address Anti-
Competitive Uses of Intellectual Property Rights’ (CDIP/4/4 Rev./Study/INF/5,  2011) 
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=187423> accessed on 30 August 2018 
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law between EU Member states. From a rule of law perspective, such differences could 
lead to better legal enforcement in one Member state than the other which might also 
lead to some inconsistencies in the application of Article 102 TFEU.  
B. Different Approaches to Refusal to License IPRs within the WIPO States 
The WIPO Member States have adopted different and complex approaches that deal 
with the refusal to license IPRs.650 Generally speaking, refusal to license is identified as 
the exclusive right to use the IPR as per statutes and national legislation. In some 
circumstances, the refusal to license can be contemplated as unlawful depending on 
national legislation. In further situations, refusal to license can trigger harsh 
sanctions.651 
1.  Right to Refuse to License as the Essence of IPRs 
The essence of IPRs offers exclusivity of rights conferred to right holders and the right 
to refuse to license a protected right.652 For instance, Article 31(b)653 of the TRIPS 
                                                          
650 J. Espinosa ‘Unilateral Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights: A Comparative Perspective’ 
(dspace.lib 2014) < http://dspace.lib.niigata-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10191/31252/1/59_257-
289.pdf> accessed on 22 August 2018; World Trade Organisation Secretariat, ‘Refusal to License IP 
Rights: A Comparative Note of Possible Approaches’ (2013) at para. 12 < 
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http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/refusals_license_IPRs.pdf> 
accessed on 30 August 2018  
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Agreement recognises that a compulsory licence can only be granted when the licensee 
had made attempts to attain a licence from the right holder under reasonable terms.  
The mentioned above is further reinforced by Article 28.2654 of the TRIPS Agreement 
which stresses that the provision would not be fulfilled if a compulsory licence is to be 
granted whenever a refusal to license takes place. Hypothetically speaking, if the 
outcome of refusal to license was to always be granted a compulsory licence, then right 
holders would always be obliged to conclude licensing contracts which will undermine 
private property rights and can consequently result in the weakening of Article 28.1655 
of the TRIPS.  
It can be noted that refusal to license can also be seen in other types of IP and not only 
patents as indicated in the introductory chapter and as can be seen in various 
countries.656 It must be noted here, however, that the US has indicated that the 
outcome of a refusal to license could differ from one type of an IP to the other, even 
when the same principles are applied to the cases involved with refusal to license 
                                                          
654 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 1996, Article 
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655 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 1996, Article 
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A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject matter of a 
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using, offering for sale, selling, or importing these purposes that product; (b) where the subject matter 
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656 J. Espinosa ‘Unilateral Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights: A Comparative Perspective’ 
(dspace.lib 2014) < http://dspace.lib.niigata-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10191/31252/1/59_257-
289.pdf> accessed on 22 August 2018; The Unilateral Conduct Working Group, ‘Report on the Analysis 
of Refusal to Deal with a Rival Under Unilateral Conduct Laws’ (international competition network, 
2010) at 23 <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc616.pdf> accessed 
24 August 2018 
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IPRs.657 As a matter of fact, Article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement outlaws the compulsory 
licensing of trademarks altogether.658  
2. The International Legal Framework on Refusal to License IPRs 
IPRs are increasingly being licensed across various jurisdictions which results in a further 
layer of complexity. There are no existing international agreements that frame 
international competition policies, unlike IPRs which are harmonised to a certain degree 
by the TRIPS Agreement.659 The international context set by the TRIPS Agreement only 
provides limited provisions on competition policy, and such provisions have been 
identified only to provide general guidance as they are not obligatory on Member 
countries.660 The determination of the circumstances where refusal to license create a 
breach of antitrust laws is left for the discretion of Member countries. It has been 
stipulated that ‘saying so little in the international instrument [TRIPS] means, by 
necessary implication, recognising correspondingly expansive latitude to the relevant 
domestic law-making powers retained by the Members.’661 Indeed, the TRIPS antitrust 
provisions are limited in scope, yet the Agreement remains the most inclusive 
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658 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), Article 21 
659 G. Duduchava and G. Miteva, ‘Global Antitrust Trends in the Context of Refusal to License IPRs’ 
(2016) WIPO Academy, University of Turin and ITC-ILO Research Papers Collection -2013-2014 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2723858> accessed on 31 August 2018; 
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(2016) WIPO Academy, University of Turin and ITC-ILO Research Papers Collection -2013-2014 < 
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661 G. Duduchava and G. Miteva, ‘Global Antitrust Trends in the Context of Refusal to License IPRs’ 
(2016) WIPO Academy, University of Turin and ITC-ILO Research Papers Collection -2013-2014 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2723858> accessed on 31 August 2018. See also 
I. Eagles and L. Longdin, Refusal to License Intellectual Property: Testing the Limits of Law and 
Economics, (Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2011), at 316 
 171 
international Agreement on IP-antitrust law.662 Some Member countries have 
extensively legislated IP-antitrust matters, whilst other Member countries do not have 
any legislation that addresses the matter, given that the TRIPS Agreement adopts a 
‘minimalist framework’663 on antitrust matters.  
It has, thus, been argued that existing inconsistencies between domestic competition 
law seems to have encouraged knowledge exchange between economic experts rather 
than international collaboration.664 It was also highlighted that the lack of 
harmonisation of international standards have made international businesses pursue 
the fulfilment of the most severe competition regimes so that they will not have to 
modify their licensing arrangements for the laws of each Member country.665 
Additionally, it has been even suggested that existing inconsistencies between domestic 
competition laws results in the unpredictability of the outcomes of right holders’ 
licensing practices that operate at an international level.666 
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Thomas Cottier and Joseph Drexl have both provided interesting suggestions to 
overcome the defects of the TRIPS Agreement’s antitrust standards. It has been 
indicated by Cottier that a separate international agreement on the national IP-related 
antitrust system would not be sufficient.667 Similarly, it has been implied by Drexl that 
harmonisation of antitrust standards between WTO Members is unnecessary, but they 
have favoured a comprehensive antitrust agreement that prohibits of discrimination 
against foreign markets.668 
3. Refusal to license as abuses of IPRs 
As previously indicated, the refusal to license can be measured as abusive by the courts 
of national legislation under specific circumstances.669 The concept of abuse of IPRs is 
established under Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention,670 as well as, Article 8.2 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.671 However, the concept of abusive conduct varies greatly from one 
jurisdiction to the other. This is because abusive conduct is established with an act that 
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669 World Trade Organisation Secretariat, ‘Refusal to License IP Rights: A Comparative Note of Possible 
Approaches’ (2013) at para. 19 < http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
competition/en/studies/refusals_license_IPRs.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018 
670 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883, Article 5(A)(2) states that ‘Each 
country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of 
compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses, which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.’ 
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is contrary to the aims of a law established in a specific jurisdiction. Clearly, the aims of 
the law differ from one country to the other and so do the definitions of abuse.672 
It has been suggested that one of the main issues in Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris 
Convention is the fact that the Article had identified the right to exclude others as the 
essence of the right given to IP holders.673 Inevitably, rights holders do also enjoy the 
right to license as well as the right to assign.674 Nevertheless, it has been argued that 
these positive rights exist due to their negative essence as the right to a licence is an 
expected consequence of the right to refuse a license. This argument is supported by 
the language used in Article 28.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. The Article used the word 
‘also’ which indicates that the positive dimension of such rights is an expected 
consequence of the right to exclude.675  
It must be mentioned that there is a difference between abusive conduct and anti-
competitive conduct with regards to the scope of Article 31(k). Once an authority of 
court finds that the practice of a right holder has been anti-competitive, then sanctions 
harsher can be applied on top of compulsory licences, such as revocation or forfeiture 
of the IPR in question.676 Moreover, an authority or a relevant administration must 
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examine the anti-competitive practices by IPRs before the granting of a compulsory 
licence, unlike abusive practices.677 This is because authorities aim to remedy anti-
competitive refusals to license as per Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement and thus, 
Article 5 of the Paris Convention becomes inapplicable678. On the one hand, the 
potential licensee must make a genuine effort to attain a voluntary licence before 
seeking a court calling for a compulsory licence due to the proprietor’s abusive refusal 
to license. On the other hand, the possible beneficiary does not have to seek a voluntary 
licence before seeking a compulsory licence from an authority or court in circumstances 
of anti-competitive practices by IPR holders.679  
The majority of WIPO Member countries can consider a refusal to license as abusive, 
particularly when the local markets cannot embody or import the patented 
invention,680 and there are no reasonable defences for a refusal to license, or when 
prejudice exists to the development or formation of national commercial or industrial 
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Approaches’ (2013) at para. 25 < http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
competition/en/studies/refusals_license_IPRs.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018 
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undertakings.681 For example, the Dominican Republic and Argentina consider such 
conduct as anti-competitive. Therefore, Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement is 
applicable in these jurisdictions. Accordingly, the condition of serious attempt to obtain 
a licence, in such circumstances, is waived in countries like Argentina and the Dominican 
Republic. Whereas, in the United Kingdom, India and Australia such practices are 
considered as abusive, and thus, a potential licensee must make a serious effort to 
acquire a licence, before seeking the claim for the compulsory licence under 
competition laws. Accordingly, Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement, in such 
circumstances, is inapplicable in these three jurisdictions is inapplicable, given that such 
practices are considered abusive, and not anti-competitive.682 
4. Refusal to license as Anti-Competitive Practices 
 In exceptional circumstances, the refusal to license could be considered as an abuse of 
dominance if violation of competition or antitrust law were to take place.683 However, 
a patent holder may be exempted from antitrust laws with valid business reasons to 
‘anti-competitive’ refusal to license.684 It has also been argued that it is rare to see that 
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 176 
market power is accorded through IP rights alone.685 Regardless, anti-competitive 
refusal to license can only occur when the actual or possible competitor exists in the 
same market. 686 
Generally, anti-competitive refusal to license is linked with, the previously discussed, 
essential facilities. 687 The facility must be unavailable and cannot be embodied in the 
relevant market.688 The essential facilities doctrine suggests that an IP must never be 
an essential facility and it should not prevent others from entering the same relevant 
market.689   
IV. THE EU COMPETITION LAW 
This section addresses the position of the ECJ towards the direct effect of international 
agreements, in particular, the TRIPS Agreement. It then examines the principle of 
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consistent interpretations and hierarchy of norms leading to the exploration of refusal 
to license as an abuse of dominance under EU competition law. 
A. The Position of the EU Towards Direct Effect of International Agreements.  
The EU strictly controls the interpretation and direct applicability of international 
treaties. It seems that the EU maintains the supremacy of EU law over international 
treaties including the WTO Agreement.690   
The EU attempted to resolve the connection between international and domestic law 
by imposing supremacy of EU law over its Member States.691 The ECJ established in the 
case of Costa v ENEL that the Member States must act in a way that validates the 
obligations derived from, at that time, Community Treaty.692 Moreover, it has been 
argued that we must distinguish the terms ‘direct effect’ and ‘direct applicability’.693 
Treaty articles are subject to the direct application by the Member States and, in 
circumstances of conflict, the EU can disregard the direct effect of international 
agreements.694 
The issue of whether the TRIPS Agreement specifically has a direct effect in the EU, 
Article 1(1) of the Agreement allows Member countries to employ measures deemed 
appropriate in their own legal system, given that they comply with the aims of the 
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Agreement.695 It was held by the ECJ, for example, that the TRIPS Agreement is non-
self-executing and thus, it does not have a direct effect within the EU.696 Nevertheless, 
the ECJ has stated that ‘there must be bona fide performance of every agreement.’697 
B. The Principle of Consistent Interpretation  
To start off with, there is room for considerable independent interpretations when 
international treaties include broad language. International treaties and the doctrine of 
consistent interpretations allow for the incorporation of different interpretations so 
long as the interpretation of the domestic law does not conflict with the international 
obligations.698 The principle of consistent interpretation significantly impacts the 
application of domestic laws.699 As indicated earlier, Articles 8(2) and 40(2) of the TRIPS 
Agreement allow Member countries to implement measures that prevent anti-
competitive conduct, but such rules or measures should remain consistent with the 
central values of the TRIPS Agreement.  
Looking into TRIPS negotiations’ history, it can be noted that there were concerns over 
the increased IP protection which can make Members with weaker economies more 
vulnerable to anti-competitive abuses by suppliers from Members with stronger 
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the rules of the organization as justification for its failure to perform the treaty.’ Note: EU has not 
ratified this treaty. 
699 S. Subramanian, ‘EU Obligation to the TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft Decision’, [2011] The 
European Journal of International Law 21(4) 997-1023 
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economies.700 It was suggested that a negative impact on international trade can 
happen when some suppliers are put in a better situated to enforce restraining 
requirements on the licensing of an IPR.701 Therefore, it was indicated that the TRIPS 
Agreement’s provisions requiring Members to make domestic competition law 
consistent with the Agreement are merely a formality to stop the extreme applicability 
of national competition laws and to provide competition authorities with control 
against the exploitation of IP rights.702 Nonetheless, it was indicated that the provisions 
of the TRIPS do not stop EU Members from ruling against anti-competitive conduct, 
however, the consistency condition does deter EU members from implementing 
measures that do not, necessarily,703 fit the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The above mentioned has been suggested to fit with the principle of ‘good faith’ set 
under Article 26 VCLT.704 This Article specifies that ‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’.705 Thus, abusive exercise 
of IPRs is unlawful under the principle of good faith.706 Accordingly, EU authorities must 
                                                          
700 Roffe and Spennemann, ‘Control of Anticompetitive Practices in Contractual Licences under the 
TRIPS Agreement’, in C. Correa and Y. Abdulqawi (eds), Intellectual Property and International Trade 
(2002) 
701 Roffe and Spennemann, ‘Control of Anticompetitive Practices in Contractual Licences under the 
TRIPS Agreement’, in C. Correa and Y. Abdulqawi (eds), Intellectual Property and International Trade: 
The TRIPS Agreement (2002), at 311; see GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, 
Communication from India, 10 July 1989, MTN.GNG./NG11/W/37, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92070115.pdf. See also J. Watal, Intellectual Property 
Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer Law International,2001) 
702 Heinemann, ‘Antitrust Law of Intellectual Property in the TRIPS Agreement of the World Trade 
Organization’, in F.K. Beier and G. Schricker (eds), From GATT to TRIPS (1996), at 239, 242. 
703 There is an extensive jurisprudence with regard to the meaning of the term ‘necessary’. Note from 
the Secretariat, ‘Necessity Tests in the WTO’, 03-6404, S/WPDR/W/27, 2 Dec. 2003, at para. 4; In United 
States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 36S/345-402 (L/6439), at para. 5.26, ‘necessity’ 
consisted in an examination of whether a satisfactory and effective alternative existed.  
704 S. Subramanian, ‘EU Obligation to the TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft Decision’, [2011] The 
European Journal of International Law 21(4) 997-1023 
705 P. Manin, ‘The European Communities and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organisations or between International Organisations’ [1987] 24 CML-Rev 468 
706 WTO Appellate Body Report, US - FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, 24 Feb. 2000, at para. 166. Thailand - H-
Beams, WT/DS122/AB/R, 12 Mar. 2001, at para. 97. US - Lamb, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, 1 
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show that competition law is a matter related to the interpretation of the principle of 
good faith.707 The integration of the articles of the TRIPS Agreement in EU decision-
making would support that EU competition law is applied under the principle of good 
faith.708 The weighing and balancing of obligations and rights can also indicate that EU 
adherence with the standard of good faith.709 Indeed, the principle of good faith is 
essential, yet Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement also indicates that the legitimate 
interests of the right-holders must be reasonable during any special cases that consider 
confining or limiting their exclusive rights. From a rule of law perspective, it could be 
argued that the legitimate expectations of the concerned parties must be met when 
interpreting EU competition law under the principle of good faith.  
 
With regards to EU law’s primacy over national law, it was suggested in Commission v. 
Germany, that: 
 
‘Secondary EU legislation must be interpreted in terms consistent with the primacy of 
international agreements that are concluded by the Community.’710  
                                                          
May 2001, at para. 115. US - Hot Rolled Steel, WT/DS184/AB/R, 24 July 2001, at para. 101. US - Cotton 
Yarn, WT/DS192/AB/R, 8 Oct. 2001, at para. 81. Mexico - Corn Syrup, WT/DS132/AB/RW, 22 Oct. 2001, 
at para. 47; EC - Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, 26 Sept. 2002, at para. 278. EC - Pipe Fittings, 
WT/DS/219/AB/R, 22 July 2003, at para. 127; EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/266/283/AB/R, 
28 Apr. 2005, at para. 307. See also Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts 
and Tribunals (Cambridge, 1953), at 125: ‘[a] reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right…is one which 
is appropriate and necessary for the purpose of the right (i.e., in furtherance of the interests which the 
right is intended to protect)’ 
707 S. Subramanian, ‘EU Obligation to the TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft Decision’, [2011] The 
European Journal of International Law 21(4) 997-1023 
708 S. Subramanian, ‘EU Obligation to the TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft Decision’, [2011] The 
European Journal of International Law 21(4) 997-1023 
709 S. Subramanian, ‘EU Obligation to the TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft Decision’, [2011] The 
European Journal of International Law 21(4) 997-1023 
710 Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:313, at [52]. Case T-01/04, Microsoft 
Corp. v. EC, [2006] ECR II-1491. EC Decision of 24 Mar. 2004, Microsoft Corp., (COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] 
OJ (2004) L 32/23, [781]. 
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Therefore, it was argued that consistent interpretation only applies to EU secondary 
legislation,711 despite the fact that the supremacy of international law is acknowledged 
as such only when the principle of consistent interpretation is also applicable to primary 
legislation, such as the TFEU.712 Regardless, it was indicated by the EU that according to 
the ‘hierarchy of norms’713, international agreements are available as an intermediary 
between both primary and secondary EU law as further indicated below. 714 
C. The Hierarchy of Norms 
International treaties require Member States and organisations to regulate their 
interests in conformity with international law.715 International law suggests that states 
and/or organisations that sign to join an international treaty would signify an 
acknowledgement of international law’s primacy over national systems.716 For example, 
Article 27 VCLT implies that all binding treaties have to be implemented in good faith. 
It is made clear by Article 27 VCLT that failure to adhere with international duties cannot 
be defended on the basis that there is a divergence between national law and such 
                                                          
711 S. Subramanian, ‘EU Obligations to the TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft Decision’ [2010] 21(4) 
European Journal of International Law 997-1023 
712 Case C-284/95, Safety Hi-Tec Srl v. S & T Srl [1998] ECR I-4301, at para. 22 states that ‘It is settled law 
that Community legislation must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with 
international law.’ See also Case C-89/99, Schieving-Nijstad and Others v. Robert Groeneveld [2001] ECR 
I-5851, at para 55 states the following: 
[W]here the judicial authorities are called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering 
provisional measures for the protection of intellectual property rights falling within a field to which 
TRIPS applies and in respect of which the Community has already legislated, they are required to do so 
as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of … TRIPS.  
See also Petersmann, ‘Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework of the GATT Multilateral Trade 
System’, in E.-U. Petersmann and M. Hilf (eds), The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(1991), at 85-93. See also T. Cottier and K. Schefer, ‘The Relationship between World Trade 
Organization Law, National and Regional Law’, [1998] 1 J Int'l Economic L 84, at 90. 
713 Europa, 'European Union (EU) hierarchy of norms' (Glossary of Summaries) <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/norms_hierarchy.html> accessed 13 November 2017 
714 S. Subramanian, ‘EU Obligations to the TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft Decision’ [2010] 21(4) 
European Journal of International Law 997-1023 
715 Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945, Art. 38(1)(a) states that ‘[t]he Court shall apply 
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the 
contesting states.’ 
716 T. Cottier and K. Schefer, ‘The Relationship between World Trade Organization Law, National and 
Regional Law’, [1998] 1 J Int'l Economic L 84, 86 
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duties.  
Without a doubt, the ECJ recognises that international law requires ‘bona fide 
performance of every agreement’.717 International law requires countries to enforce 
their international duties in their legal orders.718 However, the internal application of 
these international treaties is different from one state to another. Normally, dualist 
legal systems would transform international treaty obligations into national ones. 
Monist countries give treaties an equal legal position to that of national laws 
(subsequent to adopting the treaty), whereby the treaty would be considered as a part 
of their domestic legal system.719 On the other hand, individual countries assess ‘the 
legal regime in its totality’ to determine if it is adequately accurate for individuals to 
rely on it and if so, then it would be applicable by the national courts.720 Generally 
speaking, the EU has been monistic in regards to international treaties except it adopts 
a dualist approach when dealing with matters of WTO. The treaties become a part of 
EU law once relevant EU institutions have decided these treaties.721 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
717 Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, at para. 18. 
718 Tietje, ‘The Status of International Law in European Legal Order: The Case of International Treaties 
and Non-Binding International Instruments’, in J. Wouters et al. (eds), The Europeanisation of 
International Law (2008),p.  57 
719 S. Subramanian, 'EU obligation to TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft decision' [2010] 21(4) EJIL 997-
1023 
720 P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (Oxford 
University Press, 2004), at p. 274. 
721 Rosas, ‘The European Court of Justice and Public International Law’, in J. Wouters et al., The 
Europeanisation of International Law (2008), at 75 
 183 
D. Refusal to license in the EU 
If desired, a right holder in the EU can decide licensing arrangements. This attitude is 
applied to both tangible and intangible properties.722 Nonetheless, Article 102 TFEU723, 
in specific circumstances, can be used as an exception to the contractual freedom in 
circumstances of abusive refusal to license by a dominant business.724 This has been 
seen in various EU cases where the right holder has been found violating Article 102 
TFEU due to the abusive refusal to licence.725 Nonetheless, EU case law has been 
adopting a lenient approach to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ as its definition has 
expanded, particularly by the Commission throughout recent cases.726 Additionally, the 
standards set in IMS v NDC Health727 by the ECJ do not particularly add any limits to the 
scope of liability set under Article 102 TFEU.728 Thus, it has been stipulated that the 
                                                          
722 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 (C 45/7) 7-20 75 (2009)< http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009xc0224(01)&FROM=EN> accessed on 1st 
November 2018 
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47-390 102 (2012) <http:eu-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN> accessed on 2nd November 2018 
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289.pdf> accessed on 22 August 2018; University of Oslo, ‘Refusal to License IP as Abuse of Dominance: 
Balancing Intellectual Property and Competition Law’ (duo.uio 2010) 
<http://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/36378/178756.pdf?sequence=4> accessed on 2nd 
November 2018 
725 S. Anderman & H. Schmidt, EU Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The Regulation of 
Innovation (2nd edn., Oxford University Press 2011) 73 
726 These cases are covered in the following chapter which include the following: Case 238/87 Volvo AB 
v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] C.M.L.R 122; Case C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and 
Independent Telivision Publication Ltd (ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743; Case  C-7/97 Oscar Bronner 
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Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 (General Court) (The Microsoft judgement); Case C 170/13 Huawei 
Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14; Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp. [2016]  
R.P.C. 4 
727 Discussed further in the upcoming chapters Case C-481/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC 
Health GmbH & Co. KG [2004] ECR I 5039  
728 I. Lianos & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, ‘New Challenges in the Intersection of Intellectual Property Rights 
with Competition Law- a View from Europe and the United States’ (2013) CLES Working Paper Series 
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conditions or ‘exceptional circumstances’ are unclear.729 The following critically 
analyses, from a rule of law approach, the expansion of the exceptional circumstances 
throughout EU case law for finding an abuse of dominance in order to examine areas 
that are still unclear or that have resulted in a set of contradictory decisions.   
It can be mentioned that past decisions of the ECJ and the GC have suggested that 
abusive refusal to license can be found once several conditions are fulfilled. First, the 
right owner has to be a dominant undertaking in a relevant market. Second, the IPR has 
to be crucial to an activity in the market. Third, the refusal to license should have a 
negative effect on competition in that market. Fourth, there must be consumer demand 
for the products or services sought by the potential licensee. Fifth, there are no 
reasonable justifications for the refusal to licence.730 
1. Legal framework: Article 102 TFEU 
Article 102 TFEU does not mention examples of abusive refusal to deal or license IPRs.731 
Nevertheless, the Article applies to exploitative abuses732, structural733 and 
                                                          
4/2013, p. 81 https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/sites/cles/files/cles-4-2013new.pdf accessed on 4 September 
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732 An exploitative abuse has been defined as conduct that makes ‘use of the opportunities arising out 
of [a company’s] dominant position in such a way as to reap trading benefits which it would not have 
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and Section 2: Abuse and Monopolising Conduct,’ (2008) Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 1301690, 873 < http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1301690> accessed on 4 September 2018; Case 
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exclusionary734 abuses. Refusal to supply is categorised as exclusionary abuses, and 
thus, refusal to license IPRs has been considered as an exclusionary abuse.  The primary 
legal objective here is to preserve competition in the market, protect consumers and 
innovation which be compromised by the mere existence of a dominant business.735 
Therefore, Article 102 TFEU disallows a dominant business from using market power to 
attempt to eliminate competition and obstruct innovation with the refusal to license 
IPRs.736 
Accordingly, the ECJ has construed Article 102 TFEU as a means of offering protection 
to competitors and consumers. 737 The following chapter examines further in details the 
exceptional circumstances test adopted by EU competition authorities for determining 
abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU in cases of abusive refusal to license.  
2. Enforcing EU Competition Rules 
The European Commission has the role of safeguarding that competition in the EU 
Single Market is not hindered. To be more specific, the Directorate-General for 
Competition must ensure the effectivity of EU competition policy, explore cases of 
unlawful conduct, as well as take the necessary steps to ensure the appropriate and 
effective functioning of competition in the EU Single Market. Moreover, the European 
                                                          
734 Exclusionary abuses concern direct or indirect harm to compeittiors. The classic definition is found in 
Case 85/76 Hoffman La-Roche & Co. AG v. Comm’n (Hoffman La-Roche) [1979] E.C.R. 461 
735 S. Anderman & H. Schmidt, EU Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The Regulation of 
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Comm’n (Michelin) [1983] E.C.R. 3461 
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Commission has wide-ranging powers of investigating and carrying out unexpected 
inspections at the premises of undertakings and requiring them to deliver evidence that 
is relevant for its examinations. Finally, the College of Commissioners must then adopt 
any final and formal decisions. 
Prior to 2004, the Commission had the sole authority and the competence to enforce 
antitrust rules. Nonetheless, a new enforcement system has been introduced as a major 
reform whereby both national competition authorities and the European Commission 
can now directly apply and enforce EU competition rules. The national competition 
authorities of EU Member States and the European Commission can now cooperate as 
they do independent investigations and make competition decisions via the European 
Competition Network.  
Overall, the cooperation between national competition authorities and the European 
Commission has led to more than 2000 inspections and more than 1000 decisions by 
the end of 2017.738 Indeed, the Commission has the role of initiating investigations 
alongside national competition authorities, yet the Commission must also ensure that 
national competition authorities apply EU competition rules in a uniform manner which 
ultimately makes the European Commission the main enforcer of EU competition rules.  
 
 
 
                                                          
738 European Court of Auditors, ‘Enforcement of EU competition policy’ September 2018 < 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/BP_COMPETITION/BP_COMPETITION_EN.pdf> 
accessed on 15th September 2019 
 187 
3. CFREU and Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of IPRs 
On the one hand, Article 47 CFREU ensures the right to effective remedy and fair trial.739 
The ECJ has recently examined whether the bringing of IP infringement proceedings 
could amount to an abuse of Article 102 TFEU and hinder the standard implementer’s 
rights granted under Article 47 CFREU with regards to fair trial.740 The same Article 
ensures everyone’s rights to access justice, and thus, it could be argued that patent or 
SEP holders must enjoy the right of seeking justice in cases of disputes without the risk 
of breaching Article 102 TFEU. 
 On the other hand, the essence of IPRs is to protect and reward and innovation which 
is guaranteed under Article 17(2) CFREU741 and the Directive 2004/48/EC on the 
Enforcement of IPRs742 as they both ensure a high level of protection to IPRs. As a 
matter of fact, Directive 2004/48 aims to harmonise the minimum measures, 
procedures and remedies for the enforcement of IPRs as it makes available permanent 
and preliminary injunctions.743 Furthermore, Article 3 of the same Directive states that 
remedies must be proportionate and must aim to evade being barriers to legitimate 
trade.744 Aside from the Directive, Member States still enjoy the independence of 
enforcing and regulating their legal procedures, and thus, this leads to the lack of 
comprehensive uniformity which can raise obstacles of inconsistency. These obstacles 
can have a significant impact on disputes concerning enforcement action, as it usually 
the situation for SEPs.  
                                                          
739 Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000/C 364/01, Article 47 
740 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp. [2016] R.P.C. 4 
741 Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000/C 364/01, Article 17(2) 
742 Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
743 Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
744 Directive 2004/48/EC on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Article 3 
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4. Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings 
The Guidance has only directly mentioned the refusal to license IPRs twice. Therefore, 
the Commission views the refusal to license as merely one of the wide-ranging 
examples of abusive conduct,745 whereas the Discussion Paper746 had dedicated a full 
section on refusal to license IPRs. Moreover, the Discussion Paper has also indicated 
that EU courts should adopt a different approach in general cases of refusal to license 
of IPRs, as opposed to refusal to license of interoperability information. The Discussion 
Paper has suggested that, indeed, interoperability could be considered IP, but it does 
not make sense to apply harsh interventions similar to those applied on patents or 
copyrights.747 
Article 102 TFEU748, ex Article 82, is a short provision with a sum of undefined concepts. 
Thus, the Commission in 2009 has published Guidance on Article 82 Enforcement 
Priorities, particularly following backlash received after the Microsoft decision.749 The 
                                                          
745 I. Eagles & L. Longdin, Refusal to License Intellectual Property: Testing the Limits of Law and 
Economics (1st edn., Hart Publishing 2011), p.176 
746 DG Competition, DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
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749 P.  Akman. ‘The European Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 TFEU: from Inferno to Paradiso?’ 
[2010] 73 (4) Modern Law Review, 605-630 
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Guidance was initially welcomed as it was believed that it would provide further clarity 
and predictability to the subject matter.750 The Guidance was intended to deliver the 
following: 
 Greater clarity and predictability as regards the general framework of analysis which 
the Commission employs in determining whether it should pursue cases concerning 
various forms of exclusionary conduct and to help under-takings better assess whether 
certain behaviour is likely to result in intervention by the Commission under [Article 
102].751 
Nevertheless, it appears that the Commission’s Guidance did not reach its objectives 
since it has resulted in a sum of arguments that have been mainly brought up by 
economists. Some of which include issues related to dominance and market power, 
anti-competitive foreclosure and protection of competitors, and much more.752 It has 
also been suggested that the Guidance does not expand to cover the law of exclusionary 
abuse,753 whereby concerned relevant parties must seek consultation from authorities 
in regards to this matter.  
Some commentators have even considered that the Commission’s Guidance Paper 
brings legal uncertainty as the Commission had adopted a lenient approach in the 
                                                          
750 Shearman & sterling, 'The European Commission's Dominance Guidance: Towards a Review or 
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application of Article 102 on exclusionary abuses.754 An example on this can be provided 
by the fact that the Commission’s standpoint in paragraph 80 of the Guidance has been 
more lenient755 than the ECJ’s decision in Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB756 
on margin squeeze abuse. In fact,  it was contended that the Commission must remove 
the Guidance Paper due to the dangerous conflict between the authority of the EU 
courts, as well as, the Guidance Paper.757 Others have argued that Commission’s 
Guidance Paper should not be removed, but it should be revisited, given that it has 
failed to identify priorities which have led to more confusion amongst businesses about 
this area.758  
Indeed, it can be argued that the Guidance in itself is not binding, yet it can also be 
argued that it provides legitimate expectations for undertakings that, at least, the 
Commission is going to abide by its guidance. It must be mentioned here that the ECJ 
had ruled in Expedia Inc v Authorite de la concurrence759 that the Commission is bound 
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withdrawn’ [2010] 31 (2) ECLR 45. 
758 P. Akman ‘The European Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 TFEU: from Inferno to Paradiso?’ 
[2010] 73 (4) Modern Law Review 605. For further commentary on the debate leading to the Guidance 
and the Guidance itself see European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 
EC in Ehlermann and Marquis (eds.) (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008). A. Ezrachi ‘The European 
Commission Guidance on Article 82 EC- The way in Which Institutional Realities Limit the Potential for 
Reform’ (2009) Oxford Legal Paper Series (No 27/2009), available at www.ssrn.com. N. Pettit ‘From 
Formalism to effects? - The Commission’s Communication on Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 
82 EC’ [2009] 32 World Competition 485. M. Kellerbauer ‘The Commission’s New Enforcement Priorities 
in Applying Article 82 EC to Dominant Companies’ Conduct: A Shift Towards a More Economic 
Approach?’ [2010] 31(5) ECLR 175. D. Geradin ‘Is the Guidance Paper on the Commission’s Enforcement 
Priorities in Applying Article 102 TFEU to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct Useful?’ (2010) < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569502.> accessed 7th October 2016.  
759 C-266/11 Expedia Inc v Authorite de la concurrence [2013] Bus. L.R. 705, [28] 
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by the Notice it published as it was intended to provide guidance to courts and the 
Member States. It was held by the ECJ that the Commission could not deviate from the 
Notice without breaching the principle of legitimates expectation and equal 
treatment.760 Therefore, it can be argued here that undertakings have derived some 
legitimate expectations from the Guidance Paper. The Commission is to be bound by 
the Guidance and must fulfil its guiding principles, otherwise, the Commission could 
deviate from the principle of legitimate expectations and equal treatment. Such 
deviations do not adhere to the rule of law element of equality before the law. It would 
be interesting to see whether or not the Commission has followed its Guiding principles 
in its the Microsoft case.761 
In support to the above argument, it can be evident in the comments presented by 
Vodaphone Group Plc (Vodaphone) that some businesses do indeed prefer more 
explicit guidance on the application of Article 102 TFEU. It has been highlighted by the 
company that unclear guidance on the application of Article 102 gives a ‘chilling effect’ 
of uncertainty for the application of the Article. It has been further argued by 
Vodaphone that the Commission’s Discussion Paper on the application of Article 102 
TFEU should include more precise statements on the likelihood of circumstances to be 
pursued by the Commission, as well as examples of non-abusive behaviour and to 
reduce the discretionary language in the Discussion Paper. 762 
                                                          
760 C-266/11 Expedia Inc v Authorite de la concurrence [2013] Bus. L.R. 705, [28] 
761 It has been argued in the following chapter that the Commission has contradicted its Guidance Paper 
in the Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final which is concerning from a rule 
of law perspective as undertakings have derived expectations from the Guidance Paper despite its non-
binding character 
762 Vodaphone Group Plc, 'Vodaphone Group Plc response to DG Competition discussion paper on 
Article 82 EC' (Europaeu, March 2006) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/067.pdf> 
accessed 8 May 2018 
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It has been suggested by Vodaphone that such discretionary language used in such 
Guidelines would result in an inconsistent application, which undermines the 
Commission’s objective in developing legal certainty. Further, Vodaphone argued that 
the Discussion Paper provided an expansive definition of dominance with limited 
guidance on the assessment of dominance. Most importantly, Vodaphone implied that 
legitimate commercial behaviour suffers from a ‘chilling effect’ with the lack of 
guidance on the application of Article 102 has a substantial. The company stressed the 
importance of legal certainty in the application of the Article as it would play a huge 
role in enhancing EU productivity, human capital, employment, R&D. Therefore, 
Vodaphone considers that well-defined guidelines are achievable using more 
unambiguous language for EU businesses. 763Further, Hayek has stressed that it is 
crucial for companies to have clear guidelines which are indeed important for effective 
competition.764 
Whatever the merits of the backlash Article 102 TFEU have received, it is 
unquestionable that a because a breach of Article 102 may have significant negative 
impacts, whereby the Commission or a judicial authority can decide an excessive fine, 
similarly to that in Microsoft and Intel, on top of the fact that a third party could bring 
an action for an injunction, as well as, damages before a domestic court or judicial 
authority.765  
 
                                                          
763 Vodaphone Group Plc, 'Vodaphone Group Plc response to DG Competition discussion paper on 
Article 82 EC' (Europaeu, March 2006) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/067.pdf> 
accessed 8 May 2018 
764F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (first published 1977, Routledge 2001), p. 198 
765 It was reported in the media that out-of-court settlements were reached between Microsoft and 
various of the complainants against it for the payment of damages: a report in the Financial Times of 
October 2005 suggested that Microsoft had paid a total of $1.25 billion: see Financial Times, 13 
November 2009 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
The elimination of vague languages used in international agreements or treaties, and 
the decrease or elimination of existing inconsistencies between different domestic 
jurisdictions as to the treatment of refusal to license as an abuse of dominance is 
important from a rule of law perspective. This is because the international community 
needs the rule of law very much the same way as do national regimes. Therefore, it is, 
arguably, necessary to address IP-related antitrust frictions between Member countries 
by the international community as soon as possible to eliminate or decrease existing 
inconsistencies between different national legislations.766  This can be done by 
providing a WTO explanation on the exact scope of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 
in order to decrease concerns of dispute settlement proceedings. Moreover, as 
indicated earlier, Article 40 of the same Agreement can only be fully implemented once 
all Member countries include sufficient measures, guidance and adequate procedures 
for competition disputes. Moreover, Article 8 could benefit from the decrease of vague 
language used within its provision.  
 
Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement permits the Member States to embrace appropriate 
measures in their domestic laws that deal with anti-competitive and abusive practices 
so long they are coherent with the standards established in the Agreement. However, 
an appropriate level of fulfilling international obligations within national legal systems 
is challenging, particularly without a full understanding of the EU’s obligations to 
international treaties. It has been suggested that limited awareness of the WTO rules is 
                                                          
766 G. Duduchava and G. Miteva, ‘Global Antitrust Trends in the Context of Refusal to License IPRs’ 
(2016) WIPO Academy, University of Turin and ITC-ILO Research Papers Collection -2013-2014 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2723858> accessed on 31 August 2018 
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the cause of ‘benign neglect or even amused disrespect’.767 Additionally, the TRIPS 
Agreement’s provisions cannot be taken very seriously when the nature and scope of 
the TRIPS Agreement’s articles that have been set out to control anti-competitive and 
abusive practices are not clearly expressed.768  
Additionally, the requirement of consistency that has been set out in both Articles 8(2) 
and 40(2), were argued to be ‘caveat against an excessive exercise of competition 
policy’769, in a way that authorities cannot use antitrust laws as an excuse to undermine 
the protection of IPRs as it has set out in the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, the competition 
law Articles in the Agreement seem to be meant to be used as a means of controlling 
domestic competition policy, instead of a norm that informs the development of 
competition policy.770 
Overall, the varying levels of precision in the wording of the Agreement, indeed, can 
indicate that it would be challenging to deliver definite answers to specific disputed 
matters, given that there are constant changes within the political, economic, 
technological or scientific landscape. However, as prerequisite of the rule of law, the 
rules of the international legal order must be complete in order to provide certainty as 
to the law, and thus, it must avoid ambiguity for Member States to apply such rules and 
take them seriously. Indeed, what is required by the international rule of law is far from 
being clearly recognised and does not have clearly defined content. Nevertheless, 
completeness and certainty of the law leads to a degree of confidence that the 
                                                          
767 T. Cottier and K. Schefer, ‘The Relationship between World Trade Organization Law, National and 
Regional Law’, 1 J Int'l Economic L [1998] 1 J Int'l Economic L 84, at 94. 
768 H. Ullrich, ‘Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS 
Perspective’, in K. Maskus and J. Reichman (eds), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology 
under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (2005), at 726. 
769 H.Ullrich, ‘Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS 
Perspective’ [2004] 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 401, 410 
770 H. Ullrich, ‘Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS 
Perspective’ [2004] 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 401, 410 
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elements of the international rule of law are acknowledged by the Member States of 
the international community, and thus, ensuring the application of the legal rules when 
regulating international relations.  
As discussed above, although the TRIPS Agreement, as a whole, aims to achieve 
competitive balances and guarantees valuable minimum level of international 
protection, the Agreement does not specify standards used to achieve such competitive 
balances. It is, thus, important to firstly examine the standards adopted by EU courts 
and authorities to assess competition law interventions in refusal to license cases and 
FRAND violations and, secondly, to examine the admissibility and administration of EU 
competition law defenses within the national courts of the three previously named EU 
Member States.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ABUSIVE REFUSAL TO LICENSE IPRs AND FRAND VIOLATIONS IN THE EU  
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the conduct of IPR holders can sometimes clash 
with competition law. Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement provides IP holders with the 
exclusive right to exclude others from using or exploiting their IPRs. Right holders can 
decide to assign, license or transfer by succession their IPRs.771 However, the conflict 
between IPRs and competition law can be particularly visible when EU competition 
authorities are concerned over the maintenance or growth of the market.772 
Indeed, the mere refusal to license is not unlawful unless it has a negative impact on 
the market as seen in Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement.773 International treaties such 
as the TRIPS Agreement and Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention have only set the 
general principles for finding an abuse of dominance, particularly given that it has been 
left the door open for lawmakers to adopt specific provisions that are configured to 
control abuses or anti-competitive conduct of IPRs. 
This chapter assesses the measures adopted at a regional level by EU competition 
authorities to balance IPRs and effective EU competition against the elements of the 
                                                          
771 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 28 
772 C-85/76 Hoffman-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECLI:EU:C: 1979:36; c-62/86 AKZO v Commission 
[1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, at [69]; C-52/07 Kanal 5 and TV 4 [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:703, at [25]; C-
52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, at [2] 
773 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 40 
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rule of law. The ECJ has emphasised774 that it is necessary to achieve such a balance. 
Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abusive refusal to licenses and FRAND violations. Refusal 
to license IPRs can be deliberated as abusive under Article 102 TFEU instead of anti-
competition conduct, and thus, Article 31(K) of the TRIPS for the granting of compulsory 
licences becomes inapplicable.775 In return, a potential licensee must make serious 
attempts to obtain a licence in cases of ‘abusive’ refusal to license as per the study 
conducted by WIPO.776 However, EU courts have expanded throughout EU case law on 
the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test used for finding a dominant undertaking 
participating in abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU. Moreover, the nature and 
scope of these circumstances remain vague up till this date which is problematic from 
a rule of law perspective. This chapter aims to highlight that rule of law concerns can 
be raised, given that Article 102 TFEU has been aggressively applied and its scope of 
application has expanded to a great extent over the years, in particular to refusal to 
license cases and FRAND commitments. Additionally, this chapter aims to offer contrast 
of approaches to evaluation issues of refusal to license and potential solutions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
774 T-504/93 Tierce Ladbroke v Commission [1997] ECLI:ET:T:1997:84 
775 World Trade Organisation Secretariat, ‘Refusal to License IP Rights: A Comparative Note of Possible 
Approaches’ (2013) at para. 25 < http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
competition/en/studies/refusals_license_IPRs.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018 
776 World Trade Organisation Secretariat, ‘Refusal to License IP Rights: A Comparative Note of Possible 
Approaches’ (2013) at para. 25 < http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
competition/en/studies/refusals_license_IPRs.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2018 
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II. EU CASE LAW 
 
EU or domestic courts may decide a compulsory licence in cases of abusive refusal to 
license. Within the past thirty years, EU courts, as well as the Commission, have issued 
various compulsory licensing decisions under Article 102 TFEU. This chapter examines 
some of the most prominent cases and assesses the scope of the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ test used to determine abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU in 
some refusal to license cases and FRAND violations. Some of the cases mentioned 
below have been involved with copyrights, nevertheless, competition authorities have 
referred to such cases in refusal to license patents and FRAND violations.  
A) Volvo v Veng  
To start with, the assessment of whether a refusal to license established an abuse of 
dominance has been first captured on the 5th October 1988 by the ECJ in Volvo v 
Veng.777 Volvo, an undertaking with protected copyright design in Denmark and Italy, 
brought IP infringement action against Veng, a UK undertaking. Veng counter-claimed 
Volvo’s proceedings by stating that Volvo had abused its dominant position with its 
refusal to license.778  
The Court had determined that a refusal to license, does not, in itself, and even for a 
reasonable royalty, amount to an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU, ex Article 
                                                          
777 C- 238/87 Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] C.M.L.R 122 
778 The following chapter further assesses how the courts had dealt with competition law defenses in IP 
infringement proceedings, but it is interesting to note here that It must be mentioned here that the 
Court did not contemplate whether or not Volvo had abused its dominant position by bringing IP 
infringement proceedings against Veng. 
 199 
82 EC.779 The ECJ had identified three conditions that have to be present to establish a 
violation of dominance. First, there must be arbitrary practice such as refusal to license 
to independent parties. Second, illegal price fixing and third, prevention of the 
production of relevant products for a model that is still in circulation.780 The Court then 
decided that the mentioned elements were not present in Volvo v Veng and thus, it was 
determined that Volvo did not abuse its dominant position with its refusal to license.781  
The ECJ did not highlight whether the three elements, mentioned above, are exhaustive 
or not. Therefore, domestic courts were provided with little guidance regarding the 
determination of when a refusal to license is, indeed, unlawful. Moreover, refusal to 
supply or license has been provided as a mere example of abusive conduct, and thus, 
the decision does not necessarily add any limitations to abusive conduct.  
B) Magill 
The ECJ in Magill782 had decided a compulsory licence of the IPR in question. The ECJ 
confirmed that the mere proprietorship of an IPR does not allow the IPR holder to abuse 
its dominant position.783 The ECJ referred to its decision in Volvo v Veng to highlight 
that in ‘exceptional circumstances’ a refusal to license can be unlawful.784 In other 
words, the ECJ has outlined here that only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ can a court 
issue a compulsory licence. The ECJ further identified that a compulsory licence could 
be granted when the product is crucial for the production of a new product that is not 
                                                          
779 C-238/87 Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] C.M.L.R 122, at [8] 
780 C-238/87 Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] C.M.L.R 122, at [9] 
781 C-238/87 Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] C.M.L.R 122, at [10] 
782 C- C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Telivision Publication Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743 (referred to as Magill within the text) 
783 C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Telivision Publication Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, at [46] 
784 C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Telivision Publication Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, at [50] 
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provided by the IP holder, there are no justifiable reasons for the refusal to license, and 
the conduct excludes competition in the secondary market of that specific IPR.785 
The ECJ established that right holders could be obliged to license their IPRs in 
exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, the ECJ did not expand on whether the 
conditions mentioned above of ‘the exceptional circumstances’ test are cumulative or 
disjunctive. It also did not address whether the set of circumstances was exhaustive or 
illustrative.786  It has been attempted by the ECJ to cover such concerns in IMS Health 
which is further examined in this chapter. 
Moreover, the ECJ in its  Magill’s decision had relaxed its exceptional circumstances test 
as opposed to its approach in Volvo v Veng.787 A compulsory licence may now be 
granted under Article 102 TFEU when the production of a new product outweighs the 
right holder’s incentives to innovate.788  The ECJ had supported its decision when it 
stipulated that the new product would not challenge the original IP, as it can be 
differentiated from one another. Accordingly, the Court had resorted to a balancing of 
efficiencies and had adopted a follow-on innovation approach for the determination of 
unlawful refusal to license IPRs.789 
 
 
                                                          
785 C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Telivision Publication Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, at [53]-[57] 
786 I. Eagles and L. Longdin, Refusals to License Intellectual Property: Testing the Limits of Law and 
Economics (1 end, 2011) 163 
787 G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 228 
788 M Angelov, ‘The Exceptional Circumstances Test: Implications for FRAND Commitments from the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine under Article 102 TFEU’ [2014] 10(1) European Competition Journal, 37-67 
789 M Angelov, ‘The Exceptional Circumstances Test: Implications for FRAND Commitments from the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine under Article 102 TFEU’ [2014] 10(1) European Competition Journal, 37-67 
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C) Bronner  
The ECJ in the case of Bronner790 had provided a further elaboration as well as a new 
approach to the ‘exceptional circumstances’791 test used in Magill. In this case, 
Mediaprint was an undertaking of a home-delivery network, and Bronner wanted to 
access the network. The ECJ referred to Magill and had determined that violation of 
Article 102 TFEU, ex Article 82 EC, was not breached by Mediaprint with its refusal to 
license. The ECJ had highlighted that Mediaprint’s network was not crucial, particularly 
given that there are other methods of distribution which could include shops and post-
delivery.792 Therefore, the Court decided that there are no economic, technical or legal 
difficulties that would prevent Bronner from creating its own home-delivery 
network.793 The Court had delivered in its decision further clarifications in regards to 
the determination of abusive conduct. It was stipulated that refusal to license can be 
unlawful when the refusal could eliminate competition in that market, there are no 
justifiable objective considerations, and the product or service is indispensable for 
carrying on that individual’s business.794 
The case of Bronner is relevant to the interpretation of existing compulsory licensing 
case law even though it was not, per se, involved with IPRs. It was made clear by the 
ECJ that economic and legal considerations are necessary to balance the conduct of an 
                                                          
790 C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
[1998] E.C.R I-7791 
791 C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
[1998] E.C.R I-7791, at [40] 
792 C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Telivision Publication Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, at [37] 
793 C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Telivision Publication Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, at [42]-[47] 
794 C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Telivision Publication Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, at [41] 
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undertaking against public interests.  Moreover, the ECJ in the Bronner case has 
provided further clarifications of the requirements set in Magill.795 An example on this 
can be seen by the fact that the requirement of ‘not justified’ in Magill became ‘not 
justified by objective considerations’ in Bronner. Additionally, the requirement of 
‘exclude all competition’ found in Magill became ‘likely to exclude all competition’ in 
Bronner. The ECJ in Bronner has, thus, presented an element of probability.796 
D)  IMS Health  
The IMS Health case797 was yet another opportunity for the ECJ to expand on and 
further clarify ‘the exceptional circumstances’ test used to assess the granting of a 
compulsory licence under Article 102 TFEU, ex Article 82 EC. The ECJ’s decision in IMS 
Health reaffirmed Bronner and Magill’s requirements for the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ test in cases of refusal to license IPRs.   
To start with, IMS Health sought IP infringement proceedings before the ECJ against 
NDC Health following an objection brought to the Commission by NDC Health 
suggesting that IMS Health has breached EU competition law with its refusal to license 
the industry standard. NDC Health has then used competition law defence to counter-
claim IMS Health’s IP infringement proceedings arguing that IMS Health had breached 
EU competition law with its refusal to license its IPR.798  
The ECJ determined that the court can impose a compulsory licence when the product 
or service is indispensable within the downstream market.799 The Court trialled the view 
                                                          
795 C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
[1998] E.C.R I-7791, at [40] 
796 M Angelov, ‘The Exceptional Circumstances Test: Implications for FRAND Commitments from the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine under Article 102 TFEU’ [2014] 10(1) European Competition Journal, 37-67 
797 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28 
798 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28, at [3]-[12] 
799 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28, at [45] 
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of AG Tizzano indicating that IPRs are outweighed by competition when the ‘refusal to 
grant a license prevents the development of the secondary market to the detriment of 
consumers.’800 It can be noted here that the ECJ furthered the ‘new product’ condition 
set in Magill into the development of a secondary market.801 The ECJ further indicated 
that refusal to license could be considered unlawful when such a refusal might exclude 
potential competition on a secondary market.802 The Court provided further details on 
the new product condition, as it stated that the refusal to license IPRs by a dominant 
business could be unlawful when the IPR is indispensable for the development of a 
secondary market. Moreover, if the licence seeker does not limit itself to the mere 
duplication of the goods or services that are already provided in that market by the IPR 
holder. In other words, the licence seeker must have the intention to produce new 
products or services that are not provided by the IPR holder in that market, given that 
there is possible consumer demand on such goods or services.803 
It was, thus, recognised by the ECJ that a refusal to license by a dominant business could 
be sufficiently measured as abusive under Article 102 TFEU, ex Article 82 EC, when 
specific requirements are fulfilled. First, the IPR in question is crucial for carrying on a 
specific business. Second, the refusal prevents the production of a new product that 
might have consumer demand. Third, there are no objective justifications for the refusal 
to license, and finally, the conduct might exclude all competition in a secondary 
market.804 The Court in IM Health has created a narrower approach to the new product 
                                                          
800 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28, at [48] 
801 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28, at [239] 
802 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28, at [43] 
803 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28, at [49] 
804 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28, at [38] and 
[44]-[45] 
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condition, as it made duplication of an IPR insufficient for a compulsory licence.805 This 
stricter approach to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test is desirable from a rule of law 
perspective, given that mere economic considerations can weaken the essence of IPRs 
and cause harm to IPR owners. As a matter of fact, this approach could better safeguard 
the supremacy of law as per the rule of law doctrine, given that it would ensure that 
the law is clearly defined before any economic benefits can surface. 
The ECJ has also affirmed the cumulative aspect of the exceptional circumstances test 
used in Magill and has also tightened the test used in Volvo v Veng.806  Moreover, the 
ECJ’s decision in IMS Health is consistent with previous case law, since the main 
principles of judgement were derived from Volvo v Veng and Magill. However, the Court 
had only relied on Volvo v Veng and Magill to state that a mere refusal to license is only 
unlawful in exceptional circumstances and has only confirmed that the conditions of 
Magill are cumulative. Therefore, some questions remain unanswered, particularly 
given that the ECJ has used the term ‘sufficient’ instead of ‘necessary’ to highlight the 
circumstances of when a refusal to license could be breaching EU competition law. The 
choice of the term ‘necessary’ indicates that the three conditions set in Magill are not 
exhaustive in nature.  It would have been preferable if the ECJ did not leave the door 
open for other requirements that can also be considered ‘sufficient’ for the finding of 
unlawful conduct in future refusal to license cases. The use of the word ‘necessary’ 
would have better fulfilled the rule of law elements of legal certainty and provided 
further clarity for businesses so that they can plan their conduct accordingly. 
                                                          
805 Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, Case T-184/01 R IMS Health Inc v Commission 
[2001] ECR II-3193, 125 
806 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28, at [38] 
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Some commentators have stressed that the determination of a new product under ‘the 
exceptional circumstances’ test remains vague, despite the fact the ECJ has been 
consistent with previous case law.807 It has also been emphasised that such vagueness 
in the new product test may increase insincere complaints against lawful refusal to 
license IPRs.808 Indeed, the consistency in law principle that can be derived from the 
doctrine of the rule of law has not been jeopardised following the ECJ’s decision in IMS 
Health, yet legal certainty can be jeopardised due to the vagueness that remains in the 
application of the new product test. We must remember that the rule of law elements 
requires a transparent and predictable application of the law without unnecessary 
vagueness regarding the new product test. 
E) Microsoft  
The Commission has established a different approach to the standards that have 
already been used in cases of compulsory licences prior to its Microsoft’s decision.  This 
matter does not necessarily deal with a refusal to license,809 nevertheless, it has 
comparable effects.810 The Commission found that Microsoft had infringed EU 
competition law with its refusal to supply interoperability information to Sun 
Microsystems.811 
                                                          
807 Forrester, ‘Regulating Intellectual Property via Competition? Or Regulating Competition via 
Intellectual Property? Competition and Intellectual Property: Ten Years on, the Debate Still Flourishes’, 
in C Elhermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2005: The Relationship between 
Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) p. 67 
808 Forrester, ‘Regulating Intellectual Property via Competition? Or Regulating Competition via 
Intellectual Property? Competition and Intellectual Property: Ten Years on, the Debate Still Flourishes’, 
in C Elhermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2005: The Relationship between 
Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) p. 67 
809 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, paras 568-572 
810 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para. 546 
811 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para. 546 
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Sun Microsystems brought a complaint to the Commission against Microsoft 
Corporation. The complaint suggested that Microsoft Corporation had breached EU 
competition law with its refusal to provide Sun Microsoft sufficient information on how 
to integrate Microsoft package of Windows 2000 into its server. The Commission had 
discovered that Microsoft refused to disclose the information and share its information 
with other competitors alongside Sun Microsystems.812 The Commission found that 
Microsoft Corporation had been breaching Article 102 TFEU with its abusive refusal to 
share information and purposely restricting interoperability with other undertakings.813 
The Commission based its finding on the fact that Microsoft is a dominant business in 
the relevant market.814   
The Commission then examined Microsoft’s refusal to supply per existing case law. The 
cases of Volvo v Veng and Magill were referred to in order to highlight that refusal to 
supply cannot be considered on its own as abusive conduct. Nevertheless, the 
Commission stressed that there are exceptions to this principle, as it has been 
previously identified by the ECJ in Magill’s ‘exceptional circumstances’ test.815 The 
Commission had attempted to narrow down the definition of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ to a case-by-case method. In other words, the Commission has 
disagreed with the Magill’s single test that is used to determine a violation of EU 
competition law under Article 102 TFEU. The Commission’s main standard that was 
applied in its Microsoft’s decision has been the following: 
                                                          
812 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para 3 
813 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final 
814 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, paras 324-401. For further 
information on the Commission’s definition of relevant market, see Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-
3/37.792) [2004] C (2004)900 final, paras 472,489 and 514-562 
815 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, paras 550-551 and 557 
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 ‘The case law of the European Courts therefore suggests that the Commission must 
analyse the entirety of the circumstances surrounding a specific instance of a refusal to 
supply and must take its decision based on the results of such a comprehensive 
examination.’ 816 
The above mentioned new legal standard applied by the Commission had introduced 
an ‘entirety of circumstances’ test, instead of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test that 
has already been established by the ECJ in previous case law.817 The Commission had 
identified three exceptional requirements for finding a refusal to license by a dominant 
undertaking as abusive under Article 102 TFEU.818 The first requirement suggested that 
the refusal to supply must introduce a threat of excluding competition in the relevant 
market. The second requirement indicated that such a risk must be due to the 
indispensability of the product or service to carry on businesses in that market. The last 
requirement implied that the refusal to supply should have an adverse impact on 
technical development, as well as consumers’ interests.819 
The Commission has touched on the basic requirements of indispensability, elimination 
of competition and no objective justifications, however, the new product test was not 
a matter of concern by the Commission.820 The Commission assessed the requirement 
of indispensability by looking at the level of existing interoperability in the relevant 
market. Indeed, the Commission had found that it can be possible to reach an 
appropriate level of interoperability without issuing a compulsory licence, yet the 
Commission measured that Microsoft’s refusal to supply does not allow rivals to remain 
                                                          
816 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para 558 
817 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para 712 
818 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para 712 
819 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, paras 573-577 
820 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para 554 and 670 
 208 
in the market.821 The indispensability test in previous case law such as Bronner and IMS 
Health does not necessitate maximum access to the market when there are other 
available solutions and even if they are less beneficial.822 Nonetheless, the Commission 
had disregarded the possibility of other solutions mainly because they are less 
advantageous.  
As indicated above, the Commission did not necessarily address the new product test 
established in previous case law by the ECJ. The test has been seen in both Magill and 
IMS Health where it was noted that duplication of products is not sufficient grounds for 
deciding a compulsory licence. It has been highlighted in Magill and IMS Health that the 
licence seeker must have the intention of providing new products or services that have 
consumer demand and are not being offered by the right-holder.823 The Commission’s 
decision in Microsoft did not address whether Sun Microsystems must provide a new 
product or service that has consumer demand and is not being offered by Microsoft 
Corporation. The Commission has instead indicated that Microsoft’s information must 
be provided to its competitors in the relevant market so that they are not discouraged 
from developing new products.824  
The Commission’s approach has indicated that Microsoft’s abusive refusal to supply 
limits the technical development and incentives to innovate. The requirement of the 
elimination of competition in Microsoft appears to be inconsistent with previous case 
law. As indicated above, the ECJ had already tightened the Magill’s test in IMS Health 
to the elimination of ‘all’ competition. Nevertheless, the Commission has undertaken a 
                                                          
821 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para 712 
822 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28, at [28] 
823 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] C.M.L.R 28, at [49] 
824 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C (2004)900 final, paras [694]-[695] 
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lenient approach as opposed to the existing case with its requirement of the ‘risk of 
eliminating competition’.825 Another difference in the stance embraced by the 
Commission in its Microsoft’s decision as opposed to existing case law can be noted 
when looking into the requirement of objective justifications found in ECJ’s previous 
case law. This inconsistency can be seen when Microsoft argued that it had refused to 
disclose its information due to objective justifications in order to protect its multibillion 
R&D investments in its software and technology, yet the Commission rejected 
Microsoft’s reasons for its refusal to disclose its information. Microsoft argued that 
disclosure of its information would have had a negative impact on IPR protection and it 
would undermine the essence of IPR, as it would eliminate Microsoft’s future incentives 
to invest in more IP.826 
The Commission tackled Microsoft’s arguments by applying a new incentives trade-off 
test. It was stated that the essence of IPRs is to protect both the right holder’s moral 
rights and guarantee a reward for efforts made on creativity. Nonetheless, such 
creativity must be motivated for the interest of the public. Therefore, refusal to supply 
by a dominant business can clash, in some circumstances, with the interests of the 
general public.827 Moreover, the Commission further supported its stance when it 
implied that Microsoft would be inclined to invest in future innovations due to the 
competitive pressure of a compulsory licence. Ultimately, the Commission found that 
Microsoft’s refusal its IPRs cannot be objectively justified.828 
                                                          
825 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C (2004)900 final, at [589] 
826 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C (2004)900 final, at [709] 
827 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C (2004)900 final, at [711] 
828 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C (2004)900 final, at [712] 
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It must be mentioned that it became less challenging to access an indispensable IP 
following Microsoft’s decision.  The Commission’s lenient approach to compulsory 
licensing and access to indispensable IP can lead to products’ imitation which can have 
a negative effect on incentives to innovate and invest.829 It has been further highlighted 
that such a lenient approach to compulsory licensing may increase competition, yet it 
can harm the economy as it discourages the investment in future R&D.830  Moreover, 
the inconsistencies highlighted above of the Microsoft’s decision made by the 
Commission as opposed to existing case law, in specific to IMS Health, is concerning 
from a rule of law perspective, given that one of the basic principles of the doctrine is 
that law must be consistent. Without consistency in the judicial sector, individuals may 
lose their trust in the legal system in question. Moreover, such contradictions must be 
avoided as much as possible, because the simple statement that ‘law has to rule’ is 
derived as an essential element of the doctrine. Once the law becomes a path of 
contradictions, then it would usually lead to unacceptable outcomes,831 such as the 
discouragement of future investments in R&D.  
There have been three distinct phases that can be grasped from the EU competition 
authorities’ decisions made in an attempt to achieve a balance between competition 
law and IPRs. The stages can be summarised as the ‘new product’ requirement,832 the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ test,833 as well as, the technological improvement 
                                                          
829 M Angelov, ‘The Exceptional Circumstances Test: Implications for FRAND Commitments from the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine under Article 102 TFEU’ [2014] 10(1) European Competition Journal 37-67 
830 M Angelov, ‘The Exceptional Circumstances Test: Implications for FRAND Commitments from the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine under Article 102 TFEU’ [2014] 10(1) European Competition Journal 37-67 
831 G. Palombella, ‘The rule of law beyond the state: failures, promises and theory’ [2009] 7(1) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 442-467 
832 C- 238/87 Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] C.M.L.R 122 
833 C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Telivision Publication Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743 and Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint 
Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG [1998] E.C.R I-7791 
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principle.834 The assumption of legality of refusal to license had been present in the first 
stage: the new product requirement. This presumption still existed in the second stage, 
but the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test has emphasised that such a presumption can 
be altered.  The presumption of illegality can be seen in the third stage when the 
Commission made modifications to ‘the exceptional circumstances’ test.  
The Commission’s alterations to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test in Microsoft can 
have a major effect on incentives to innovate and invest. Indeed, several commentators 
have stressed that a potential licensee does not have to bring a totally different ‘new 
product’ so long as it satisfies the requirement of possible consumers’ demand.835 
However, Monti had reminded us that the Commission’s modifications to the ‘new 
product’ test should only be applied when they do not weaken the right holder’s 
incentive to innovate and invest.836  
It can be noted that there has been a striking development throughout EU case law for 
the determination of breach of EU competition law under Article 102 TFEU. To start 
with, the duplication and imitations have been the main point of concern in Volvo and 
IMS Health and then Magill, where the follow-on innovation motivated by new 
products, has justified fears of imitation initially found in Volvo. The same fears 
concerning duplication became less important in the Microsoft case via the insertion of 
the reasoning of technical development, nonetheless, technical development does not 
necessarily indicate a distinctive new product. As noted from the earlier discussion, the 
                                                          
834 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final 
835 C Ahlborn, D Evans and J Padilla, ‘The Logic and Limits of the ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ in Magill 
and IMS Health’ [2005] 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1109, at 1147 and P Larouche, ‘The 
European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy and Innovation: Comment on Ahlborn 
and Evans’ [2009] 75 Antitrust Journal 935, at 946 
836 G Monti, EC Competition Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 228 
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Commission did not investigate concerns of imitation that were highlighted in previous 
case law such as Magill and IMS Health. In other words, the Commission has mainly 
emphasised that consumer demand for a particular technical development as well as 
follow-on innovation outweigh concerns of duplication. It can, thus, be argued that the 
Commission has prioritised competition over inventor’s incentives to innovate.  
The Commission’s decision in Microsoft has been based on follow-on innovation that 
entails a modification of a particular product837 and not a ‘new product’ that was 
presented in the rationale of follow-on innovation by the ECJ in Magill.838 From a rule 
of law perspective, the rationale of technical development is inconsistent with 
preceding case law as it has not based on the principles of the ECJ’s previous case law.839 
It is also striking that the GC in the Microsoft appeal case, discussed further below, also 
seems to have weakened the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test when it allowed refined 
and similar products to enter the market.840  
Moreover, the Commission had stressed in Microsoft that compulsory licensing could 
be granted when the benefit to consumers outweighs the adverse effects on future 
incentives to invest. The Commission has also emphasised in Microsoft that competition 
encourages a dominant undertaking to further its incentives to invest and innovate due 
to the pressure of existing competition.841  Nevertheless, it must be mentioned here 
                                                          
837 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final 
838 C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P; Radio Telefis Eirann (RTE) and Independent Telivision Publication Ltd 
(ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743 
839 As indicated in chapter three of this research, consistency in the application of the law is one of the 
pillars of the rule of law.  
840 M Angelov, ‘The Exceptional Circumstances Test: Implications for FRAND Commitments from the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine under Article 102 TFEU’ [2014] 10(1) European Competition Journal, 37-67 
841 Microsoft Case (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) [2004] C(2004)900 final, para [725] 
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that the Commission’s Guidance, referred to in the previous chapter, had highlighted 
the following:   
 The Commission will consider claims by the dominant undertaking that a refusal to 
supply is necessary to allow the dominant undertaking to realise an adequate return on 
the investments required to develop its input business, thus generating incentives to 
continue to invest in the future, taking the risk of failed projects into account. The 
Commission will also consider claims by the dominant undertaking that its own 
innovation will be negatively affected by the obligation to supply, or by the structural 
changes in the market conditions that imposing such an obligation will bring about, 
including the development of follow-on innovation by competitors 842 
The Commission had acknowledged in its Guidance that a compulsory licence might 
discourage inventors from investments in future innovations following the extensive 
investments already made on an IPR before the granting of a compulsory licence. The 
Commission, in its Guidance, also recognised that easy access to technology via 
compulsory licensing may discourage IPR holders from incentives to invest in their own 
IP. However, the Commission had deviated from its Guidance in its Microsoft’s decision. 
This sort of departure can be easily seen when the Commission stated in Microsoft that 
competitive pressure on the essential facility motivates Microsoft’s future innovation 
and investments, whereas it stated in its Guidance that easy access to technologies via 
compulsory licensing could discourage the IPR holders’ incentives to invest in new 
technologies. Even though the Commission had recognised such problems in its 
                                                          
842 Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 EC [now 102 TFEU] to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/01, [89] 
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Guidance, it had still decided that Microsoft would be forced to compete and innovate 
due to the competitive pressure of providing rivals with the same technology. 
 From the rule of law viewpoint, the Commission’s contradictions between its 
Microsoft’s decision and its Guidance Paper is concerning, particularly given that 
undertakings can derive legitimate expectations in regard to the outcome of their 
conduct per the published Commission’s Guidance. Therefore, it is to be expected that 
the Commission would follow its own Guidance to remain coherent with the rule of law 
principles of predictability and equality before the law. 
Moreover, an unacceptable outcome due to the contradiction presented by the 
Commission is that the competitive pressure argument mentioned in the Microsoft 
decision allows businesses to go above their position in the market and easily obtain a 
compulsory licence.843 Some have argued that undertakings, in innovative industries,  
must be fast with their innovations in order to remain844 and maintain their position in 
that market.845 Thus, competitors of a dominant business should not presume legality 
of a compulsory licence,846 particularly in the innovation industry. This sort of 
presumption can have a more significant impact on the IPR holders’ incentives to invest 
and innovate as has already identified by the Commission in its Guidelines.847 
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844 W Baumol, J Panzar and R Willing, Contestable Markets and the theory of Injudsty Structure 
(Harcourt College Pub, 1982) 
845 T Kaseberg, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in the EU and the US (Hart 
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846 M Angelov, ‘The Exceptional Circumstances Test: Implications for FRAND Commitments from the 
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The presumption of legality of a compulsory licence can now also be seen in the ECJ’s 
recent case of Huawei Technologies v ZTE Corp,848 examined below. The ECJ has 
indicated that Huawei, the IPR holder, could be abusing its dominant position by 
bringing IP infringement claims against the user. However, it is to be argued that 
potential licensees still need to take appropriate measures to obtain a licence and 
should not automatically assume their entitlement to a licence.  
Indeed, the Commission had supported the judgement made in Microsoft via the 
argument that Microsoft’s incentives to innovate and invest would be furthered by 
competitive pressure. However, the GC seems to have disagreed on that point as it 
concluded in the appealed case of Microsoft Corp v Commission that effective 
competitive structure on that specific industry had been impaired by the acquisition of 
a significant market share.849 The GC, nonetheless, has reasoned that the proprietor 
would impair the effective competitive structure when it establishes its IPR as an 
industry standard due to the product’s success in that market. The GC has further 
emphasised that the proprietor’s product, in such circumstances, must be licensed to 
its competitors. 850 Whereas, the Commission has suggested that competition and 
competitive pressure are vital factors for Microsoft’s incentives to innovate. In other 
words, the GC has identified that a dominant business would be motivated to advance 
its technology and invest in future innovations. However, undertakings must be careful 
not to develop their technology to the extent where it becomes vital as an industry 
standard in order not to impair effective competitive structure.  
                                                          
848 C-170/13 Hauwei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp, ZTE Duetschland GmbH (Re Smartohone Standard 
Essential Patents) [2015] C.M.L.R 14 
849 T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 (GC), at [664]. The case was brought by 
Microsoft Corp against the Commission decision 
850 T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission [2007] ECR II--3601 (GC) 
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F) RE Google Search (Shopping)  
As indicated earlier, EU competition law does not necessarily consider that market 
dominance in itself is illegal. Nonetheless, the market power enjoyed by a dominant 
undertaking must not restrict competition in the market it is dominant in or in a 
separate market.851 The Microsoft’s case of 2004 is the last comparable decision to the 
recent case of Re Google Search (Google). The Commission’s decision in Microsoft 
became a precedent-setting case when it was had upheld by EU courts in 2007 finding 
that Microsoft had indeed breached Article 102 TFEU as it leveraged its dominance in 
order to put its rivals out of business. Therefore, some of the European Commission’s 
experts that investigated Re Google Search (Shopping) have also previously worked on 
the Microsoft case. The Intel case was a significant case in 2009 among a small group of 
hardware undertakings. Nonetheless, the Microsoft and Re Google Search (Shopping) 
cases have an impact on a wide range of industry.852 
Google’s conduct was found to be abusive because it had prioritised its own comparison 
shopping services over its competitors in its shopping search engines. This case was not 
involved with refusal to license, yet reference was made to the Microsoft case for the 
determination of an abuse of dominance.853 The Commission had adopted the 
standards implemented in the case of Microsoft and considered that Google’s conduct 
had been abusive because Google had financially benefited from the significant impact 
it had on competition in the market for comparison shopping at the expenses of 
                                                          
851 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as 
search engines by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service’ (Europa.eu Press 
Release, 27 June 2017) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm> accessed on 23 
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852 Fair Search, ‘The Google Comparison Shopping Case: Background’ (Fairsearch. Org, 26 June 2017) 
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853 Case AT.39740 Re Google Search (Shopping) [2018] 4 CMLR 12 
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competitors as well as the detriment of consumers. Moreover, the Commission 
considered that Google had breached Article 102 TFEU by using its own search engines, 
Google Search, to make its services more visible than the services of its competitors. 854  
Nevertheless, consumers are still capable of comparing prices when they visit other 
sites or by simply scrolling down Google’s search engine to compare prices before they 
buy online. The Commission in Google Search (Shopping) imposed a duty on Google to 
provide competitors with access to its search result engine, without the establishment 
of a duty to supply by reference to the Bronner criteria. This point is central because 
the ECJ in Bronner855 did not find that Mediaprint had abused its dominant position. It 
was found that Mediaprint’s home-delivery network is not crucial, given that there are 
other methods of distribution. 856 Similarly, there are other platforms available for 
competitors besides Google’s shopping search engine, yet the Commission still found 
that Google’s conduct had been unlawful.  
The decision of the Commission in the case of Google Search (Shopping) has resulted in 
scrutiny amongst scholars and commentators throughout the Commission’s 
examination of the facts and after the publication of the decision.857 The Commission 
has imposed on Google the second highest fine of 2.42 billion Euros in matters of an 
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abuse of dominance up to this date.858 High fines may donate positively to deterrence, 
yet commentators have questioned the appropriateness of the fine imposed by EU 
competition authorities.859 The imposition of severe fines could come into conflict with 
the principles of prospective laws as per the rule of law and legal certainty when the 
unlawfulness of conduct is unclear ex-ante to the sanctions imposed.860 Moreover, 
hefty fines without clear legal standards and principles can result in the deterrence of 
pro-competitive practices and harm long-term competition and innovation.  
It has even been feared that the Re Google Search (Shopping) case could have a negative 
impact on consumers as it could lead to innovation being rejected rather than 
rewarded, particularly given that the Commission did not provide much economic 
evidence or guiding principles on consumer harm.861 Indeed, the Commission had 
covered an in-depth analysis of the unfairness to competitors as not many consumers 
are clicking on their links due to the means used by Google to design its search results 
page. Nevertheless, the Commission did not provide an in-depth examination of 
consumer harm and how consumers have been affected by the conduct of Google.862 
The Commission’s decision in Re Google Search (Shopping), as well as the Commission 
and GC’s decisions in Microsoft, have indicated that innovators must be careful in the 
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future as to how they improve their products. In other words, undertakings must be 
careful not be too successful in providing the consumers with what they want. It must 
not be forgotten that Google Search’s users can use different platforms if they do not 
like the Google Shopping service or they can simply scroll down to compare prices. 
Therefore, it has been suggested that consumer harm can only be seen had they been 
confined to solely using Google Shopping’s service, yet consumers can easily use other 
competing products search platforms such as eBay or Amazon.863 
Moreover, Google has appealed the case before the GC calling for at least the 
annulment or, at least, the reduction of the fine. Google had presented several 
arguments as to why it believes that there are errors in the Commission’s decision. 
Some of which first include that the Commission’s decision violates the legal standard 
for the assessment of Google’s objective justifications for showing Shopping Units. 
Second, the Commission did not provide sufficient evidence as to how Google’s conduct 
is unlikely to have anti-competitive effects. Third, the Commission’s decision speculates 
anticompetitive effects without an examination on actual market developments and 
that the fine imposed has been improperly calculated. Google further argued that the 
Commission had required Google to supply its competitors with access to its product 
improvements, but without meeting the required legal requirements.864 Google could 
argue here that the Commission did not meet the required legal conditions set by the 
ECJ in Bronner for finding an abuse of dominance, given that Google’s shopping search 
engine is not crucial and thus, there is no evident consumer harm. Hopefully, the GC 
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could provide further clarifications on self-preference as an abuse of dominance in its 
ruling, yet the outcome of the case is still pending.  
 
G) Google Android 
The Commission has circulated a press release where it announced that Google had 
been fined €4.34 billion for violating EU competition laws.865 The Commission has 
decided that Google has been imposing unlawful restrictions on Android device 
manufacturers and mobile network operators to strengthen its monopoly through the 
general internet search.866 The Commission has announced that Google would face 
penalty costs or up to 5% of the average global turnover of Google’s parent undertaking 
(Alphabet) if Google does not end its conduct within 90 days.867 The deadline for Google 
ending its conduct was October 28 2018.868  
The Commission has concluded that Google is a dominant undertaking in the market of 
internet search services, licensable devices operating system and app stores for the 
Android mobile operating structure.  It has been established that Google’s conduct is 
abusive due to the following: first, it had been participating in unlawful tying when 
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android-2018-10?r=US&IR=T> accessed on 25 October 2018 
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Google conditioned that it will only license Google’s app store if manufacturers pre-
installed the Google Search app and browser app (Chrome). Second, Google has 
engaged in unlawful payments made to specific large-scale corporations and mobile 
network operators under the requirement that the Google Search app is exclusively pre-
installed into their products. Third, Google engaged in unlawful barriers to developing 
and distributing competing Android operating systems when it prohibited corporations 
from selling a device that runs on other types of Android that Google did not accept. 869 
At this point of time, the decision made by the Commission in 18th July 2018 in the case 
AT.40099 Google Android cannot be critically examined, as the Commission has still not 
published a version of the decision.870 It must be mentioned that Google has already 
appealed the Commission’s decision before the GC to contest the €4.3 billion fine for 
the abuse of dominance in the Android operating system. Google has also indicated 
that it did not abuse its dominant position. Instead, it has provided everyone with an 
exciting ecosystem, further innovation and lower prices that advances competition.871 
A sum of almost €7 billion in fines within two years would inevitably have an immense 
impact on many undertakings, yet that may not necessarily be the case for Google due 
to its size. It is interesting to note that the decision took place one week before the 
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Commission’s chief Jean-Claude met with President Donald Trump on the tariffs 
dispute. Some were concerned that the decision would result in a transatlantic trade 
war with the U.S, particularly following Trump’s announcement to impose tariffs on 
EU’s exports of steel and aluminium.872 Noteworthy, it initially appears that the 
Commission’s decision873 emphasises that the rule of law doctrine is essential, 
regardless of any possible political concerns or clashes that may arise following such 
decisions. It highlights that no one is above the laws that are set for all, not even Google 
or anyone else.  
Google has announced that it will start charging a fee for its previously free systems 
such as Google Chrome, Google Play and Gmail.874 Google has also introduced a new 
paid licensing agreement for EU Google as of the end of October 2018 whereby it 
reiterated that Android would stay as a free and open source. Manufacturers would 
have to pay an unspecified fee to Google for them to install applications on all Android 
devices that are launching or shipped to the EU. Such applications could include Google 
Play Drive or YouTube.875 It is important to note that Google’s licensing fees must 
remain reasonable. Otherwise, EU competition authorities could be capable of pursuing 
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Google under Article 102 TFEU for an abusive refusal to supply to manufactures on 
reasonable licensing fees.  
Nevertheless, the Commission’s decision could have an impact on consumers as it could 
lead to devices becoming more expensive.876 Manufacturers are likely to add the costs 
to us, the consumers, in order to evade loss of profits due to the new policy.  
The case at hand is similar to the case of Microsoft v Commission. The Microsoft case 
led to the ‘browser choice’ popup on Windows which made matters confusing for many 
users in the EU. Following the decision, new users were presented with a popup once 
they installed Windows. Ironically, it led to the decline in the use of Internet Explorer 
and resulted instead in the rise of Chrome’s use.   
Apple will be able to sell its devices whilst locking its consumers to a particular set of 
tools. The EU does not consider this as a matter of concern from a competition law 
perspective because Apple has a fully-closed ecosystem. In other words, it does not 
dictate decisions for other manufacturers because no other manufacturer can produce 
an iPhone.877 There is a chance that the decision of Google could end up pushing 
consumers into using Apple’s monopoly. Unlike Microsoft a decade ago, Google 
dominates 90 per cent of all search and Chrome controls 66 per cent of browser share 
and thus, it is not foreseen that Google Search and Chrome will fail following the 
decision.878 Once the decision is published, it will be interesting to examine the test 
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used by the Commission to determine Google’s abuse of dominance and whether it 
provided evidence of consumer harm once it has made its decision public, as well as, to 
assess the outcome of the appealed case by the GC. 
III. INTERIM RESULT 
It appears that the approaches that are taken by EU competition authorities to advance 
competitive structure lead to legal uncertainty, as the focus is directed more towards 
offering protection to competitors instead of competition.879 The main issue with the 
approach adopted by EU competition authorities as case law progressed is that 
competition considerations have started to outweigh IPRs. It appears that competition 
considerations are on top, so much on top, that by bringing IP infringement proceedings 
against an unlicensed user can be considered by EU competition authorities as an abuse 
of dominant position, as seen in the case of Huawei Technologies v ZTE Corp.880 
This chapter so far has portrayed that the point of focus in Volvo v Veng was on the IPR 
holder’s economic freedom and protection against similar products prevailing in the 
market, whereas the main point of focus in Microsoft and Re Google Search (Shopping) 
was on the protection of competitors. It may initially appear that EU competition 
authorities have focused on consumer welfare, but in reality, competition and 
economic factors are prioritised by EU competition authorities as they are expected to 
benefit consumers automatically.881 It is concerning that the protection appears to be 
mainly focused on competitors rather than competition and without much evidence on 
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consumer harm. From a rule of law perspective, this approach leads to legal uncertainty 
due to the drastic shift in the presumption of legality and over inclusivity of competition 
rules.  
The following section aims to provide a more tangible meaning of IPR holders’ 
commitments arising from FRAND violations by building on the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ rationale and the rule of law doctrine.  
IV. WHAT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY UNDER EU 
COMPETITION LAW 
The arguments around FRAND licensing terms have stemmed originally from one of the 
very first references to FRAND.  The European Telecommunications Standard Institute 
(ETSI) had established a digital mobile standard for trans-European Trunked Radio882 
when it initially chose the model of Thomson Electronics instead of Digital Voice 
Systems Inc (DVSI).883 Initially, the ETSI had decided to incorporate Thomson’s code 
even though it was a lower quality product, given that DVSI had refused to make its IP 
a course code. The matter of concern here was that ETSI, during the standard-setting 
process, had interpreted that DVSI’s licensing terms were FRAND. Thus, its refusal to 
reveal its code has been considered by ETSI as consistent with EU procedure. The ETSI 
has then decided to proceed with Thomson’s lower quality code, as Thomson portrayed 
its willingness to make its code public.  DVSI had protected its invention with an IPR, 
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and thus, it prevented DVSI from fully contributing within the industry standard. It has 
been suggested by the Commission that ‘over standardisation can have extremely 
negative effects on market development and competition’ and ETSI was advised that 
they must assess standards and procedures for any possible impact on competition.884 
Interestingly, the Commission has considered ‘over standardisation’ as a matter of 
concern, however, competition law is currently over-inclusive. 
It was highlighted that competitors would be put in an advantageous situation when 
the specification of DVSI’s standard become public, given that its key components were 
trade secrets following extensive resources to develop and research the new 
product.885 However, it has also been indicated that the Commission had allowed 
competition to treat potential or current competitors preferentially when it accepted 
the lower quality product when there are two competing products in setting an 
industry.886  
It must be mentioned here that the Commission’s Guidelines have emphasised that:  
 In some cases, it would be necessary for the benefit of the consumers or the economy 
at large to have only one technological solution. However, this standard must be set on 
a non-discriminatory basis. Ideally, standards should be technology neutral. In any 
event, it must be justifiable why one standard is chosen over another. 887 
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Even though the Commission had indicated that standards should be decided on a non-
discriminatory basis, the DVSI ultimate decision has portrayed that a business was 
discriminated against following ETSI’s decision to publicise DVSI’s product as opposed 
to the norms finally. In other words, the purpose of an SSO is not to oblige IPR holder 
to publicise their products following the establishment of a standard. Instead, the SSO 
is responsible for providing access to the standard on FRAND terms. However, the 
Commission had avoided acting following the decision by ETSI to publicise the product 
when such a decision had, arguably, disregarded the comments made by the 
Commission. It is, therefore, evident that from the non-acting of the Commission that 
EU competition authorities saw that it is crucial for standard specifics to become public 
in order not to impact the competitive process negatively. 
A)  The Judgements in Magill and IMS Health 
To start with, the Commission in Magill decided that the initial IP owners, ITP, BBC and 
RTE, must provide their programme listings to one another and other parties when 
requested on a non-discriminatory basis.888 It has been identified by the Commission 
that this requirement only applies to listings as there is no need to provide any other 
information. If right owners decide to provide licences for means of reproduction, then 
they must also provide the other party with further information and the royalties must 
be reasonable.889 The Commission also stressed in Magill that it is essential to protect 
a better-quality coverage whereby higher royalties are justified, however, the 
Commission in DVSI remained silent about the better quality product.890 
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Strikingly, the Commission adopted different approaches when dealing with the same 
matter. In DVSI, the better-quality product was a protected IPR and DVSI had refused 
to declare its IPR as a standard and was initially denied incorporation into the industry 
standard on FRAND terms. In Magill, the Commission had particularly expressed that 
an IPR holder can request higher royalty in the circumstance of a better-quality 
innovation that is sheltered under an IPR protection. Therefore, unjustifiable different 
treatment can be noted in DVSI, particularly given that royalties were not demanded 
for the better-quality innovation. Kaseberg has pointed out that there are loose 
substantive principles when the Commission imposes a duty to license.891 The loose 
substantive principles applied to the duty to license are concerning from a rule of law 
perspective, given that everyone is equal under the rule of law and thus, unjustifiable 
different treatment could be inconsistent with the main principles of equality before 
the law as per the doctrine.  
Also, a tangible definition of ‘reasonable’ was not provided by the Commission. Indeed, 
it was identified in Microsoft that this problem could be resolved by resorting to an 
independent expert. Nonetheless, the role and responsibilities of the independent 
expert have been delimited by the GC in the Microsoft appeal case.892 
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B)  The Microsoft Decision 
The Commission, in Microsoft, had initially followed a similar method previously used 
in IMS Health when it referred to an independent expert to assess whether Microsoft’s 
information was accurate and complete, whether Microsoft’s terms were reasonable 
and non-discriminatory and whether the continuous disclosures were completed within 
reasonable time.893  However, the duties and responsibilities of the independent expert 
set by the Commission were soon delimited by the GC in the appealed case of Microsoft.  
The Commission provided some clarification to ‘reasonable’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ 
by indicating that the license fee must be ‘forward-looking’. The term ‘forward-looking’ 
suggests that future disclosures must be considered whilst determining a license fee.894 
However, the term ‘forward-looking’ does not provide any certainty as to its 
interpretations. On the one hand, the Commission might have intended to use the term 
‘forward-looking’ to indicate that a licence fee must be high in order to encourage 
invectives to innovate and invest.895 On the other hand, the Commission might have 
intended to use the term ‘forward-looking’ to indicate that the licence fee must be low 
in order to encourage follow-on investors.896 Therefore, it is to be argued that from a 
rule of law perspective, the considerations of a ‘forward-looking’ licensing fee should 
be specified in order to avoid any vagueness in outcomes of the application of the 
Article 102 TFEU.  
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 Arguably, the significance of distinct products has been underestimated by the 
Commission897 when it rejected Microsoft’s requested royalties and had found that the 
fee for patent access was unreasonable because the algorithms were not considered 
innovative.898 Indeed, the Commission’s decision in Microsoft was upheld by the GC. 
Nonetheless, the GC did not provide any further guidance as it had used vague language 
when it assessed the concepts of ‘novelty’ and ‘non-obviousness’ for the evaluation of 
the interoperability of the algorithms. The GC only contemplated that small 
improvements or developments on interoperability information are not considered 
innovative.899  
Moreover, the GC has highlighted that strategic and intrinsic value of technologies must 
be differentiated from one another for the determination of reasonable licensing 
terms.900 The Commission and the GC have made reference to the case of Automec901 
in order to stress that the Commission can impose any method deemed suitable on the 
parties without providing any guidance to the calculations of a reasonable royalty.902 It 
has, thus, been stipulated that the GC sees that the Commission is under no obligation 
to give any guidance or recommendations in regards to the evaluation of reasonable 
future royalties, given that the Commission does not have to follow one specific 
method.903  
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Additionally, the Court had highlighted that it is important to compare Microsoft’s 
earnings with the advantages Microsoft derives from abusing its dominant position in 
order to determine Microsoft’s licensing fees.904 The GC has emphasised that the 
royalty must not be within the revenue region of the infringer and thus, the Commission 
cannot impose one particular method for royalty calculation.905  However, the 
‘comparable’ earning referred to by the GC can vary significantly.  
Although the Commission’s requirement of ‘forward-looking’ licence fee has been 
referred to by the GC,906 the GC still had determined a licensing fee that was less than 
what was thought to be reasonable by Microsoft. Therefore, competitors have been 
rewarded a much less royalty for an input that is valuable and indispensable which 
indicates that competition authorities have gone for the tactic of market-based pricing 
in order to add restrictions on dominant businesses by making the downstream market 
so easily accessible.907 It has also been submitted that that competition authorities gave 
new competitors a boost because Microsoft was obliged to provide its product for a 
lower fee than what was initially proposed by Microsoft.908 Ultimately, the GC’s 
judgement in Microsoft left unanswered questions as it did not provide much 
clarifications or guidelines as to FRAND commitments following the Commission’s 
decision.909  
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The following section examines a recent case between Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v 
ZTE Corp in order to examine the ‘exceptional circumstances’ approach adopted by the 
ECJ when dealing with FRAND commitments.  
 
V. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO LTD V ZTE CORP 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, this case is significant for purpose of this 
research as it is a recent case where the ECJ provided its ruling indicating that under 
‘exceptional circumstances’ a SEP owner may be found abusing its dominant position 
by seeking IP infringement claims against an unlicensed user. The rule of law doctrine 
emphasises that whenever there is a legal issue, everyone has the right to access the 
courts. Therefore, unjustifiable restrictions added to access to court could be highly 
inconsistent with the rule of law doctrine, especially if unanswered questions are left 
by the ECJ which can lead to legal uncertainty. Leaving unanswered question when the 
ECJ had considerably limited IP owners’ rights to access justice is, arguably, very 
problematic as it adds limitations to access to courts which also fall within the realm of 
Article 17(2) CFREU, as well as, the risk of allowing the free-riding off innovation.  
A)  Background on the Case and its Parties 
The case was involved with a SEP which was considered as indispensable to all 
competitors associated with that standard. The status of a SEP had been granted via a 
particular standardisation body which obliges the SEP holder to license on FRAND 
terms.910 Huawei and ZTE are powerful Chinese companies in the telecommunications 
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sector, and both are competitors within the Chinese and the EU markets.911 Huawei 
committed to license on FRAND conditions, as the undertaking had acknowledged that 
few of its patents are vital to the standard set in ETSI’s 4G/LTE. Negotiations were 
initiated between both ZTE and Huawei, however, both companies were unable to 
reach a mutual agreement. To be more specific, Huawei rejected ZTE’s request for a 
cross-licensing agreement instead of paying royalties. Even though negotiations were 
unsuccessful, ZTE allegedly continued to use Huawei’s SEPs without providing 
royalties.912 Accordingly, Huawei brought an action for infringement or a claim for 
damages against ZTE before the Düsseldorf Regional Court (Landgericht Düsseldorf).  
The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) noted the existing 
inconsistencies between the German view and the Commission. Thus, the German 
Court has raised some questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. Mainly, the German 
Court requested elaboration on the exact circumstances for finding the conduct of a 
SEP holder abusive under EU competition law by initiating an action against a standard 
user who is willing to take a licence. The German Court also requested clarifications in 
regards to the assessments used under Article 102 TFEU for the finding of an abuse of 
dominance in cases of refusal to license.913 
B) The ECJ’S decision  
The ECJ in Huawei914 had used the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test to determine a 
balance between free competition and protection of IPRs. It first had to assess the 
legality of IP infringement proceedings brought by the proprietor against a user who 
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does not have a licence to use the SEP. The main questions of concern were whether a 
proprietor could bring IP infringement proceedings without breaching Article 102 
TFEU,915 given that Articles 17(2) and 47 CFREU safeguard the right of effective judicial 
protection and a high level of IP protection in the internal market.916 Second, the ECJ 
had also to determine whether the proprietor had breached EU competition law with 
its refusal to license and assess whether such conduct had an impact on the 
maintenance or growth of competition within the market.917  
The Court highlighted that according to existing case law such as Volvo v Veng, Magill 
and IMS Health, the proprietor enjoys the right to exercise its exclusive rights granted 
under IPRs. Thus, a dominant undertaking cannot abuse its dominance by bringing an 
IP infringement proceeding in itself.918 However, the Court then also referred to the 
same cases: Volvo v Veng, Magill and IMS Health to highlight that the proprietor can be 
found, in exceptional circumstances, in breach Article 102 TFEU by bringing IP 
infringement proceedings.919 The ECJ further pointed out that according to the three 
requirements of abuse that are found in Volvo v Veng,920 a dominant undertaking can 
be found abusing its dominant position if it participates in abusive conduct different 
than those that govern regular competition. 921  
The Court identified that the exercise of exclusive IPRs does not automatically 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position, even when the act of an undertaking is in a 
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dominant position.922 The exercise of exclusive IPRs could be in breach of Article 102 
TFEU, but only in exceptional circumstances.923 Furthermore, the ECJ recognised that 
the abuse of IPRs of this case must be distinguished from other existing case law, the 
main concerns in Huawei/ZTE revolve around the FRAND commitment, as well as the 
concept of standardisation.924 The use of a SEP here is vital to all competitors, especially 
if the essential patent meets the set-out standard. The Court indicated that a SEP holder 
could stop competitors from dealing with the product by bringing an action for a 
prohibitory injunction to solely enjoy manufacturing the product. Nonetheless, 
standard users have been provided with the legitimate expectation that they are always 
going to obtain FRAND licences.925 As a result of such an expectation, standard users 
can raise a competition law defence in IP infringement proceedings and, in return, 
compel the proprietor to license the SEP.926 
The preceding refusal to license cases have ‘indispensability’ as a criterion to the 
exceptional circumstances test. A SEP can be argued to inherit the indispensability 
criterion due to its context. Therefore, it seems that the ECJ has remained consistent 
with the reasoning previously adopted in IMS Health and Bronner regarding the 
indispensability criterion of previous case law. Moreover, the ECJ has referred to the 
legitimate expectations of standard users as the second criterion for the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ test used in the case of Huawei v ZTE. This new framework for the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ test has never been featured in previous refusal to license 
case law.  The Court, however, did not assess the other ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
                                                          
922 C-170/13 Huawei technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R. 14, at [46] 
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924 C- 170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14, at [48]  
925 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375 
926 C- 170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14 
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requirements established in previous case law.  
The Court, for example, did not explore whether the refusal to license a SEP had 
stopped the appearance of a new product or whether the conduct had eliminated 
competition or was likely to eliminate competition.  These prerequisites had formed an 
integral element of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test as EU law progressed. It can, 
thus, be argued that oversight of the requirements of ‘new product’ and ‘elimination of 
competition’ showcase contradictions in the reading of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
test. Although, the Court may have intended to omit these requirements to 
differentiate between SEPs and other types of IPRs, the Court could have provided more 
explicit justifications and reasoning within its ruling for the deviations from previous 
case law, instead of merely stating that this case can be distinguished from existing case 
law due to the legitimate expectations of standard users. 
On top of the above, it must be mentioned that the Court established that the 
proprietor of a SEP must fulfil specific requirements before seeking infringement 
proceedings in order not to be found abusing its dominant position. First, a SEP holder 
has to alert the user of the infringement taking place by describing the patent and 
detailing how the user has trespassed the SEP in question. This condition appears to be 
essential for the ECJ because usually there is a significant number of SEPs that compose 
a standard and thus, a standard user is not necessarily aware of the infringement taking 
place.  Second, a SEP holder has to present to an ‘infringing’ user a scripted licensing 
offer had the user conveyed its willingness to obtain a licensing agreement on FRAND 
terms.927  
The licensing offer provided by the proprietor must specify the terms, the royalty and 
                                                          
927 C-170/13 Hauwei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp, ZT 5  [2015] C.M.L.R 14 
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how it has been determined. If the ‘infringing’ user continues to use the SEP without 
attentively reacting to the offer as per usual commercial norms, as well as, the principle 
of good faith, then the proprietor can bring IP infringement proceedings against the 
alleged infringer without infringing its dominant position.928 The court held that if the 
‘infringing’ user did not accept the offer made by the proprietor of the SEP,  but has still 
provided a counter-offer on FRAND terms, in a prompt manner and in writing, then the 
SEP holder would be found abusing its dominant position by initiating IP infringement 
proceedings.929  
The Court decided that a dominant undertaking with an essential standard is prohibited 
from abusing its monopolistic position by bringing IP infringement claims against a user 
to obtain rendering accounts for past conduct of use or an award of damages. This 
approach adopted by the Court is because IP infringement claims can have an adverse 
impact on competition to the detriment of consumers and businesses that have already 
invested in preparing, adopting, as well as, applying the standard.930 Furthermore, the 
Court identified that the user should provide suitable financial security for its use. The 
calculation should also cover the number of the previous uses of the SEP. When an 
agreement cannot be grasped on FRAND terms, then the parties can with a mutual 
agreement request intervention by a third party for the amount of royalty to be decided 
without delay.931 
The balance between the right to effective remedy and the protection of IPRs are 
correspondingly covered under Article 17(2) and Article 47 CFREU.932 It is important to 
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highlight here that Articles 17(2) and 47 CFREU imply the importance of complying with 
the rule of law perspective by ensuring ‘the right to effective remedy and to fair trial’ 
and933 that IPRs must be given a high level of protection within the internal market.934 
The SEP holder in Huawei was ready to grant a FRAND licence, but both parties were 
unable to agree on what constitutes FRAND terms.935 The ECJ in such cases compels 
both parties to display conduct that safeguards a ‘fair’ balance between their 
interests,936 whereby the rights of enforcing IPRs must be taken into account. The ECJ 
has highlighted that these rights are covered under Directive 2004/48 and Article 17(2) 
CFREU which aims to protect IPRs, as well as Article 47 CFREU which provides the right 
to effective judicial protection937 as it has been highlighted in the case that: 
This need for a high level of protection for intellectual property rights means that, in 
principle, the proprietor may not be deprived of the right to have recourse to legal 
proceedings to ensure effective enforcement of his exclusive rights, and that, in 
principle, the user of those rights, if he is not the proprietor, is required to obtain a 
licence prior to any use.938 
Despite the above observation, the ECJ still appears to favour standard users in FRAND 
                                                          
Fundamental Rights, Art. 17 (2) which states that ‘Intellectual property shall be protected’, and Art. 47 
states the following: 
 Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to 
an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, 
defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so 
far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.  
933 CFREU, Art. 47 
934 CFREU, 17(2) 
935 C- 170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14 
936 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375 
937 C- 170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14, at [57] 
938 C- 170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14, at [58] 
 239 
commitment, as SEP holders are compelled to fulfil certain requirements before seeking 
infringement proceedings against unlicensed use.939 Moreover, the ECJ had identified 
that Article 47 CFREU provides effective judicial protection and thus, the standard user 
cannot be criticised for challenging the SEP during the period of negotiations. 940 It has 
been stipulated941 that the Court’s reference to the standard user’s right to effective 
judicial protection as guaranteed by Article 47 CFREU is unclear and vague. What if the 
standard user was providing unfair offers to the SEP holder which cannot be accepted 
under FRAND terms?  Indeed, Article 47 CFREU provides effective judicial protection to 
the standard user, but it also provides the same for the SEP holder. Therefore, it appears 
to be vague as to why the infringer cannot be criticised for challenging the SEP during 
negotiation periods, and yet the SEP holder can be criticised for bringing IP infringement 
proceedings when both parties clearly cannot agree on mutual FRAND terms.   
Also, the following distinction made by the ECJ concerning actions for injunction, or 
recall of products and actions for the rendering of accounts or damages highlights that: 
Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as not prohibiting, in circumstances such as those 
in the main proceedings, an undertaking in a dominant position and holding an SEP, 
which has given an undertaking to the standardisation body to grant licences for that 
SEP on FRAND terms, from bringing an action for infringement against the alleged 
infringer of its SEP and seeking the rendering of accounts in relation to past acts of use 
of that SEP or an award of damages in respect of those acts of use. 942 
However, further questions were referred to the ECJ some of which first include, 
                                                          
939 C- 170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14, at [59]  
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941 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
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942 C- 170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] 5 C.M.L.R 14, at [74] et seq. 
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whether abuse of dominant position can only be assumed when the SEP holder has 
rejected an unconditional offer, and such a rejection would unfairly obstruct the 
standard user or breach the prohibition of discrimination.943 Second, whether 
willingness to negotiate is considered acceptable if it has been orally and generally 
portrayed, or should the standard user start negotiations by the submission of certain 
conditions of a licensing agreement?944 Third, whether submitting an unconditional 
offer to reach a licensing agreement is a requirement for consideration of an abuse of 
dominance and if so, should such an offer include all the conditions which are usually 
covered in licensing agreements?945 Fourth, are the conditions for presuming of an 
abuse of dominance by the holder a SEP applicable on an action brought on the grounds 
of other claims, such as the account’s rendering, damages and recall of products?946 
 It has been highlighted by the ECJ that there is a need to uphold a balance between 
competition laws and IPRs, as well as, the right to effective judicial protection.947 It has 
also been suggested that the bringing of an infringement action does not automatically 
establish an abuse of dominance.948 Indeed, the implementation of IPRs can breach EU 
competition laws, but only in exceptional circumstances. 949 The ECJ was attentive on 
differentiating this case from earlier case law. First, the importance of the patent which 
is a SEP established by an SSO. Thus, the patent is essential to all competitors that wish 
to use the patent in fulfilment to the standard that the patent is associated with.950 
Second, the SSO accepts a patent as a SEP so long as the holder is willing to fulfil the 
                                                          
943 C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp. [2016] R.P.C. 4 
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948 C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp. [2016] R.P.C. 4, at [46] 
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950 C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp. [2016] R.P.C. 4, at [49]-[50] 
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duty of granting licences on FRAND terms while taking into account that IP infringement 
proceedings brought by the holder of a SEP can stop products being manufactured by 
competitors in the relevant market. 951 
The ECJ highlighted two circumstances for abuse on the grounds of Article 102 TFEU 
that include the following:  
‘[C]reate legitimate expectations on the part of third parties that the proprietor of the 
SEP will in fact grant licences on such terms’, and therefore ‘a refusal […] to grant a 
licence on those terms’ could be raised as a defence in actions for a prohibitory 
injunction.952  
The underlying facts of the case may be reflected by the reference to ‘competitors’ 
made by the ECJ, given that the case has involved two competing companies, whereas 
the operative element of the decision applies to all SEP holders. The remark made to 
‘competitors’ in the rationale of the decision results in unanswered questions. One of 
which includes the question of whether similar legal standards would apply to other IP 
infringement proceedings that are sought by a licensing undertaking that is not a 
competing manufacturer.  
The ECJ has emphasised that the SEP holder is not stopped from the enforcement of 
the patent in question, however, the grating a licence under FRAND terms is obligatory. 
If both parties are incapable of reaching an agreement on FRAND terms, then an 
injunction can be successful only when the SEP holder had put efforts in ensuring ‘a fair 
balance of the interests concerned.’953 The SEP holder cannot be deprived of judicial 
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protection, thus should enjoy the opportunity of legal proceedings to safeguard 
effective enforcement of its rights.954 Nevertheless, the binding duty to issue licences 
on FRAND terms supports ‘the imposition on that [SEP holder] of an obligation to comply 
with specific requirements when bringing actions against alleged infringers.’ 955 
Therefore, some of the requirements set by the Court are unclear, such as the efforts 
that must be taken by the SEP holder in order to make sure that there is a fair balance 
of the interests of the concerned party. From a rule of law perspective, this gap is better 
filled as it can have a massive impact on the SEP holder, given that the Court could find 
a SEP owner abusing its dominance under Article 102 TFEU via an unclear set of 
requirements. 
In addition to the above, the case highlights the binding duty of SEP holders to license 
their SEP on FRAND terms, nevertheless, it must be taken into consideration the 
unlikeliness of both parties always and easily agreeing on mutual terms. Therefore, it is 
essential that the EU judicial system clarifies and outlines the legal standards that are 
to be taken for the determination of when a SEP owner has taken appropriate steps in 
ensuring a ‘fair balance of interests’. If these questions remain unanswered, then such 
a gap in FRAND commitments could have a considerable impact on innovation. 
Moreover, the rule of law doctrine requires a clear and consistent law that safeguards 
the rights of the public. 
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C) Comments 
It has been stipulated that the application of Article 102 TFEU is broad and does not 
give much consideration to procedures, rules and remedies where there is a well-
established law that already covers such areas of practice,956 such as access to court 
and effective judicial protection.  
The mentioned above can be particularly seen in the case of Huawei v ZTE, as the Court 
suggested that the bringing of IP infringement proceedings, in exceptional 
circumstances, can be seen as an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU. However, 
this perspective could clash with one of the basic principles of the rule of law, as well 
as, the fundamental rights that include access to courts and justice. It can be a matter 
of concern that the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU covers such wide-ranging areas 
of practice and its application has been continuously and aggressively expanding to 
cover more areas throughout EU case law. The rule of law and CFREU indicate that 
everyone should have access to justice. We must remember that the right holder is the 
ultimate owner of that particular IP. Restrictions added to the access to court could 
install fears of being found abusing a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. 
It is to be argued that Article 102 TFEU should not expand to cover matters of access to 
justice under its vague ‘exceptional circumstances’ test as this could easily contradict 
with the rule of law doctrine and fundamental human rights. The Court could provide 
the right holder with a prohibitory injunction against the user that had not obtained a 
licence to commence such a use.  As a matter of fact, the licence seeker’s rights are still 
protected, as they can still seek a parallel proceeding against the right holder’s ‘abusive’ 
                                                          
956 D. Bailey, ‘The new frontiers of Article 102 TFEU: antitrust imperialism or judicious intervention?’ 
[2018] 6(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 25-53 
 244 
refusal to license to obtain a compulsory licence and make claims for damages resulted 
from the right holder’s abusive refusal to license.  
E) The Commission’s and the GC’s view prior to Huawei v ZTE 
The GC had highlighted that the Commission’s two conditions for finding an abuse of 
dominance by bringing legal action are correct.957 The first requirement identified by 
the Commission is that the legal action was brought as a means of harassment to the 
opposite party. The second requirement is that the legal action aims to eliminate 
competition.958 It has been stressed in the case of Protégé International that these two 
requirements must be interpreted and applied narrowly in order not to clash with the 
general fundamental right of access to court.959 
However, it is extremely difficult for the IPR holder who had genuinely abusively refused 
to license to eliminate competition. Thus, the Commission’s second requirement for 
finding an abuse of a dominant position by bringing a legal action against an infringing 
user is near impossible. It is to be stressed here that, from a rule of law perspective 
everyone should have the right to access justice and thus, bringing IP infringement 
proceedings against an infringing user should not be considered abuse of a dominant 
position, particularly given that access to courts is a basic fundamental right.960 
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F) Few Issues Post-Huawei v ZTE 
Although theories on competitive harm have not been appropriately established,961 
decisions like Magill or IMS Health have highlighted that competition law under Article 
102 TFEU, and its relationship with the corresponding rules on IP protection had created 
the core of the ECJ’s argumentation. However, the current legal concepts are not 
necessarily stemmed from competition law, given that the Articles of the Charter962 and 
notions of fairness, good faith and recognised commercial practices now provide an 
important part of the ECJ’s legal reasoning in Huawei.  
The new legal reasoning found in Huawei as the EU law-framework for the protection 
of IP and competition has arguably the following possible impacts: 
To start with, it can be argued here that it blurs out the view on the relationship 
between IP protection and competition law. The reason being is that the Court 
suggested ‘strik[ing] a balance between maintaining free competition […]and the 
requirement to safeguard that proprietor’s intellectual property rights […] guaranteed 
by Article 17(2) […] of the Charter.’ However, these phrases make it appear as if 
competition and IP protection are conflictive principles rather than complementing 
ones. IPRs need competition to produce profits, and in return, IPRs are meant to 
empower competition by the blocking of replication, competition by replacement, as 
well as competition based on follow-on innovations.963 
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 In addition to the above, these phrases appear to emphasise that the scope of IPRs’ 
protection is limited. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that this outlook is 
‘dangerous’.964 This is because, arguably, the ECJ had mainly965 established IPRs as a 
means to grow the market, and it appears as if they are only being tailored to this 
purpose via EU case law. 
Further, CFREU is binding on all EU institutions which provides further means for 
protection concerning IPRs. It has been highlighted here that IP holders may be 
restrained to exercise their rights not only because it violates EU competition law, but 
also because their conduct could be breaching CFREU as applied in Huawei.966 This can 
consequently have an impact on future cases whereby Article 102 TFEU will not be the 
only means that can be used to enforce and apply a compulsory licence, as the EU 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48 EC, cited in the Huawei v ZTE’s,967 requests ‘fair’, 
‘equitable’ and ‘proportionate’ remedies968 and such phrases can be interpreted in 
alignment with the CFREU.969 This has an impact on the link between the rules of 
conduct highlighted in Huawei v ZTE and the market dominance requirement of Article 
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102 TFEU, given that the ECJ in its decision suggested a fair interaction between specific 
members in a standards-based market.  
Indeed, Article 102 TFEU is used to establish when a ‘dominant undertaking’ abuses its 
dominant position.  However, the rules of conduct under the CFREU do not require 
dominant business to particularly undertake such conduct. The concept of fairness and 
the Articles of the CFREU do not depend on dominance, and thus, they could be 
applicable to all market participants.970 Accordingly, this case is problematic as it 
appears that the decision has not been genuinely based on competition law as Article 
102 TFEU has only been available as an additional dominance-dependent sanction for 
the violation of a widely applicable standard of fairness.971 
On one the hand, looking into the American case of Apple v Motorola, Apple did not 
make a particular counter-offer.972 The ‘willingness’ of Apple can be thus questioned if 
hypothetically compared to the principles of Huawei v ZTE, yet this did not keep Judge 
Posner from rejecting to granting an injunction. On the other hand, the Commission 
stated that Article 102 TFEU is breached with an action of an injunction, especially if a 
standard user was keen to negotiate a licence. The Commission did not provide further 
explanation in relation to the level of ‘willingness’ that must be shown by the standard 
user.973 The determination of what forms ‘willingness’ on the part of a potential licensee 
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is complicated. Without a doubt, the ECJ’s decision provided helpful guidance in regard 
to the licensing negotiations, nonetheless, some areas of uncertainty are still not 
answered which are left to be addressed by national courts. From a rule of law 
perspective, the reference to willingness is unclear, as it does not define the level of 
willingness that must be portrayed by the standard user or how to evaluate the 
‘appropriate’ degree of willingness.  
Moreover, the press release suggests that Article 102 TFEU can be breached with an 
action for an injunction which can clash with one of the rule of law principle which is 
access to justice. Thus, it is essential that EU authorities avoid legal uncertainties in the 
requirement of willingness so that SEP holders can understand their obligations and 
foresee the outcomes of their conduct.  
VI. CONTRAST OF APPROACHES TO EVALUATION ISSUES OF JUSTIFICATION OF 
REFUSAL TO LICENSE 
To start off with, the ECJ identified in Volvo v Veng three conditions that must be 
fulfilled for an abuse of dominance to be established. The ECJ did not outline whether 
these three elements are exhaustive or not.  These elements first include that there 
must be arbitrary practice such as refusal to license to independent parties. Second, 
there must be the presence of illegal price fixing and third, the prevention of production 
of relevant products for a model that is still in circulation.974   
Following this, the ECJ in Magill975 has relaxed its exceptional circumstances test as 
opposed to its approach in Volvo v Veng.976 The ECJ in the case of Magill has 
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acknowledged that a compulsory licence could be granted when the product is crucial 
for the production of a new product that is not provided by the IP holder, there are no 
justifiable reasons for the refusal to license, and the conduct excludes competition in 
the secondary market of that specific IPR.977 Indeed, the ECJ established here that a 
compulsory licence may now be granted when the production of a new product 
outweighs the right holder’s incentives to innovate.978  Accordingly, the Court had 
resorted to a balancing of efficiencies test and had adopted a follow-on innovation 
approach for the determination of unlawful refusal to license IPRs.979 
Following the cases of Volvo v Veng and Magill, the ECJ in the case of Bronner has 
introduced a new approach to the exceptional circumstances test.980 The ECJ in this case 
stipulated that refusal to license can only be unlawful when the refusal could eliminate 
competition in that market, there are no justifiable objective considerations, and the 
product or service is indispensable for carrying on that individual’s business.981 
Accordingly, it was made clear by the ECJ that economic and legal considerations are 
necessary to balance the conduct of an undertaking against public interests.  Moreover, 
the ECJ in the Bronner case has provided further clarifications to the requirements set 
in Magill.982 An example on this can be seen by the fact that the requirement of ‘not 
justified’ in Magill became ‘not justified by objective considerations’ in Bronner. 
Additionally, the requirement of ‘exclude all competition’ found in Magill became ‘likely 
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to exclude all competition’ in Bronner. Therefore, an element of probability has been 
introduced by the ECJ in Bronner.983 
Following the cases of Volvo v Veng, Magill and Bronner, the ECJ in the case of IMS 
Health984 reaffirmed the exceptional circumstances requirements that were previously 
set in Bronner and Magill.  The ECJ further stated here that a compulsory licence can be 
determined by the court when the product or service is indispensable within the 
downstream market.985 The Court also indicated that a compulsory licence can be 
issued when the ‘refusal to grant a license prevents the development of the secondary 
market to the detriment of consumers.’986 Therefore, it can be noted here that the ECJ 
furthered the ‘new product’ condition set in Magill into the development of a secondary 
market.987 The ECJ further indicated that refusal to license could be considered unlawful 
when such a refusal might exclude potential competition on a secondary market.988 
Moreover, a licence seeker must have the intention to produce new products or 
services that are not provided by the IPR holder in that market, given that there is 
possible consumer demand on such goods or services.989 
It was, thus, recognised by the ECJ that a refusal to license by a dominant business could 
be sufficiently measured as abusive under Article 102 TFEU, ex Article 82 EC, when 
specific requirements are fulfilled. First, the IPR in question is crucial for carrying on a 
specific business. Second, the refusal prevents the production of a new product that 
might have consumer demand. Third, there are no objective justifications for the refusal 
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to license, and finally, the conduct might exclude all competition in a secondary 
market.990 Accordingly, the Court in IM Health has created a narrower or a rather 
stricter approach to the new product condition, as it made duplication of an IPR 
insufficient for a compulsory licence.991  
Moving on to the approach adopted by the Commission, it is important to recap that 
the Commission has established in the case of Microsoft a different approach to the 
standards that have been previously introduced by the ECJ. Although the Commission 
has referred to Volvo v Veng and Magill to highlight that refusal to supply cannot be 
considered on its own as abusive conduct, the Commission still stressed that there are 
exceptions to this principle.992 Accordingly, the Commission has introduced an ‘entirety 
of circumstances’ test when it attempted to narrow down the definition of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ to a case-by-case approach.993 The Commission has identified three 
exceptional requirements for finding a refusal to license by a dominant undertaking as 
abusive under Article 102 TFEU.994 The first requirement suggested that the refusal to 
supply must introduce a threat of excluding competition in the relevant market. The 
second requirement indicated that such a risk must be due to the indispensability of 
the product or service to carry on businesses in that market. The last requirement 
implied that the refusal to supply should have an adverse impact on technical 
development, as well as consumers’ interests.995   
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The Commission has touched on the basic requirements of indispensability, elimination 
of competition and no objective justifications, yet the new product test appears not to 
be a matter of concern for the Commission.996 Moreover, the indispensability test in 
previous case law such as Bronner and IMS Health does not necessitate maximum 
access to the market when there are other available solutions and even if they are less 
beneficial.997 Nonetheless, the Commission has used a liberal approach to the 
indispensability test as it disregarded the possibility of other solutions mainly because 
they are less advantageous. Furthermore, the requirement of the elimination of 
competition in Microsoft appears to be inconsistent with previous case law. As 
indicated earlier, the ECJ had already tightened the Magill’s test in IMS Health to the 
elimination of ‘all’ competition. Nevertheless, the Commission has undertaken a lenient 
approach as opposed to the existing case with its requirement of the ‘risk of eliminating 
competition’.998  
Another inconsistency that can be pointed out here is the Commission’s lenient 
approach to the previously established requirement of objective justifications. This 
inconsistency can be seen when Microsoft argued that it had refused to disclose its 
information due to objective justifications to protect its multibillion R&D investments 
in its software and technology, yet the Commission rejected Microsoft’s reasons for its 
refusal to disclose its information. The Commission stated that the essence of IPRs is to 
protect both the right holder’s moral rights and guarantee a reward for efforts made 
on creativity, but such creativity must be motivated for the interest of the public.  
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Therefore, the Commission tackled Microsoft’s arguments by applying a new incentives 
trade-off test.   
The Commission’s lenient approach to compulsory licensing and access to indispensable 
IP can lead to products’ imitation which can have a negative effect on incentives to 
innovate and invest.999 Such a lenient approach to compulsory licensing may increase 
competition, yet it can harm the economy as it discourages the investment in future 
R&D.1000  Moreover, the inconsistencies highlighted in this chapter can lead individuals 
to lose their trust in the legal system in question.  
In addition to the above, the ECJ in the recent case of Huawei v ZTE has referred to 
existing case law such as Volvo v Veng, Magill and IMS Health to highlight that the an IP 
holder can be found, in exceptional circumstances, in breach Article 102 TFEU by 
bringing IP infringement proceedings.1001 The ECJ further pointed out that according to 
the three requirements of abuse that are found in Volvo v Veng,1002 a dominant 
undertaking can be found abusing its dominant position if it participates in abusive 
conduct different than those that govern regular competition.1003  
Indeed, the ECJ recognised that the abuse of IPRs of this case must be distinguished 
from other existing case law as Huawei v ZTE revolves around the FRAND commitment, 
as well as the concept of standardisation;1004 the use of a SEP here is vital to all 
competitors. Therefore, it can be argued that the ECJ remained consistent with previous 
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case law regarding the requirement of ‘indispensability as a SEP can automatically 
inherit the indispensability criterion due to its context. However, the ECJ has referred 
to the legitimate expectations of standard users as the second criterion for the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ test used in the case of Huawei v ZTE. This new framework 
for the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test has never been featured in previous refusal to 
license case law.  Moreover, the Court did not assess the other ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ requirements established in previous case law, such as whether the SEP 
has stopped the appearance of a new product or whether the conduct had eliminated 
competition or was likely to eliminate competition.   
Accordingly, it can be argued that oversight of the requirements of ‘new product’ and 
‘elimination of competition’ showcase contradictions in the reading of the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ test. Although, the Court may have intended to omit these requirements 
to differentiate between SEPs and other types of IPRs, the Court could have provided 
more explicit justifications and reasoning within its ruling for the deviations from 
previous case law. However, the ECJ has merely stated that this case can be 
distinguished from existing case law due to the legitimate expectations of standard 
users. 
Overall, there has been a prominent development throughout EU case law for the 
determination of breach of EU competition law under Article 102 TFEU. The cases of 
Volvo v Veng and IMS Health and then Magill focused on concerns of the duplication 
and imitations. Then, the Commission appears to take this issue less seriously when it 
introduced the idea of technical development as a justification for a compulsory licence 
even when technical development does not necessarily indicate a distinctive new 
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product. It is therefore argued here that the Commission appears to have prioritised 
competition over inventor’s incentives to innovate.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The rule of law doctrine calls for legal certainty, but consistency in decision making is 
one of the key elements for achieving this. The indicated gradual shift of the application 
of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test indicates that decision making at an EU level has 
adopted, through-out EU case law development,  a more aggressive application of 
Article 102 TFEU which portrays the over-inclusivity of competition law regime in 
refusal to license cases.1005 It can, thus, be argued that dominant undertakings might 
avoid certain practices that are pro-competitive only due to fears of having it being 
considered as abusive by EU competition authorities. It is believed that the essence of 
IPRs is sometimes diluted by the purely economic approach adopted by EU competition 
authorities in refusal to license cases.1006 This can mainly be seen in FRAND 
commitments where economic approach would fulfil the demands of the participants 
in the patent pool rather than the essential right holder. However, the rule of law 
doctrine calls for respecting fundamental rights and one being IPRs, and thus, the 
current over-inclusivity of the EU competition law regime is disfavoured  from a rule of 
law perspective as it could undermine the essence of IPRs.  
As a potential solution to the over-inclusivity of the EU competition law regime, it is to 
be argued here that the EU competition authorities and judicial system could have been 
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more attentive on consumer welfare, rather than the examination of what is better for 
rivals and then consumers. This approach could have been more sensible, given that 
both radical innovation and market breakthrough are most advantageous to consumer 
welfare.  
Moreover, this chapter aimed at highlighting that there will be an inevitable significant 
adverse impact on incentives to invest and innovate  with the new attitude that has 
been introduced by EU competition authorities regarding the presumption of the 
illegality of refusal to license.1007 As a result, the position of dominant undertakings has 
been weakened as can be seen in recent cases of abusive refusal to license and FRAND 
violations, given that the current application of Article 102 TFEU has a softer approach 
towards dependent undertakings, but without clear guidelines. In the innovation 
sector, the presumption of illegality of the refusal to supply or license gives license 
seekers power to go above their position in the market as already seen and discussed 
in the case of Microsoft. Therefore, as a potential solution, the presumption of legality 
of the refusal to license or supply is desirable whereby the license seekers must be the 
ones to rebut such a presumption. Such an attitude is also favourable from a rule of law 
approach, as it can strengthen the protection of IPRs and, in return, encourage 
incentives to innovate.  
Further, inconsistencies can be seen when the approach of the Commission is compared 
against its Guidelines. The Guidelines have stressed the importance of equal treatment 
and maximising consumer welfare. Nonetheless, the Commission’s non-involvement 
following ETSI’s decision in DVSI has portrayed that the circumstances that are not 
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related to the requirements of an actual licence can add discrimination against an 
undertaking. In other words, ETSI’s decision portrayed that the holder of a product that 
is better quality which had offered its product on FRAND term was discriminated 
against. Such issues lead to legal uncertainty, especially given that the Commission did 
not get involved following ETSI’s decision. It can be noted that the approach of 
competition authorities has been progressively becoming more aggressive towards 
dominant businesses that hold an essential facility and holders of an essential IP within 
the standard-setting process.  
The challenges that arise in the progressive and over-inclusive EU competition law 
regime can conflict to some degree with some of the main principles of the rule of law 
doctrine, such as legal certainty, predictability and consistency in decision-making. On 
top of the inconsistencies that progressed with time in EU case law as highlighted 
throughout this chapter, the application of Article 102 TFEU and the interpretation of 
‘exceptional circumstances’ test has also been aggressively expanding whereby a 
proprietor can now be found abusing its dominant position for bringing IP infringement 
claims. This can be problematic from a rule of law perspective, as the CFREU already 
covers matters related to access to justice and courts. Therefore, it is odd that Article 
102 TFEU has now expanded to the point where EU competition authorities can apply 
their exceptional circumstances test to intervene with such matters that are already 
covered under other areas of law such as the CFREU.  
A legal system that fully adheres with the rule of law needs to offer protection against 
arbitrary use of power to those subject to the law. Moreover, a legal system that fully 
adheres with the rule of law and its elements such as legal certainty must allow 
individuals to regulate and manage their conduct with certainty. In order to provide 
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legal certainty, decisions must be made based on rules that are available to the public. 
Indeed, legal certainty can vary depending on various elements, nonetheless, legal 
certainty often provides the basis of how the law progresses and how it is made, 
construed and applied in coherence with the rule of law. Accordingly, it is to be argued 
here that the new interpretation of Article 102 TFEU where IPR holders can be found 
abusing their dominant position by bringing of IP infringement proceedings does not 
necessarily fully adhere with legal certainty and the rule of law, as such an 
interpretation was not made available to the public prior to the decision made in 
Huawei v ZTE. This decision did not give the right holder in this case the chance to 
fashion their conduct according the rules that are made available to them at that time. 
Therefore, as a potential solution, it is to be argued that the interpretation of Article 
102 TFEU should be limited and must not expand to cover other matters covered in 
other areas such as the CFREU.  
To conclude, international treaties left the door open for EU competition authorities to 
achieve a balance between competition and IP which had implications at a regional 
level. Nonetheless, the exceptional circumstances test under Article 102 TFEU for 
finding an abuse of a dominant position has also had implications on domestic courts 
within the EU. The following chapter assesses the admissibility and administration of 
EU competition law defence in IP infringement proceedings brought before domestic 
courts and the implications of Huawei v ZTE on the interpretations adopted by national 
courts in regards to the applicability of Article 102 TFEU in finding an abuse of 
dominance by bringing IP infringement claims. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF EU COMPETITION LAW IN IP-RELATED 
MATTERS BY NATIONAL COURTS: THREE CONTRASTING CASE STUDIES 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As technology and innovation are evolving, it is inevitably becoming more challenging 
for the law to keep up with these changes. The previous chapter has argued that EU 
competition law and the tests adopted for establishing an abuse of dominance are 
aggressively expanding leading to, arguably, instability and some degree of legal 
uncertainty. A striking matter of concern here is that the finding of an abuse of 
dominance under Article 102 TFEU could give room for the free-riding of innovation 
which would be inconsistent with the rule of law element of fundamental human rights 
with regards to respecting property rights.  
As it has been indicated in the previous chapters, competition law concerns can be 
raised under Article 102 TFEU when there are doubts regarding the legality of the 
practices undertaken by dominant businesses.1008 In some circumstances, potential 
licensees commence use of the IPR without obtaining authorisation from the right 
holder and in other circumstances, they commence use of the IPR after making a mere 
offer to the right-holder to license the IPR in question. These circumstances can be 
particularly seen in FRAND commitments as standard implementers have become 
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accustomed to assuming the automatic right to a licence, in particular following Huawei 
v ZTE. 
Therefore, IP infringement proceedings are being increasingly raised against ‘infringing’ 
users, whereby users bring competition law defences to argue that they should have 
been granted a licence in the first place. In other words, a plaintiff files an IP 
infringement proceeding against the defendant who is an unlicensed user, and then the 
defendant argues that the right holder is abusing its dominant position with its refusal 
to license. Consequently, IP courts are left to determine whether competition law 
defence to a compulsory licence can be admissible in IP infringement proceedings, 
although a competition law counter-claim was not settled before a competition 
authority or court.1009  
This chapter examines the interpretations of Article 102 TFEU that are adopted by the 
jurisdictions of the UK, Germany and Netherlands before Huawei v ZTE. This study is 
then followed by an analysis of the striking implications of the decision in Huawei v ZTE. 
This discussion focuses on the three named jurisdictions due to the interesting contrasts 
in the approaches taken for administering EU competition law in their jurisdictions. It 
must be mentioned here that the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has three 
legal systems which consist of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, yet 
Competition Law Act 1998 applies to all these mentioned legal systems1010. For the 
purpose of this thesis, it is being referred to as the UK competition law. 
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1010 Competition Law Act of 1998, S. 76 states that this Act applies to England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland 
 261 
II. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS IN APPLYING EU COMPETITION LAW 
As mentioned previously, prior to 2004, the Commission had the sole authority to 
enforce antitrust rules. Nonetheless, a major reform has been introduced whereby both 
national competition authorities and the European Commission can now directly apply 
EU competition rules. Moreover, the national competition authorities of EU Member 
States and the European Commission cooperate as they do their independent 
investigations via the European Competition Network. The cooperation between 
national competition authorities and the European Commission has led to more than 
2000 inspections and more than 1000 decisions by the end of 2017.1011  
With regards to EU competition law, Regulation 1/2003 provided national courts with 
a great enforcement role of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.1012 Both the Commission and 
national competition authorities have the role of initiating investigations, yet the 
Commission has the added role of ensuring that national competition authorities apply 
EU competition rules in a uniform manner which ultimately makes the European 
Commission the main enforcer of EU competition rules. It must also be mentioned that 
the Commission assists national courts to make sure that the application of Article 102 
TFEU is consistent throughout the EU.  As a matter of fact, national courts must provide 
the Commission with a copy of any decision where the national court has applied Article 
102 TFEU. Moreover, national courts can ask the Commission for an opinion as per 
Article 15(1) Regulation 1/20031013. Also, Article 15(3) of the same regulation allows the 
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Commission to submit its comments to national courts as amicus curiae.1014 
Additionally, the Commission offers a grants programme to train judges of national 
courts in EU competition law, as well as judicial cooperation between domestic judges.  
 
In addition to the above, although domestic judicial authorities can ask for the 
Commission’s opinion as per Article 15(1) Regulation 1/2003, this does not away the 
right or obligation of domestic courts to refer questions to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling under Article 267 TFEU.  Once a preliminary reference is made to the CJEU, the 
CJEU interpretation of EU law which would bind the domestic court, as opposed to the 
Commission’s opinion which would not bind the national court.  Moreover, if a question 
is referred to the CJEU, the Court will provide a preliminary ruling concerning the correct 
interpretation of EU law, as well as the validity of EU acts, while the Commission’s 
opinion can be provided not only legal matters, but also factual and economic issues.  
 
Further to the above, domestic courts are required to provide the Commission with a 
written copy of any judgement passed at a domestic level when it involves the 
application of Article 102 TFEU as per Article 15(2) Regulation 1/2003. As a matter of 
fact, these rulings have to be passed to the Commission “without delay after the full 
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written judgement is notified to the parties.”1015 These rulings are then published, in 
the original language, for public access in an online database to portray the role of 
domestic courts as enforcers of EU competition law. 1016 
 
Overall, national courts play a significant part in the enforcement of EU competition 
law, as well as its development. Accordingly, the following sections aim to critically 
assess how domestic courts have applied and enforced EU competition law prior to the 
case of Huawei v ZTE and then assess the implications of this case on the domestic legal 
regime of three jurisdictions as examples to the administration of EU competition law 
by domestic courts.  
 
III. COMPETITION LAW DEFENCE PRIOR TO HUAWEI V ZTE 
This section explores the jurisdictions of the UK, Germany and Netherlands as examples 
to the application of Article 102 TFEU by domestic courts across the EU prior to the case 
of Huawei v ZTE. 
A) The UK Perspective 
To start off with, this subsection examines the admissibility of EU competition law in IP 
infringement proceedings brought before the UK legal system. Namely, this section 
analyses the approaches adopted by the UK courts prior the ECJ’s ruling in Huawei v 
ZTE. 
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 264 
Indeed, a right holder would be participating in absusive practices with a refusal to 
license that does not adhere to the principles set in Article 102 TFEU or the relevant 
domestic law. It has been suggested that an action for an injunction within IP 
infringement proceedings should automatically fail when a right holder had abusively 
refused to license.1017 It has been portrayed in the previous chapter that a refusal to 
license can be considered as an abuse of a dominant position in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ under Article 102 TFEU. Moreover, abuse of a dominant position can 
also occur when the right holder brings an IP infringement proceedings in exceptional 
circumstances under Article 102 TFEU.1018 It is believed by some that right holders 
misuse their dominant position when IP infringements are sought, given that such 
proceedings would not have been brought in the first place had a right holder granted 
a licence as per Article 102 TFEU or the relevant national law.1019  
The arguments mentioned above appear to be consistent with existing UK case law. For 
example, in the judgement made by the English Court of Appeal in British Leyland.1020 
The judgement confirmed that the IPR owner would be abusing its dominant position 
by attempting to impose unrelated conditions on a trader that is in desperate need for 
a licence to trade. It has been indicated by Justice Templeman that, in such 
circumstances, the IPR holder will not be granted the requested injunction against the 
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user.1021 The Court has further highlighted that the owner’s right to use copyright does 
not mean that the copyright’s holder can breach EU competition law.1022  
This finding has also been confirmed in Intel v Via1023 concerning patents that have been 
considered essential to the chipsets market before the England and Wales Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division). Lawrence Collins J allowed Via to appeal the case before the 
Court of Appeal, but only in respect to whether competition law defence can be raised 
for the market division term following Via’s reference to British Leyland.1024 It was 
stipulated by Vice-Chancellor Sir Andrew Morritt in the appealed case that the user 
could raise competition law defence when the conduct of the right-holder breaches  
Article 102 TFEU.1025  
The Court of Appeal in Intel v Via had first to examine whether a sufficiently pleaded 
case has been put forward by Via. The allegations put forward should also satisfy the 
Court that Intel’s refusal to license is, in fact, breaching Article 102 TFEU. The Court of 
Appeal referred to three ECJ’s decisions of Volvo v Veng1026, ITT Promedia v 
Commission1027 and Magill1028 in order to determine whether Intel had abused its 
dominant position with its refusal to license to Via.1029  
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relief to which they would otherwise be entitled. If, for example, ... the owners of English copyright were 
only prepared to grant a licence on terms which created, or helped to create, a breach of Community law, 
this court, I apprehend, would not grant an injunction against an infringer who desperately needed a 
licence for his business purposes and was willing to pay a reasonable royalty for the privilege. 
1022 British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd v TI Silencers Ltd [1981] 2 CMLR 75, at [8] 
1023 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2002] EWCA Civ 1905. 
1024 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2002] EWCA Civ 1905, at 
[30] 
1025 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2002] EWCA Civ 1905, at 
[80] 
1026 Volvo v Veng [1988] E.C.R. 6211 
1027 Promedia v Commission [1998] E.C.R. II-2941 
1028 Magill (RTE and Others v European Commission) [1995] ECR I 743, 823 para 50 
1029 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2002] EWCA Civ 1905, at 
[36] 
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The ECJ in Volvo v Veng1030 had recognised that, initially, the owner of an IPR appears 
to have the full entitlement to prevent others from manufacturing or using the IPR.1031 
However, the right holder does not always enjoy this exclusive right due to competition 
law concerns. The ECJ in ITT Promedia v Commission1032 held that, in some 
circumstances, a dominant undertaking might not be allowed to act or take certain 
measures even when they are not abusive conduct due to competition law concerns. 
Consequently, the exercise of IPRS by dominant undertakings, in some circumstances, 
can be challenged based on competition law even when similar conduct would be 
considered lawful had it been undertaken by a non-dominant business.1033 
The Court of Appeal then highlighted that the test that is to be used to assess abuse of 
dominance is ‘the exceptional circumstances’ test; it referred to Magill1034 in support of 
this approach.1035  
The Court of Appeal had to identify from the two broad principles made by the ECJ in 
Volvo v Veng and ITT Promedia v Commission the exceptional circumstances where a 
dominant undertaking can be found breaching EU competition laws. However, it has 
been indicated by the Court that it is challenging to determine such circumstances 
because the ECJ's jurisprudence on this issue is still in a state of instability.1036 It is 
                                                          
1030 Volvo v Veng [1988] E.C.R. 6211 
1031 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2002] EWCA Civ 1905, at 
[36]; Volvo v Veng [1988] E.C.R. 6211, at 6235 [8] 
1032Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2002] EWCA Civ 1905, at 
[36]; Promedia v Commission [1998] E.C.R. II-2941, at 2987 [139] 
1033 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2002] EWCA Civ 1905, at 
[36]; Promedia v Commission [1998] E.C.R. II-2941, 2887 para 139 
1034 Magill (RTE and Others v European Commission) [1995] ECR I 743, 823 at [50] 
1035 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2002] EWCA Civ 1905, at 
[37] 
1036 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2002] EWCA Civ 1905 
[32] Lawrence Collins J states that “the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice is in the course of 
development it is dangerous to assume that it is beyond argument with real prospect of success that the 
existing case law will not be extended or modified so as to encompass the defence being advanced.” 
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interesting to note that the Court of Appeal had highlighted that such instability in ECJ’s 
jurisprudent makes it more challenging for national courts to determine the 
circumstances of when a dominant undertaking can be found in breach of EU 
competition law. The rule of law doctrine can be referred to here to highlight that 
stability in the EU jurisprudence is essential so that individuals can manage their affairs 
effectively.1037 It is not argued here that the EU legal framework must offer an absolute 
degree of legal stability, given that this can create a rigid legal structure that could be 
inconsiderate to the possible changes in social practices and norms.1038 However, it is 
argued that the EU legal framework must provide general greater legal stability due to 
the ethical significance which ensures that similar cases are to be dealt with equally.1039 
Clearly, the Court of Appeal had allowed the appeal and permitted reference to be 
made to the ECJ’s decisions with some level of hesitation or caution. Generally, IP courts 
have already carefully dealt with a number of cases that are concerned with ‘Euro-
defences’1040 in order to avoid extra expenses and long trials.1041 Lawrence Collins J had 
highlighted that Euro-defences usually raise questions of different laws which makes it 
inappropriate for a summary determination.1042 Additionally, it has been stipulated by 
Lawrence Collins J that reference to the EU Court should not be made prior to dealing 
                                                          
1037 H Hart and A Sacks, ‘The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law’ in W 
Eskridge and P Frickey (eds), Hart and Sacks the Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and 
Application of Law (Westbury: NY: Foundation Press, 1994) 
1038S Lindquist and F Cross, ‘ Stability, Predictability and the Rule of Law’ 
https://law.utexas.edu/conferences/measuring/The%20Papers/Rule%20of%20Law%20Conference.cros
slindquist.pdf accessed in 28 September 2018 
1039S Lindquist and F Cross, ‘ Stability, Predictability and the Rule of Law’ 
https://law.utexas.edu/conferences/measuring/The%20Papers/Rule%20of%20Law%20Conference.cros
slindquist.pdf accessed in 28 September 2018 
1040 Euro defences are competition law defences that are usually based on Article 102 TFEU 
1041 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2003] EWCA Civ 1905; at 
[32] and [35] 
1042 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2003] EWCA Civ 1905; at 
[32] and [35] 
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with all relevant facts by the national court.1043  In other words, Lawrence Collins J 
stressed that competition law defences should not be assessed until all relevant factors 
of IP infringement have been first assessed.  Regardless, the Court had allowed the 
appeal based on Article 102 TFEU and thus, has put the attention back on Euro-
defences.1044  
B) The German Perspective  
This subsection examines the approach adopted by German courts regarding the 
admissibility of EU competition law in IP infringement proceedings prior to the decision 
of the ECJ in Huawei v ZTE. Namely, it assesses the requirements provided in the 
landmark decision of the Orange-Book-Standard.1045 
The German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) had adopted another 
approach when dealing with competition law defences in IP proceedings as can be seen 
in its Orange-Book-Standard1046 of May 2009. The Court here had highlighted that a 
user could challenge IP infringement proceedings with a competition law defence under 
Article 102 TFEU. The user can also request an injunction on the grounds that the right 
holder had abused its dominant position with its refusal to reach a licensing 
agreement.1047  
Two forms of abuse were identified by the Court. The first form of abuse is the abusive 
refusal to license. The second form of abuse is the enforcement of a claim with an action 
                                                          
1043 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2003] EWCA Civ 1905, at 
[35] 
1044 T. Hoppner, ‘Competition Law in Intellectual Property Litigation: The Case for Compulsory Licence 
Defence Under Article 102 TFEU’ 7[2] European Competition Journal 297-322 
1045 Case KZR 39/06, [2009] 180 BGHZ 312, 316—Orange-Book-Standard. An English translation can be 
found at https://www.ie-
forum.nl/backoffice/uploads/file/IEForum/IEForum%20Uitspraken/Octrooirecht/EN%20Translation%20
BGH%20Orange%20Book%20Standard%20-%20eng.pdf accessed 18 December 2018 
1046 Case KZR 39/06, [2009] 180 BGHZ 312, 316—Orange-Book-Standard.  
1047 Case KZR 39/06, [2009] 180 BGHZ 312, 316—Orange-Book-Standard.  
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for injunction against a user.1048 The enforcement of IPRs as a form of abuse has been 
first introduced in the Orange-Book-Standard, as it has never been established before 
that point by any of the EU courts.1049 Therefore, it could be safe to argue that the ECJ 
in Huawei v ZTE was influenced by the German’s administration of Article 102 TFEU. As 
we know, national courts play an important role in influencing the development of 
international or regional law.  
The Court automatically assumes that the first form of abuse exists when there is 
abusive enforcement of an IPR. If a user has a lawful claim to a licence under Article 102 
TFEU, then the Court considers the enforcement of an IPR as abusive. Generally, the 
German Court indicated that a competition counter-claim to a licence should not be 
brought in IP infringement proceedings, as this must be done via an independent 
competition law action.1050 However, the Court identified a specific set of conditions 
that can be met for the admissibility of a competition law defence before a German 
court.1051 
The Court outlined two conditions for the finding of abusive enforcement of an IPR. 
First, the user should make an unconditional offer to the right holder for the conclusion 
of a licensing agreement between both parties. Second, the user must complete the 
commitments and obligations that arise with the use of the patent as if a licence 
agreement has been formed between both parties.1052 In such circumstances, the user 
should predict the contractual rights of the ‘hypothetical’ licence and implement the 
                                                          
1048 Case KZR 39/06, [2009] 180 BGHZ 312, 316—Orange-Book-Standard.  
1049 T. Hoppner, ‘Competition Law in Intellectual Property Litigation: The Case for Compulsory Licence 
Defence Under Article 102 TFEU’ 7[2] European Competition Journal 297-322 
1050 T. Hoppner, ‘Competition Law in Intellectual Property Litigation: The Case for Compulsory Licence 
Defence Under Article 102 TFEU’ 7[2] European Competition Journal 297-322 
1051 Case KZR 39/06, [2009] 180 BGHZ 312, 316—Orange-Book-Standard. 
1052 Case KZR 39/06, [2009] 180 BGHZ 312, 316—Orange-Book-Standard.  
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obligations that have not yet taken place by an actual contract.1053 The main focus point 
is that the user must render regular accounts and arrange payment of appropriate fees 
to the right holder for the use of the IPR in question.1054  
It can be noted that although the Federal Supreme Court allowed the user to raise a 
defence against both an action for injunction and an IP action for damages, yet the 
defendant should still meet some specific requirements that tailor to the right holder’s 
interests in order to obtain a defence against an action for damages. Thus, a 
competition law counter-claim to a licence is not sufficient on its own and without 
providing an unconditional offer to the proprietor and the rendering of accounts.1055  
On the one hand, some commentators have emphasised that the conditions set by the 
Court in the Orange-Book-Standard add limitations to the application of Article 102 
TFEU in circumstances of abusive refusal to license.1056 This is because a standard user 
holds the burden of identifying and presenting the conditions of a licence, as well as 
ensuring that these conditions do not leave the door open for further negotiations. In 
addition, the interests of a SEP owner must be met to the extent that the owner does 
not have the right to reject such an offer without committing an abuse.1057 The standard 
user is expected here to begin instantly fulfilling these conditions, but without having 
yet identified the true prospective of the licensing agreement. 1058 
                                                          
1053 Case KZR 39/06, [2009] 180 BGHZ 312, 316—Orange-Book-Standard.  
1054 Case KZR 39/06, [2009] 180 BGHZ 312, 316—Orange-Book-Standard. 
1055 Case KZR 39/06, [2009] 180 BGHZ 312, 316—Orange-Book-Standard 
1056 H. Ullrich, ‘Patents and Standards: A Comment on the German Federal Supreme Court Decision 
Orange Book Standard’ [2010] 41 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition law, at 
340–41 
1057 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375; Ullrich, IIC 2010, 337, 344 et seq.; Frohlich, GRUR 2008, 205, 213. 
1058 Ibid 
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On the other hand, some have argued that the Orange Book decision gives users room 
to manoeuvre negotiation processes by permitting the use of a SEP by potential 
licensees prior to obtaining an actual licence from the proprietor for such a use.1059 
Moreover, it has been indicated that SEP holders are unlikely to be in abuse here since 
the standards are used by them, and therefore, SEP holders are forced by what is called 
a no challenge-clause.1060  
C) The Dutch Perspective  
This section examines the approach adopted by the Dutch courts in IP infringement 
proceedings prior the ECJ’s ruling in Huawei v ZTE. It will be noted below that the 
approach adopted by Dutch courts have emphasised the importance in ensuring legal 
certainty under Dutch patent law.  
Some commentators have argued that a right holder should be able to enforce the 
rights associated with IPRs and thus, infringements of IPRs are not permitted even when 
a user has a claim for a licence under EU competition law.1061 It has been further 
highlighted that users should not be allowed to challenge IPR infringement proceedings 
by simply initiating a counter-claim to a licence under EU competition law unless a user 
                                                          
1059 It was highlighted that some users may await an injunction to be raised against them before they 
arrange appropriate payments; see T. Hoppner, ‘Competition Law in Intellectual Property Litigation: 
The Case for Compulsory Licence Defence Under Article 102 TFEU’ 7[2] European Competition Journal 
297-322  
1060 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375 
1061 T. Hoppner, ‘Competition Law in Intellectual Property Litigation: The Case for Compulsory Licence 
Defence Under Article 102 TFEU’ 7[2] European Competition Journal 297-322; Jaecks and T Dörmer, 
‘Der wettbewerbsrechtliche Anspruch auf Lizenzerteilung, die eigenmächtige Nutzung von 
Immaterialgüterrechten und die prozessualen Folgen’ in K Boesche, J Füller and M Wolf (eds), 
Variationen im Recht (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006), 97, 106–09; S Maaßen, Normung, 
Standardisierung Und Immaterialgüterrechte (C Heymanns, 2006), 257–58; M van Merveldt, ‘Der 
Ausschluss kartellrechtlicher Einwendungen im Patentverletzungsverfahren’ [2004] Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 19–25.  
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has transformed the claim into a concrete licence.1062 Accordingly, supporters of this 
view have argued that users should seek a licence within an appropriate period of time 
in a parallel proceeding before a competition court.1063 
These aforesaid views also appear to be consistent with the approach of the Dutch 
Court when dealing with competition law defences in IP infringement proceeding. This 
can be seen in the judgement of The Hague in NL-Philips v SK Kasetten1064 regarding 
infringement proceedings of SEPs brought by Philips against SK Kasetten. It was held by 
The Hague Court that SK Kasetten had infringed various SEPs that belong to CD and DVD 
technology. Therefore, the Court concluded that a compulsory licence would not be 
issued prior to the conclusion of a licensing agreement between both parties. SK 
Kasetten referred to the German’s Orange-Book-Standard, but the Dutch Court was 
quick to reject the argument. This is because the Court saw that users could then rely 
on competition law defences even when a user had not sought a licence under FRAND 
terms before commencing the use of the SEP.1065 The Court of The Hague, thus, held 
that the German approach to EU competition law would not be applicable under Dutch 
patent law.1066 
                                                          
1062 T. Hoppner, ‘Competition Law in Intellectual Property Litigation: The Case for Compulsory Licence 
Defence Under Article 102 TFEU’ 7[2] European Competition Journal 297-322 
1063 T. Hoppner, ‘Competition Law in Intellectual Property Litigation: The Case for Compulsory Licence 
Defence Under Article 102 TFEU’ 7[2] European Competition Journal 297-322 
1064 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands for translation of 
relevant sections of the case, please see https://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2010/03/nl-philips-
v-sk-kasetten-frand.html  
1065 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, at [6.22] states 
that: “[b]efore engaging in its trade in discs, or from the moment that it was aware or reasonably 
should have been aware that by doing so it was infringing, SK should have requested Philips for a license 
under FRAND-terms”. 
1066 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands 
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The main three reasons as to why the competition law defence was rejected by the 
Court include the following: First, the system of compulsory licencing was laid down by 
Dutch laws so that it can be applied only when patent rights are unenforceable.1067 
Second, Philips is the actual right-holder whereby SK Kasetten only wishes to use the 
SEP in question. Therefore, SK Kasetten should have sought a licence from Philips prior 
to the bringing of infringing goods to the market, or once it has been identified and/or 
could have been reasonably identified by SK that its use was infringing Philip's rights.1068 
The Dutch court considered that German’s Orange-Book-Standard would create legal 
uncertainty, especially since the interests of potential licensees are adequately 
protected under Dutch laws by the opportunity to acquire a compulsory licence before 
a court in a parallel proceeding. Third, the Dutch Court noted that the Orange-Book-
Standard would be unsuccessful even if it were to be applied, given that SK Kasetten 
had admitted that no payment had been secured in relation to royalties as per the 
requirement set in the Orange-Book-Standard.1069 
In the case at hand, the Court saw the proprietor would be incapable of enforcing the 
rights associated with its IP if an infringer would always assume the automatic right for 
a compulsory licence. The Dutch Court highlighted that compulsory licences can only be 
issued following the conclusion of licensing terms between both parties or a court’s 
order.1070 Although the Court emphasised on the fact that there are some exceptions 
to this general principle by which compulsory licences can have a retroactive effect, 
                                                          
1067 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, at [6.20] 
1068 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, at [6.22] 
1069 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands 
1070 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands 
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these exceptions were not applicable in the case at hand.1071 Moreover, the Court 
rejected SK Kasetten's argument in order to avoid legal uncertainty,1072 given that the 
licensing terms are still unclear without the conclusion of an actual licence.1073 The 
Court had, thus, stressed that a compulsory licence could not be issued prior to the 
determination of a licensing agreement between both parties.1074 This approach is 
desirable from a rule of law standpoint as it ensures a higher degree of legal certainty 
as well as the enforcement of adequate IP protection which also falls in line with Article 
17(2) of the Charter.  
Moreover, a defendant that is facing IP infringement proceedings brought by a 
proprietor that had genuinely infringed competition laws could seek other means of 
protection under Dutch law. Some examples of such protection include the fact that the 
defendant could still seek authorisation from the proprietor before commencing use. 
The defendant can also seek an interlocutory injunction in matters of urgency for the 
granting of a licence. Additionally, the defendant can also claim damages against the 
proprietor for any losses caused by the right holder’s abusive refusal to license.1075 It 
can, thus, be noted that under Dutch law the potential licensee’s rights are still 
protected and safeguarded via other means than the mere entitlement to a compulsory 
licence or the ‘automatic’ acceptance of a competition law defence in IP infringement 
proceedings.. 
                                                          
1071 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, at [6.22]- [24] 
1072 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, at [6.21] 
1073 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, at [6.21] 
1074 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands 
1075 Joint cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics 
N.V. v SK Kassetten GmbH & co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, at [6.22]– [24]. 
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The Dutch’s approach appears to add an extra layer of clarity to the protection of IPRs 
which seems to be consistent with the ideal of the rule of law and its main objectives. 
Indeed, the inadmissibility of competition law defences in IP infringement proceedings 
may lengthen the process and increase the costs, yet it eliminates the ‘automatic’ 
admission of a competition law defence, and thus, could be more consistent with the 
ideal of the rule of law. This is because it allows the right holder to enforce the rights 
associated with the IPR. It also allows the right holder to protect its IPR against 
unauthorised use by users that did not seek consent from the right holder or 
authorisation from a court or relevant authority. Needless to say, this approach also 
protects licence seekers against genuine abusive refusal to license as they can still seek 
damages for any losses suffered due to the abusive refusal to license. Therefore, it can 
be argued that this approach fits with the rule of law element of equality before the 
law.  
The above mentioned does not mean that Court does not recognise ‘specific 
circumstances’1076 that could apply for a specific case. SK Kasetten could have been 
granted a compulsory licence by the Dutch Court had SK Kasetten sought negotiations 
with Philips and Philips had completely refused to license. An example of this situation 
can be seen when a FRAND defence was allowed in the Dutch case of LG Electronics v 
Sony1077 due to the ongoing negotiations between both parties. 
                                                          
1076G. Kuipers, D. Groenvelt and O. Lamme 'A further perspective on Apple v Samsung: How to 
successfully enforce Standard Essential Patents in the Netherlands' 222, 224-25 (Berichten industriell 
eigendom, 2012) <https://www.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/NEWS%20-
%20PUBLICATIONS/artikel1_Kuipers-Groeneveld-Lamme.pdf> accessed 27 March 2018 
1077 Case KG ZA 11–269 G Electronics v Sony [2011] District Court of The Hague, The Netherlands; G. 
Kuipers and others, ‘A Further Perspective on Apple v Samsung: How to Successfully enforce Standard 
Essential Patents in the Netherlands’  (berichten industriele eigendom, August 2012) 222 
https://www.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/NEWS%20-%20PUBLICATIONS/artikel1_Kuipers-
Groeneveld-Lamme.pdf accessed 18 December 2018 
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Moreover, the Philips’ principle was further examined in the case of Samsung v 
Apple.1078 This case established that the Philips’ principle is inapplicable when a SEP 
holder is aware of the unlicensed use by the user and has still allowed it.  The Philips’ 
principle has also been inapplicable if the pursuit of an injunction took place during the 
ongoing negotiations between both parties.1079 The Court indicated that such conduct 
is abusive and against the principles of pre-contractual good faith, because the user 
may feel pressured by the injunction to agree on a licence that does not adhere with 
FRAND terms.1080  
It appears that the Dutch Court has taken a careful attitude towards the admissibility of 
Article 102 TFEU in order to avoid legal uncertainty. This also adds an extra layer of 
protection towards the rights of patent holders so that IPR infringements do not take 
place with the mere entitlement to a competition law defence. This approach is 
favourable from a rule of law approach, given that such a complex matter should be 
dealt with extreme caution in order to ensure that both parties are protected and that 
patent rights are not prevented from being rightfully enforced. Businesses are provided 
with a sense of security as their rights are protected from the risk of a mere claim of a 
compulsory licence under competition laws and thus, further encourage innovation in 
the Dutch market. It appears that the Dutch Court has been cautious by adopting strict 
                                                          
1078 Joint Cases 400367/HA ZA 11–2212, 400376/HA ZA 11–2213 and 400385/HA ZA 11–2215 Samsung 
v Apple [2012] District Court of The Hague, The Netherlands.  
1079 Joint Cases 400367/HA ZA 11–2212, 400376/HA ZA 11–2213 and 400385/HA ZA 11–2215 Samsung 
v Apple [2012] District Court of The Hague, The Netherlands 
1080 Joint Cases 400367/HA ZA 11–2212, 400376/HA ZA 11–2213 and 400385/HA ZA 11–2215 Samsung 
v Apple [2012] District Court of The Hague. For further discussion on the case, see also G. Kuipers, D. 
Groenvelt and O. Lamme ‘Netherlands: A Further Perspective on Apple v Samsung: How to Successfully 
Enforce Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in the Netherlands’ (mondaq.com 11 September 2012) 
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criteria for admitting competition law defence in IP infringement proceedings in order 
to ensure that legal certainty exists under Dutch law. 
It is important to mention here that the Netherlands, despite its small size, has been 
ranked third place out of one hundred and thirty in the 2017 Global Innovation 
Index.1081 The fact that the Netherlands appears to block EU distribution of infringing 
products effectively is the reason as to why the Dutch market is so important for many 
international corporations.1082 Therefore, it can be argued that this approach provides 
more legal certainty and attempts to fulfil the legal expectations of undertakings in 
regards to their rights and obligations as right holders. Moreover, right holders would 
be better situated in predicting the outcomes of their actions when they bring IP 
infringement claims before a Dutch court.  
IV. INTERIM RESULTS 
It can be noted that prior to the Huawei decision national courts had different 
approaches regarding the mere question of whether competition law defences are 
admissible in IP infringement proceedings despite them being essential to a market 
standard. Competition law defences, in some EU Member countries, can fall under a 
very strict set of conditions as seen by the approach adopted by the Dutch Court.1083 In 
other jurisdictions, such as the UK, competition law defences are generally admissible 
in court in order to avoid long and expensive trials and to protect users against abusive 
conduct by IP holders, but only after examining all relevant factors of the case.1084 The 
                                                          
1081 S. Dutt, B. Lanvin and S. Vincent ‘The Global Innovation Index 2017’ (wipo.int, 2017) p. 18 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2017.pdf accessed 11 November 2018 
1082 W. Maas ‘The Patent Litigation Law Review: Netherlands’ (thelawreviews.co.uk, November 2018) 
https://thelawreviews.co.uk/chapter/1151089/netherlands accessed 11 November 2018 
1083 Joint Cases No 316533/ HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535 HA ZA 08-2524 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV 
v SK Kassetten GmbH & Co. KG [2010] District Court The Hague, The Netherlands 
1084 As seen in British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd v TI Silencers Ltd [1981] 2 CMLR 75 and Intel 
Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2003] EWCA Civ 1905 
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German’s Orange-Book-Standard highlighted that competition law defences can be 
accepted if certain conditions are fulfilled. However, the Orange-Book-Standard can 
lead to legal uncertainty, given that the competition law defences are admitted in IP 
proceedings despite the fact that licensing terms have not been established by both 
parties. Moreover, it can be argued that right holders should have the right to enforce 
their rights provided under IP.  Therefore, the bringing of IP infringement proceedings 
against allegedly ‘infringing’ user should not be considered as an abuse of a dominant 
position as contemplated by the German court, because under the rule of law 
perspective everyone should have the right to access courts to resolve a conflict.  
On top of the above, potential licensees can still seek damages for the refusal to license 
before a competition court as seen in the interpretations of Article 102 TFEU by the 
Dutch court. It can, thus, be argued that potential licensees should not commence use 
of infringing products prior to obtaining a licensing agreement. If a licensing agreement 
cannot be reached due to a genuine abusive refusal to license, then the potential 
licensee should seek a competition court for a compulsory licence as well as damages 
that have been suffered due to the abusive refusal to licence. Accordingly, the rights of 
potential licensees are still reserved without allowing users to continue using the IPR 
without a licence, or at least, rendering accounts. It is understandable that some 
economists might argue that this may hinder competition and delay economic benefits. 
Nonetheless, the rule of law highlights that law is supreme and thus, an appropriate 
legal procedure must be followed before any economic benefits can surface.  
How are Member States impacted by EU law? The question is not only difficult to 
answer but is also politically sensitive. It is a politically sensitive question because it is 
concerned with how the EU law has an impact on domestic sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
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the impact of EU law on the national Member States is crucial, from the perspective of 
the rule of law as it has an impact on citizens and businesses regarding determining the 
rights and obligations. In cross-border exchange and trade, the differences existing 
between EU Member countries in the admissibility of EU competition defences can 
raise questions of concern. This is because undertakings might become hesitant 
altogether in investing in a market so that they do not lose the economic value of their 
IPRs.  It has been indicated in Article 9 of the Directive 2004/84/EC on enforcement of 
IPRs that the substantive law on IPRs is weak which can, thus, cause reduction of the 
investments made in innovation and creation.1085 Therefore,  this matter must be 
addressed urgently for the sake of greater degree of legal certainty and consistency in 
the enforcement of IPRs across the EU Member States to avoid loss of confidence within 
the EU business circle.  
It is important to reach a level of harmonisation of the substantive enforcement of IPRs 
at a regional level by providing national courts a clear set of guidance, as well as 
requiring the licence seeker to submit a licence offer to the licence holder which 
includes terms and conditions that cannot be rejected by the right-holder without 
abusing its dominant position. If a right holder was to be found to be in breach of 
competition laws with its refusal to licence, then it makes sense to require the 
defendant to make a licence offer to the right holder, particularly before commencing 
the use of the IPR, that cannot be rejected without breaching competition law, whereby 
the potential licensee would not be capable of using a competition law defence without 
having made such an offer. It also does not make sense to use a competition law 
defence in IP infringement proceedings without having provided an unconditional offer 
                                                          
1085 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights [2004] OJI157/45, Article 9 
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to the right-holder. This is particularly important as right holders should be given a 
chance to reach a voluntary agreement with the potential licensee on reasonable terms. 
This uniform application would also be desirable from a rule of law perspective to 
protect right holders from differences in the approaches adopted by a different set of 
judgements made by various national courts within the EU market. This would also be 
highly beneficial to multinational businesses operating in different countries within the 
EU as it provides a layer of clarity in regards to when a competition law defence can 
actually be raised by a defendant who is using the IPR without the right holder’s 
consent. 
It is important in the following section of this chapter to examine the impact of the 
recent decision made by the ECJ in Huawei and ZTE on the UK, Germany and 
Netherlands in respect to refusal to licence and competition law defences in IP 
infringement proceedings.  
V. COMPETITION LAW DEFENSE AFTER HUAWEI V ZTE 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Huawei v ZTE has left some unanswered questions 
to be addressed by domestic courts within the EU.1086 Therefore, this section critically 
examines the approaches adopted by the UK, Germany and Netherlands in IP 
infringement proceedings post-Huawei. It aims to evaluate the impact of the decision 
in Huawei v ZTE on domestic courts and highlight how the courts had to adapt in order 
to remain consistent with EU case law. 
 
                                                          
1086 Some of these questions have been highlighted in section V of Chapter Five  
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A) The UK Perspective 
This subsection examines the approach of the UK, mainly the courts of England and 
Wales in addressing the unanswered questions following Huawei v ZTE as well as 
highlight competition law implications following Brexit in a no-deal scenario.  
Inevitably, the Huawei decision of the ECJ has influenced UK case law.  This influence 
can be seen in the case of Unwired Planet v Huawei.1087 The Claimant, Unwired Planet, 
is a company that grants licences to companies in the sector of telecommunication 
equipment.  Unwired Planet has a global patent portfolio which was essential to the 
telecommunication standards set by the ETSI. The ETSI had required its participants to 
commit to licensing their essential patents on FRAND terms.1088 Unwired Planet sued 
Huawei, Samsung, and Google for infringement of six patents from their portfolio, five 
of which were allegedly SEPs.1089 The Court had allowed Huawei to present its 
competition law defence, but only following the determination of whether Unwired 
Planet’s offer was FRAND or contrary to Article 102 TFEU.1090  
The High Court of Justice decided that Unwired Planet did not abuse its dominant 
position when it ‘prematurely’ sought proceedings for an injunction.1091 The Court 
further decided that Unwired Planet did not infringe EU competition law with its refusal 
to license.  Thus, it was held that Huawei had infringed valid patents, given that it 
                                                          
1087 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) [2017] 
R.P.C 19 
1088 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) [2017] R.P.C 
19, [4] 
1089 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) [2017] R.P.C 
19, [1] 
1090 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Chancery 
Division Pat) [2018] 4 C.M.L.R 17 at [17] and [18] 
1091 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Chancery 
Division Pat) [2018] 4 C.M.L.R 17 [17] 
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refused to accept a FRAND licence that was presented by the SEP holder.1092 Indeed, 
although Unwired Planet is a dominant undertaking, it was decided by the Court that 
this position had not been abused.1093 The decision was supported by the fact that the 
defendant was unwilling to take a licence on FRAND terms and thus, Unwired Planet 
did not breach EU competition law.1094 Ultimately, an injunction for infringements of 
patents was granted on  June 2017.1095 The value of the claim was over one billion 
pounds,1096 and the Court decided that a final injunction to restrain infringement of 
these SEPs should be granted.  
Indeed, the High Court of Justice had referred to the inconsistencies between the 
Commission’s Press Release and the Orange Book Standard which resulted in questions 
referred to the ECJ in the case of Huawei v ZTE. The High Court of Justice indicated that 
Commission’s Press Release suggested that the bringing of an action by the SEP holder 
would always result in a breach of Article 102 TFEU when the defendant was willing to 
negotiate.1097 Therefore, Huawei’s claims could be dismissed if the Court followed the 
Commission’s Press Release.  Whereas, Huawei could have been granted an injunction 
in the case of Huawei v ZTE as the requirements set in the Orange Book Standard were 
                                                          
1092 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) [2018] 4 
C.M.L.R 17 [18] 
1093 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat); [2018] 4 
C.M.L.R 17 [17] 
1094 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat); [2018] 4 
C.M.L.R 17; [2017] R.P.C 19, at [23] 
1095 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) [2018] 4 
C.M.L.R 17 [17]  
1096 The Claimant’s solicitors advised that the value of the claim was over £1 Billion. See Enyo Law, 
‘Representative Cases’ (enyolaw) https://www.enyolaw.com/cases/1/enyo-law-acted-for-unwired-
planet-llc-in-significant-claim accessed on 16 September 2018 
1097 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Chancery 
Division Pat) [2018] 4 C.M.L.R 17 [718] 
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not fulfilled by ZTE;  ZTE presented an unconditional offer rather than a conditional offer 
as well as it did not provide any royalties to Huawei.1098 
The High Court of Justice has further stated that the ECJ’s decision in Huawei v ZTE has 
been incomplete in a material way.1099 This is because the ECJ has justified its conclusion 
via the existence of legitimate expectations of standard implementers, whilst 
disregarding the enforceability of FRAND undertaking.1100 However, according to the 
High Court of Justice has satisfied itself that a FRAND undertaking is enforceable in court 
irrespective of competition law. The High Court of Justice indicated that this approach 
does not only set the rights of users but also their obligations which appear to have 
been neglected by the ECJ as highlighted by the analysis of Huawei v ZTE in Unwired 
Planet International v Huawei. 1101 
Regardless, the High Court of Justice has provided an outline of its interpretation of the 
case of Huawei v ZTE.1102 According to the English Court, the ‘willingness to conclude a 
licence on FRAND terms’ refers to a general willingness.1103  The fact that proposals are 
a requirement does not mean that it is necessary to examine whether the offers were 
really FRAND or not. The Court has further indicated that a standard user should not act 
with ‘impunity’ as this could amount to abuse even if the user submits to the required 
procedure when it brings a competition law claim. Notably, the Court has referred to 
                                                          
1098 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Chancery 
Division Pat) [2018] 4 C.M.L.R 17 [718]-[719] 
1099 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Chancery 
Division Pat) [2018] 4 C.M.L.R 17 [723] 
1100 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Chancery 
Division Pat) [2018] 4 C.M.L.R 17 [722] 
1101 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Chancery 
Division Pat) [2018] 4 C.M.L.R 17 [723] 
1102 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Chancery Division 
Pat) [2018] 4 C.M.L.R 17 [744] 
1103 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Chancery 
Division Pat) [2018] 4 C.M.L.R 17 [708] 
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the fact that abuse of a dominant position would only be established if the claimant had 
persisted in seeking an injunction to restrain the defendants from using the SEPs, even 
if the defendants have provided an absolute commitment to accept any licence that 
was based on FRAND terms as per the principles of Huawei1104 were applied. However, 
the Court decided that the determination of abuse depends on an examination of a 
case-by-case basis. Ultimately, the Court found that the claimant had not abused its 
dominant position.1105  
This judgement is important as it can be seen that the English court has reached this 
conclusion based on the ‘general willingness’ aspect. The Court had suggested that the 
bringing of action without prior notice does not automatically constitute an abuse of 
dominant position which is a different perspective than one adopted in Huawei by the 
ECJ. From a rule of law perspective, it appears that the English Court here has eliminated 
a substantial amount of vagueness on the subject matter, but still has left the door open 
for the determination on a case-by-case basis. Regardless, this case can be highly 
persuasive in future cases with similar facts. It is interesting to note that the High Court 
of Justice has been critical about the ECJ’s decision in Huawei v ZTE which resulted in 
the elimination of significant vagueness for the interpretations of the ECJ’s decision 
under UK’s administration of EU law.  
Recently, the judgement of the High Court of Justice has been appealed by Huawei, 
nevertheless the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on October 2018.1106 One of the 
arguments that were presented by Huawei in the appeal case was in respect to whether 
                                                          
1104 C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp EU:C:2015: 477, [2015] Bus. L.R. 1261 
1105 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat); paras 630, 
670, 712, 744, 755, 784, 791. 
1106 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 
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Unwired Planet is entitled to an injunction despite the fact that Unwired Planet did not 
fulfil the principles set by the ECJ in Huawei v ZTE. The ECJ in Huawei v ZTE had described 
that competition law would be breached if a SEP holder did not provide a notice prior 
to a claim for an injunction as well as an offer to licence on FRAND terms.  However, it 
was determined by the Court of Appeal that the ECJ in Huawei v ZTE did not lay down 
obligatory steps for the determination of abuse of a dominant position in case of non-
compliance with these steps.  Instead, the judgement provided a positive duty to inform 
the user prior to the commencement of proceedings. The Court of Appeal considered 
that depending on the content and nature of the circumstances of the case at hand, 
Unwired Planet had given sufficient notice.1107  
Moreover, it was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal that this is a new and developing 
area of law and thus, different approaches adopted by courts are unavoidable. The 
Court of Appeal highlighted that it is important to reach an internationally acceptable 
approach as case law progresses with time.1108 Indeed, the Court of Appeal decision has 
set a blueprint for the way that SEPs should be licensed to standard implementers. 
Clearly, this judgement has adopted a rational and sensible approach that safeguarded 
SEP holders’ rights that operate in the UK market.  Although the Court of Appeal 
highlighted that Huawei v ZTE provides a clear-cut principle of the SEP holder’s 
obligation to provide a prior notice to the ‘infringing’ user, yet the Court of Appeal has 
confirmed that Article 102 TFEU cannot be automatically triggered even if the 
conditions set in Huawei v ZTE are not fulfilled by the SEP holder.1109 This is because the 
assessment of abuse must take into account all circumstances of the case at hand. From 
                                                          
1107 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, [258] 
1108 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, at [206] 
1109 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 [232] 
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a rule of law perspective, this decision provides more legal certainty to undertakings 
and highlights the importance of adhering with the essence of IPRs as it has prevented 
the free-riding of innovations.1110 It must be mentioned, however, a SEP holder’s non-
compliance of the conditions set in the ECJ’s decision of Huawei v ZTE will remain a high 
risk if litigation was to take place before courts of other EU Member States. 
B) Potential Competition Law Implications Following Brexit in a No-deal Scenario 
It can be noted from the aforementioned that competition law defences under Article 
102 TFEU are, per se, admissible in UK courts once all relevant facts have been dealt 
with by a national court. Nevertheless, UK courts, post-Huawei, must now assess on a 
case-by-case basis whether a SEP holder abuses its dominant position by seeking an 
injunction against an ‘infringing’ user in order to remain consistent with EU case law. 
It is important to mention here that Brexit may have an effect on competition policy of 
both the EU and UK. For example, it has been indicated that UK competition authorities 
may have to examine antitrust infringements independently. This independent control 
most likely would not be embraced by various industries, because it could lead to legal 
uncertainty as well as extra costs.1111 It is important to note that EU competition law 
under Article 101 and 102 TFEU will remain to be applicable post-Brexit on agreements 
or practices of UK undertakings that have a link with the EU in the same way that 
agreements or practices of Asian and US undertakings are subject to EU competition 
                                                          
1110 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 [54] it was 
highlighted by the Lord Kitchen in the Appealed case that “Just as implementers need protection, so too 
do the SEP owners. They are entitled to an appropriate reward for carrying out their research and 
development activities and for engaging with the standardization process, and the must be able to 
prevent technology users from free-riding on their innovations. It is therefore important that 
implementers engage constructively in any FRAND negotiation and, where necessary, agree to submit to 
the outcome of an appropriate FRAND determination”. 
1111 R. Whish, 'Brexit and EU Competition Policy' [2016] 7(5) Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 297-298 
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law. Moreover, in a no-deal scenario, EU companies operating in the UK would have to 
comply with UK competition law following Brexit.1112 Although the Commission would 
still be capable of investigating and imposing fines on an international UK business, the 
Commission will no longer have the authority to commence on-site explorations in the 
UK or request the Competition and Market Authority to act on its behalf. The 
Commission would have to make written requests to UK undertakings for information, 
as it currently does with many undertakings outside the EU.1113 
Mainly, UK authorities will feel the effect of this when enforcing competition law. EU 
competition law and UK competition law are similar to one another, given that Section 
60 of the Competition Act 19981114 states that UK competition rules must remain 
consistent with EU competition case-law. However, the technical notice of 13 
September 2018 sets out that UK competition law system in the event of a ‘no-deal’ 
scenario will put the supremacy of EU law to an end. In such a scenario, future decisions 
                                                          
1112 Ashurst, ‘”No deal” Brexit: what UK competition law might look like’ (ashurst.com 17 October 2018) 
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/no-deal-brexit-what-uk-competition-
law-might-look-like/ accessed on 31 October 2018 
1113 P. Wilis and R. Eccles, ‘Brexit: Competition law implications’ (twobirds.com 10 October 2018) < 
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/uk/competition-law-implications-of-a-brexit> 
accessed on 27 October 2018 
1114 The Competition Act of 1998, Section 60 states the following:  
“(1) The purpose of this section is to ensure that so far as is possible (having regard to any relevant 
differences between the provisions concerned), questions arising under this Part in relation to 
competition within the United Kingdom are dealt with in a manner which is consistent with the 
treatment of corresponding questions arising in Community law in relation to competition within the 
Community. 
(2) At any time when the court determines a question arising under this Part, it must act (so far as is 
compatible with the provisions of this Part and whether or not it would otherwise be required to do so) 
with a view to securing that there is no inconsistency between— 
(a)the principles applied, and decision reached, by the court in determining that question; and 
(b)the principles laid down by the Treaty and the European Court, and any relevant decision of that 
Court, as applicable at that time in determining any corresponding question arising in Community law. 
(3) The court must, in addition, have regard to any relevant decision or statement of the Commission. 
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) also apply to— 
(a) the Director; and 
(b)any person acting on behalf of the Director, in connection with any matter arising under this Part. 
(5) In subsections (2) and (3), “court” means any court or tribunal. 
(6) In subsections (2)(b) and (3), “decision” includes a decision as to— 
(a) the interpretation of any provision of Community law; 
(b) the civil liability of an undertaking for harm caused by its infringement of Community law.” 
 288 
of the Commission or European courts would no longer be binding on the Competition 
and Market Authority and UK courts.1115 Therefore, Section 60 of the Competition Act 
1998 would end up being repealed in the event of a no-deal scenario and thus, there is 
the possibility that the UK could change the substantive and procedural rules on 
competition law.1116 It must be mentioned that the UK made contributions to EU 
competition law over the years.1117 In a no-deal scenario, the UK is unlikely to have 
influence or make contributions to EU competition law and thus, it could be unable to 
help UK companies that operate in the EU market.  
Although UK courts will not be able to refer questions to the ECJ to ensure consistency 
in interpretations which can lead to divergence, gaps in law may take some years before 
they emerge due to the existing similarities of the substantive provisions. Another 
important effect of Brexit, in a no-deal scenario, could be seen in the field of private 
enforcement of competition law.  This is because undertakings will not be able to 
depend on EU infringement decisions in order to bring follow-on claims for damages in 
the UK. Nonetheless, these claims can still be possible in the UK with respect to 
judgements conducted prior to Brexit.1118  
 
                                                          
1115 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ‘Guidance: Merger review and anti-
competitive activity if there’s no Brexit deal’ (gov.uk, 13 September 2018) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/merger-review-and-anti-competitive-activity-if-theres-
no-brexit-deal/merger-review-and-anti-competitive-activity-if-theres-no-brexit-deal> accessed on 27 
October 2018 
1116 Competition Law Act of 1998, S. 76 states that this Act applies to England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland 
1117 G. Monti, ‘The United Kingdom’s Contribution to European Union Competition Law’ [2017] 40(5) 
Fordham International Law Journal 1444-1472 
1118 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ‘Guidance: Merger review and anti-
competitive activity if there’s no Brexit deal’ (gov.uk, 13 September 2018) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/merger-review-and-anti-competitive-activity-if-theres-
no-brexit-deal/merger-review-and-anti-competitive-activity-if-theres-no-brexit-deal> accessed on 27 
October 2018 
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C) The German Perspective  
The few German decisions following Huawei v ZTE are not necessarily favoured by 
standard implementers. As a matter of fact, standard implementers have often,1119 but 
not all the time,1120 been considered in breach of conduct, as well as the principles set 
in Huawei v ZTE. 
The abovementioned can be seen in a long and interesting decision from Manheim 
Regional Court.1121 Although the patent in question was not presented to the SSO 
during the standard-setting process, it was declared as essential to ETSI following the 
standard-setting process by the International Patent Evaluation Consortium. Thus, the 
Court decided that the patent holder did not breach the duty to disclose the patent as 
a SEP, given that the patent owner had only become a member of the ETSI following 
the standard-setting process. 1122 
In this case, the claims brought by the standard users for a compulsory licensing on the 
basis of Article 102 TFEU, Section 19 of the German Act against Restraints of 
Competition and the Huawei v ZTE principles were rejected by the Court. It was held by 
the Court that the defendants were unwilling to license. Although the SEP owner had 
informed one of the ‘alleged’ infringers about the infringement taking place after 
seeking IP infringement proceedings which can be considered late as per the principles 
                                                          
1119 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375; Saint Lawrence v Deutsche Telekom [2015] Mannheim Regional Court 2 O 106/14 (No 
English version of the case could be found for this case. Therefore, I had to refer to the summary on the 
case by P. Picht who is Affiliated Research Fellow in the Max Planck Institute’s Department of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law.); LG Düsseldorf, 3 November 2015, 4a O 144/14. 
1120 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375; In favour of the implementer, e.g. OLG Düsseldorf, 13 January 2016, I-15 U 65/15, 15 U 
65/15. 
1121 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375; Saint Lawrence v Deutsche Telekom [2015] Mannheim Regional Court 2 O 106/14. 
1122 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375; Saint Lawrence v Deutsche Telekom [2015] Mannheim Regional Court 2 O 106/14 
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of Huawei v ZTE, yet the standard user still did not portray any willingness to take a 
licence even one year following the lawsuit. In addition, the second standard user had 
declared vague willingness to accept a licence three month following the lawsuit. This 
three months’ period was considered as unreasonable by the Court. Moreover, the 
Court saw that the standard users have only communicated proposals to have royalties 
decided by a third party, but they did not deliver any precise, clear and binding offers 
to the plaintiff.  
Finally, it was decided that the standard users’ conducts were insufficient, mainly due 
to the fact that they did not provide financial security for royalties. Therefore, it was 
considered by the Court irrelevant whether the royalty set by the SEP owner has met 
FRAND standards or not.1123 It can be noted that the principles set in Huawei v ZTE were 
not narrowly applied by the German Court in the case at hand. It is also interesting to 
see that Court had considered that the SEP owner did not abuse its dominant position 
by bringing IP infringement proceedings against the standard implementers as they did 
not provide any financial securities. This approach ensures that free-riding of innovation 
could be unacceptable under German patent laws which is favourable from a rule of 
law perspective.   
In another significant decision following the ruling of Huawei v ZTE, LG Düsseldorf has 
decided that since the lawsuit was brought before the Court prior to the Huawei v ZTE 
ruling, then principles set in Huawei v ZTE are not applicable here and the SEP owner 
meets the requirements of the case law available at that time.  Therefore, the Court 
held that implementers must respond to the licensing offer delivered by the SEP owner 
                                                          
1123 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375; Saint Lawrence v Deutsche Telekom [2015] Mannheim Regional Court 2 O 106/14 
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even if the offer made by the SEP holder was not FRAND.1124 The Court had further 
highlighted that users must render account and provide suitable financial security, even 
in the circumstances when the user’s first1125 counter-offer was rejected by the SEP 
holder. Therefore, the Court has decided to grant an injunction as well as damages in 
favour of the SEP holder, given that the standard implementer did not render 
accounts.1126 
Nonetheless, the Düsseldorf  Upper Regional Court had suspended the execution of the 
judgement as it decided to examine whether the SEP holder’s offer was FRAND as per 
the Huawei v ZTE requirements.1127 It was decided by the Court that the framework of 
Huawei v ZTE is applicable to transitional cases.1128 Therefore, the FRANDness of the 
offer presented by the SEP owner had to be examined before the German Courts 
despite the fact that the case has been a transitional case.1129  
Interestingly, the outcome of the case could have differed following the decision of the 
appealed case. As a matter of fact, the Higher Regional Court has decided that the offer 
presented by Sisvel had been unFRAND.1130 Nevertheless, it was also decided by the 
Court that the standard implementers must render accounts despite the fact that the 
                                                          
1124 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375; Sivel v Haier [2015] LG Düsseldorf 4a O 144/14, [149]. 
1125 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375; Sivel v Haier [2015] LG Düsseldorf 4a O 144/14, [156]. 
1126 G. Nolte, Panasonic R&D Centre Germany GmbH, Lev Rosenblum and Witney LLP, ‘Injunctions in 
SEP cases in Europe’ (2017) < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2984193> 
accessed 4th November 2018 
1127 G. Gabison, ‘A two-dimensional approach to non-discriminatory terms in FRAND licensing 
agreements’ (bu.edu) < https://www.bu.edu/jostl/files/2018/03/3-Gabison-Online-Version.pdf> 
accessed on 1st November 2018; Sisvel v Haier [2017] OLG Dusseldorf No. I-15 U 66/15 
1128 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375; Sisvel v Haier [2017] OLG Dusseldorf No. I-15 U 66/15 
1129 P. Picht ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues post-Huawei’ [2016] 37(9) 
ECLR 365-375; Sisvel v Haier [2017] OLG Dusseldorf No. I-15 U 66/15 
1130 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/german-court-decisions/olg-dusseldorf/sisvel-v-haier-olg-dusseldorf-1 
accessed on 4th November 2018; Sivel v Haier [2017] Case No. I15 U 66/15, [34] 
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SEP owner has breached EU competition laws.1131 Both parties ended up settling the 
matter, and thus, the Court did not have to make a decision about the injunction.1132 
It would have been interesting had the Higher Regional Court provided a decision about 
the injunction as this would have helped assess whether concerns of EU competition 
law would have overridden IPRs or vice versa.  Nevertheless, the Court did identify that 
standard users must render regular accounts even if the SEP owner has breached EU 
competition law. Therefore, this case has still provided some useful German guidelines 
in ensuring that standard implementers should not free-ride SEP owners’ innovations 
as they must still render accounts despite SEP owners breaching EU competition law. 
D) The Dutch Perspective  
As mentioned earlier in this research, the Dutch courts have adopted a strict approach 
when dealing with competition law defences brought in IP infringement proceedings.  
However, following the case of Huawei v ZTE, SEP holders must now fulfil certain criteria 
before they can seek IP infringement proceedings, otherwise, they could be found 
abusing their dominant position.  
The Dutch Court has provided its first judgement post-Huawei in a case between Archos 
SA v Royal Philips NV of 2017.1133 The SEP holder did not fulfil the principles of Huawei 
                                                          
1131 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/german-court-decisions/olg-dusseldorf/sisvel-v-haier-olg-dusseldorf-1 
accessed on 4th November 2018; Sivel v Haier [2017] Case No. I15 U 66/15, [75] and [175] 
1132 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/german-court-decisions/olg-dusseldorf/sisvel-v-haier-olg-dusseldorf-1 
accessed on 4th November 2018; Sivel v Haier [2017] Case No. I15 U 66/15, [47] 
1133 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw4ipcouncil.com/dutch-court-decisions/archos-v-philips-rechtbank-den-haag accessed on 
5th November 2018; Archos SA v. Royal Philips NV [2017] Rechtbank The Hague C/09/505587 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 accessed on 1st 
November 2018. (The case is not available in an English version) 
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v ZTE. This has put the proprietor at risk of being found abusing its dominant position 
under Article 102 TFEU.1134 Nevertheless, Philips sought IP infringement proceedings 
against Archos on three SEPs patents declared essential to a mobile communication 
standard. Archos raised a competition law defence to counter-argue that Philips did not 
comply with the principles set in ECJ’s Huawei v ZTE decision as Philips has a duty to 
offer a licence. The Court has rejected Archos’s arguments.1135 This is because both 
parties had participated in negotiating a licensing agreement prior to Philips seeking IP 
infringement proceedings against Archos and Philips had declared its willingness to 
license its SEP to any user on FRAND terms.1136 To be more specific, Philips made an 
offer to license the SEP to Archos in 2015 whereby both parties have commenced the 
negotiation process. Archos then indicated that Philips would have to take the matter 
to court if Philips does not agree with a licence that does not exceed a few thousands 
of euros.1137 Suddenly, Archos decided to make a new counter-offer to Philips merely 
due to the fact that Philips had sought IP infringement proceedings against Archos.1138 
                                                          
1134 1134 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw4ipcouncil.com/dutch-court-decisions/archos-v-philips-rechtbank-den-haag accessed on 
5th November 2018; Archos SA v. Royal Philips NV [2017] Rechtbank The Hague C/09/505587 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 accessed on 1st 
November 2018  
1135 W. Maas and M. Rijks, ‘Netherlands’ The Law Reviews Intellectual Property Review Edition 6 
(Netherlands, June 2017) < https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-intellectual-property-review-
edition-6/1143674/netherlands> accessed on 1st November 2018 
1136 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw4ipcouncil.com/dutch-court-decisions/archos-v-philips-rechtbank-den-haag accessed on 
5th November 2018; Archos SA v. Royal Philips NV [2017] C/09/505587 Rechtbank The Hague 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 accessed on 1st 
November 2018  
1137 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw4ipcouncil.com/dutch-court-decisions/archos-v-philips-rechtbank-den-haag accessed on 
5th November 2018; Archos SA v. Royal Philips NV [2017] C/09/505587 Rechtbank The Hague, at [4.3]. 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 accessed on 1st 
November 2018 
11384IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw4ipcouncil.com/dutch-court-decisions/archos-v-philips-rechtbank-den-haag accessed on 
5th November 2018;  Archos SA v. Royal Philips NV [2017] C/09/505587 Rechtbank The Hague, at [4.3]. 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 accessed on 1st 
November 2018 
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In this case, the Court had to determine whether Philip’s licensing offer was FRAND and 
whether the specific licensing costs determined by Archos were FRAND. It was noted 
by the Court1139 that Archos holds the burden of proof as Philips had brought 
declaratory proceedings. Archos claimed it could prove that the offer presented by 
Philips was unFRAND based on public information and it did not attempt to shift the 
burden of proof on Philips.1140 
It was highlighted by the Court that FRAND is a range1141 and thus, the offer provided 
by the SEP holder and the counter-offer provided by the user does not have to be 
identical. 
 It was also indicated by the Court that the majority of the negotiations between both 
parties was undertaken prior to the Huawei v ZTE decision. The Court identified that 
legal principles that can be derived from prior case law such as Philips v SK Kassetten 
and the German Orange-Book-Standard had required users to make the initiative to 
provide a FRAND licence offer, rather than the SEP holder.1142 This meant that the Court 
had identified that the decision of Huawei v ZTE provided an opportunity to start new 
                                                          
1139 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw4ipcouncil.com/dutch-court-decisions/archos-v-philips-rechtbank-den-haag accessed on 
5th November 2018; Archos SA v. Royal Philips NV [2017] C/09/505587 Rechtbank The Hague, at [4.2]. 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 accessed on 1st 
November 2018 
1140 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw4ipcouncil.com/dutch-court-decisions/archos-v-philips-rechtbank-den-haag accessed on 
5th November 2018; Archos SA v. Royal Philips NV [2017] C/09/505587 Rechtbank The Hague, at [4.2]. 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 accessed on 1st 
November 2018 
1141 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw4ipcouncil.com/dutch-court-decisions/archos-v-philips-rechtbank-den-haag accessed on 
5th November 2018; Archos SA v. Royal Philips NV [2017] C/09/505587 Rechtbank The Hague, at [4.4]. 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 accessed on 1st 
November 2018 
1142 4IP Council, ‘Case Law post CJUE ruling Huawei v ZTE’ (caselaw.4ipcouncil.com) 
http://caselaw4ipcouncil.com/dutch-court-decisions/archos-v-philips-rechtbank-den-haag accessed on 
5th November 2018; Archos SA v. Royal Philips NV [2017] C/09/505587 Rechtbank The Hague, at [4.3]. 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 accessed on 1st 
November 2018 
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negotiations between Philips and Archos. The Court, thus, examined Archos and Philip’s 
expert reports, but the Court was ultimately not convinced by Archos’s report.1143 
Accordingly, the Court deemed that Archos was not open for negotiations and thus, 
Philips did not breach Article 102 TFEU.1144 
It can be noted that the framework of Huawei v ZTE had an impact on Dutch courts as 
it had opened the opportunity for both parties to commence new negotiations. 
Nevertheless, the principles set in Huawei v ZTE were examined with some reluctance 
by the Dutch court as it had still referred to legal principles prior to the ECJ’s decision in 
Huawei v ZTE. The Dutch case of Philips v SK Kassetten, in itself, is drastically different 
from the ECJ’s decision. The case of Philips v SK Kassetten had set the legal principle 
that standard users must provide the licensing offer on FRAND terms and not vice versa 
in order to ensure legal certainty and the protection of the SEP owner under Dutch 
patent laws, whereas, the ECJ’s decision clearly identifies that the SEP holder must 
provide the licensing offer had the standard user portrayed its willingness to accept a 
licence. From a rule of law perspective, this can cause complications and legal 
uncertainty due to a sudden change in the approach that must be adopted by Dutch 
courts when assessing the admissibility of EU competition law in IP infringement 
proceedings. 
 
                                                          
1143 Taylow Wessing, ‘First Dutch ruling on SEPS and FRAND since Huawei v ZTE’ (lexology.com 8 
February 2017) https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5f77e6af-a887-44e3-b319-
1ff7135b4eed accessed 1st November 2018 
1144 Archos SA v. Royal Philips NV [2017] C/09/505587 Rechtbank The Hague, at [4.3]. 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 accessed on 1st 
November 2018; EPLaw, ‘EPLAW Patent Blog: NL- Archos v Koninklijke Philips/ FRAND’ (eplay.org, 14 
February 2017) http://eplaw.org/nl-archos-v-koninklijke-philips-frand/ accessed 18 December 2018 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Questions regarding the admissibility of competition law defences have become no 
longer the main point of concern following Huawei v ZTE. This is because domestic 
courts across the EU must now ensure consistency with EU case law, given the primacy 
of EU law.1145 Therefore, competition law defences could now be subject to the 
automatic admission in IP infringement proceedings, as national courts of EU Member 
States must now assess whether the bringing of IP infringement proceedings, in itself, 
could be a breach of EU competition law. As can be noted from the study above, the 
case of Huawei v ZTE could have a drastic impact on the procedures that have already 
been adopted by national courts across the EU when dealing with IP infringement 
proceedings prior to the ECJ’s new framework set in Huawei v ZTE.  
The decision of Huawei v ZTE has provided helpful and practical guidance in regards to 
FRAND licensing negotiations, yet it has still left some uncertain areas that have to be 
addressed by national courts post-Huawei. Moreover, UK courts have criticised the 
ECJ’s decision, and thus, the UK court established in the final judgement of Unwired 
Planet v Huawei that only one element of the Huawei v ZTE framework is mandatory 
which is the obligation of the SEP owner to notify the implementer before commencing 
IP proceedings. This judgement has, therefore, presented a flexible and a rational 
approach when examining the process of negotiations by looking into the ‘general 
willingness’ of standard implementers on a case-by-case basis, as opposed the rigid set 
of criteria outlined in Huawei v ZTE that may not fit the circumstances of different cases.  
                                                          
1145 Europa, ‘Precedence of European Law’ (eur-lex.europa.eu, 1st October 2010) < https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14548> last accessed on 4th November 2018 
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The case of Unwired Planet v Huawei has highlighted the importance of examining not 
only the legitimate expectations of standard implementers as opposed to the ECJ 
approach in Huawei v ZTE.  The High Court of Justice, as well as the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales, have highlighted the importance of examining the legitimate 
expectations of SEP owners that invested in research and developing their innovation 
and have gone as far as engaging in the standardisation process. The approach adopted 
by the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal of England and Wales have 
emphasised the importance of ensuring that the essence of IPRs which is to ‘protect’ 
and ‘reward’ innovation by not allowing the free-riding of SEPs. This fits well with the 
rule of law approach1146 and the high level of IPRs’ protection ensured under Article 
17(2) of the Charter as well as Directive 2004/48 on the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights.  
It can be noted from above discussions that issues were raised following Huawei v ZTE 
ruling. It is clear that some national courts, such as the UK and Netherlands, have been 
reluctant when applying the principles of the Huawei v ZTE. Germany still considers the 
fact that standard implementers must render accounts despite any EU competition law 
concerns, and in return, this ensures that stander users do not free-ride IPRs. Clearly, 
national courts have been stricter in finding an abuse of a dominant position as opposed 
to the ECJ in Huawei v ZTE. 
The ECJ’s new framework in Huawei v ZTE has left some unanswered questions that had 
to be addressed by domestic courts, yet this matter of law is complicated and the 
circumstances differ from one case to the other. Nevertheless, inconsistencies in the 
                                                          
1146 from a substantive point of view to the rule of law doctrine, individuals could lose their trust in law 
without a high level of IPRs protection. 
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application of law between the EU Member States can divert investors from investing 
within the EU market. Off course, competition law is essential for the benefit of 
consumers, economic growth and prospect, as well as ensuring an effective competitive 
structure. However, this should be achieved without compromising the right to 
effective IPRs protection. Indeed, innovation is evolving day after day and thus, it is 
becoming more challenging for the law to keep up with these changes. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be stressed enough that it is essential to ensure that the impact of EU 
competition laws on patent law should not go as far as allowing for the free-riding of 
innovation. As a matter of fact, this would also fit in with the rule of law doctrine as it 
ensures a high level of IPRs’ protection, given that one of the elements of the rule of 
law is respecting property rights as part of the fundamental human rights.  
Therefore, it is essential to set clear legal principles imposing the standard users to 
render accounts even if the SEP owner was indeed abusing its dominant position under 
Article 102 TFEU with its abusive refusal to license on FRAND terms. This is because the 
standard users have the opportunity to seek litigation in order to compel the SEP 
owners to license their SEPs on FRAND terms. Moreover, it is crystal clear now that 
standard users can use competition law defences in IP infringement proceedings which 
ensures additional protection of the standard users’ rights. Therefore, it is essential now 
for both IP specialists and EU competition law specialists to provide guidelines that 
outline not only the duties and responsibilities of SEP owners but also to identify the 
means of ensuring that their innovation is adequately protected and rewarded against 
standard users that act with impunity. Is it possible to achieve a clearer set of guidelines 
and legal principles in order to ensure the uniform application and administration of EU 
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competition law and to identify and/or limiting the scope of the application of Article 
102 TFEU on IP-related matters? 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The aim of this thesis has been set to identify the best solution for the sake of legal 
certainty regarding EU competition intervention on IP-related matters, in particular, 
patents and SEPs. The research commenced by looking into existing literature which 
was followed by the exploration of the protection preserved in international 
agreements, namely TRIPS, as well as EU treaties and relevant case law. The study was 
designed to examine the effectiveness of the EU legal system in protecting IP holders 
against unauthorised use and whether competition law intervention has undermined 
the essence of IPRs, especially following recent case law. This research was 
underpinned by the investigation of international obligations which was then followed 
by the analysis of selective EU case law, as well as the administration of Article 102 TFEU 
by national courts across three Member States, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands.  
This thesis posed the following research questions: 
1. What role does the rule of law doctrine play in this field of law? Are the basic 
elements of doctrine fully met by the EU legal system when a dominant 
undertaking is found abusing its dominant position under Article 102 TFEU?  
2. What role do international agreements play with regard to abusive or anti-
competitive conduct by IP holders? What is the position of the EU towards the 
direct effect of international agreements? 
3. What are the requirements of ‘the exceptional circumstances’ test used by EU 
judicial and competition authorities to determine abusive conduct under Article 
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102 TFEU? Is the framework of this test consistently applied and interpreted 
throughout EU case law? 
4. How do national courts apply and interpret Article 102 TFEU pre and post-
Huawei v ZTE?  
 
Initiating with the literature review in chapter two, competition law experts have called 
for major reforms to Article 102 TFEU in order to better distinguish good and bad 
competition. Further, some IP commentators have been opposed to the idea of the 
compulsory licensing system as a remedy to anti-competitive or abusive conduct due 
to the unclear and inconsistent application of Article 102 TFEU. Whereas, some 
competition law commentators have contemplated that the mere exclusive rights 
conferred to IP holders had obstructed the establishment of a comprehensive 
compulsory licensing system.  
Some economic contributors have called for the inclusion of consumer welfare as the 
primary objective of a competition law intervention and thus, adopted a perspective of 
social obligations in this context. Moreover, some economic experts have presented a 
competition-oriented theory incorporating an economic perspective on IP-related 
matters, and some have adopted the essential facilities doctrine as a theory to indicate 
that compulsory licensing may be necessary when access to the facility is essential. On 
the one hand, some have adopted an incentive balancing test to argue that compulsory 
licensing should only be granted when the benefits outweigh the negatives. On the 
other hand, some IP experts have argued that the right to issue a voluntary licence has 
become more of an obligation following the over inclusivity of competition law 
interventions.  
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Several critics have adopted a business community perspective to argue that extreme 
intervention and overregulation can impair the confidence of investors to further invest 
in innovation. This business community approach has even called for patent and 
competition law officials to work together at early stages, so that competition experts 
govern alongside IP specialists the granting of an IP status. This proposed strategy is 
aimed at providing more legal certainty. Furthermore, IP specialists have argued that IP 
owners have been facing challenges in predicting, controlling, managing and even 
understanding how to plan for the future which has led to this research adopting the 
rule of law doctrine to call for a predictable legal system for the sake of right holders.  
Chapter three has examined the rule of law doctrine and its elements, given that 
dominant undertakings can find it challenging to predict the outcome of their conduct, 
especially when there are existing inconsistencies regarding EU competition law 
intervention. Despite potential challenges that may arise with the substantive approach 
to the rule of law, this thesis has, nonetheless, adopted a substantive outlook to the 
doctrine. The substantive approach in this research has emphasised the element of 
respecting fundamental rights, as well as other generally recognised elements of the 
doctrine including access to courts, equality before the law, clearly defined and 
enforceable law, legal certainty and predictability, as well as consistency in the law and 
non-retroactivity. This chapter has aimed to accentuate that given that compulsory 
licensing is retroactive by nature, it is essential to provide a high degree of legal 
certainty and foreseeability of competition law intervention so that the essence of IPRs 
is kept well preserved within the EU legal system.  
Chapter four has looked at international agreements and the principle of consistent 
application of these agreements. Most predominantly, Article 13 of the TRIPS 
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Agreement provides right holders with the expectations that limitations to exclusive 
rights should be confined to only special cases that do not unreasonably prejudice their 
legitimate interests. Meeting right holders’ legitimate expectations and interests aligns 
with the rule of law doctrine as it provides a predictable degree of IP protection. This 
attitude would also ensure that the rule of law element of respecting fundamental 
rights is not undermined by an unclear retroactive competition law intervention that 
unreasonably restricts the exclusive rights conferred to IP holders. 
Following the exploration of international obligations in chapter four, EU case law has 
been critically assessed in chapter five. The findings of this chapter aimed at 
contributing to existing knowledge by addressing the issues that arise with a 
competition law intervention against the rule of law doctrine as per the following: 
To start with, a refusal to license by a dominant undertaking, in itself, does not amount 
to an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU. The EU legal system sets a few 
‘exceptional circumstances’ that must be adjoined with the refusal to license for the 
conduct of an undertaking to be considered as an abuse of dominance. In other words, 
a dominant undertaking is not obliged to license its IPR to a third party as a general rule. 
An exception to this general rule is the presence of the cumulative ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ that can be summarised as the following: 
1. A third party is denied access to an ‘indispensable’ product or service. 
2. There is potential consumer demand for a new product that is prevented from 
emerging due to the refusal to license. 
3. Competition is likely to be eliminated. 
4. There are no objective justifications for the refusal to license. 
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The refusal to license amounts to an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU if the 
set of requirements mentioned earlier are met. The EU legal system, nevertheless, has 
left a gap in the law, most likely intentionally, so that other requirements could be 
identified as ‘exceptional circumstances’ in future case law. In IMS Health, for example, 
the ECJ used the word ‘sufficient’ instead of ‘necessary’ to highlight the circumstances 
of when a refusal to license would breach Article 102 TFEU. Therefore, the ECJ has left 
a gap in law as to the requirements that can be considered ‘sufficient’ for the finding of 
an unlawful refusal to license. It may well be intentional that the ECJ has used to word 
‘sufficient’ instead of ‘necessary’ to highlight the circumstances of abusive conduct so 
that it can keep the door open for future prerequisites to be added to the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ test.  
However, unnecessary gaps in law could lead to legal uncertainty which could deviate 
from the rule of law. One of the rule of law elements is clearly defined and enforceable 
law. The research, thus, calls for the need of identifying the circumstances that are 
‘necessary’ to conclude an abusive refusal to license under Article 102 TFEU. It is to be 
argued here that the circumstances of when a refusal to license a patent or SEP would 
breach Article 102 TFEU should be more explicitly defined to ensure legal certainty and 
better adherence with the rule of law. This leads to the first recommendation as the 
following:  
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Recommendation 1 
More transparent and explicit guidelines regarding the circumstances that are 
‘necessary’ to conclude an abusive refusal to license under Article 102 TFEU. The 
identified circumstances that constitute an abusive refusal to license would help 
create more legal certainty and predictability, as right holders can rely on them to 
identify their obligations and rights.   
 
In addition to the fact that gaps in law could lead to legal uncertainty, legal certainty is 
also impacted by the inconsistent application and interpretation of the law by a judicial 
system. In the context of this research, consistency in law as one of the rule of law 
elements is set to achieve legal certainty, but this has not been fully met by the EU 
judicial and competition law authorities. As a matter of fact, the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ test in EU case law has showcased a high degree of inconsistency in its 
interpretation and application of Article 102 TFEU. The ECJ, for instance, relaxed its 
exceptional circumstances test in Magill with its follow-on innovation approach as 
opposed to the test that had been initially used in Volvo v Veng. The ECJ in Magill had 
portrayed that a compulsory licence may now be granted if the production of a new 
product outweighs the right holder’s incentives to innovate, as well as if the conduct 
excludes competition and there are no justifiable reasons.   
Indeed, the ECJ had then tightened the exceptional circumstances test in Bronner where 
it presented an element of probability with its insertion of the requirement of ‘likely to 
exclude all competition’ as opposed to the requirement of ‘exclude competition’ that 
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had been previously introduced in Magill. Moreover, the ECJ had also tightened the test 
previously used in Volvo v Veng by recognising in IMS Health that the mere duplication 
of an IPR is insufficient grounds for a compulsory licence. The ECJ had also reinforced 
Bronner’s requirement of ‘likely to exclude all competition’ in IMS Health. Additionally, 
the Commission had also endeavoured to narrow down the exceptional circumstances 
test to a case-by-case approach when it introduced the ‘entirety of circumstances’ test 
in Microsoft as opposed to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test established by the ECJ 
in previous case law.  Nevertheless, there has still been inconsistency in EU case law. 
This unconformity can be seen, for example, when the Commission deviated in 
Microsoft from the preceding case of IMS Health as it did not examine the new product 
requirement when it decided to interfere due to competition law concerns.  
The Commission also deviated from previous case law and loosened the requirement 
of the ‘elimination of all competition’ previously found in Bronner and IMS Health to 
the ‘risk of eliminating competition’ in Microsoft. Additionally, the Commission had 
diverged in Microsoft from the requirement of ‘no objective justifications’ formerly 
established in Bronner and IMS Health. This shift can be noted when the Commission 
overlooked Microsoft’s argument that it had refused to license due to the objective 
justifications of protecting its multibillion R&D investment in its software and 
technology.  
The Commission departure from preceding case law also resulted in its parting from its 
own Guidance Paper. The Guidance has stated that a compulsory licence may 
discourage inventors from investing in future innovations in the circumstances of easy 
access to technology. However, the Commission saw in the case of Microsoft that 
Microsoft would be inclined to invest in future innovations due to the competitive 
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pressure of a compulsory licence. Such deviations from previous case law and the 
Guidance Paper raise concerns regarding the fulfilment of the expectations of right 
holders and treating market competitors equally. This argument is supported by the ECJ 
acknowledgement in the case of Expedia Inc v Authorite de la concurrence, referred to 
in chapter four, that the Commission is bound by its published guidance in order not to 
breach the principle of legitimate expectations and equal treatment.  
In addition to the above, let us not forget that the GC in the appealed case of Microsoft 
appears to have also weakened the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test. The GC, for 
instance, allowed improved but similar products to enter the market as opposed to the 
requirement set in IMS Health which had previously considered duplications of 
products and services as insufficient grounds for a compulsory licence.  
Further inconsistencies in EU case law can also be seen in the recent case of Huawei v 
ZTE where the ECJ initiated a new ‘exceptional circumstances’ test within the scope of 
SEPs. The Court had suggested that FRAND commitments create legitimate 
expectations amongst rivals that they are always going to be granted a licence. Although 
the ECJ could have intentionally deviated from the criterion of ‘indispensability’ due to 
the context of a SEP, the ECJ did not explicitly state the reasons or distinctly justify its 
departure from previous case law. The vaguely justified departure can raise concerns 
regarding the rule of law element of consistency in law and decision making.  
The above mentioned takes us to recommendations 2, 3 and 4 as the following: 
Recommendation 2 
The need to maintain consistency in EU decision-making as much as possible to 
ensure legal certainty and predictability. 
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Recommendation 3 
The Commission is to be bound by its Guidance on the Enforcement of Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Conduct by Dominant Undertakings to 
ensure better coherence with the principles of legitimate expectations of right 
owners and equal treatment of market competitors. 
 
Recommendation 4 
The assessment of the compulsory licensing intervention should not be based on the 
competitive pressure it has on IP holders. Instead, competition law intervention must 
be based on the assessment of whether a compulsory licence, in itself, would provide 
easy access to technology and whether it would have an impact on the right holder’s 
incentives to innovate. This recommendation is based on the fact that right holders 
have invested in R&D their innovations, and thus, easy access should be frowned 
upon.  
 
As can be noted from the arguments mentioned above, the development of the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ test used by the ECJ, GC and the Commission has been 
inconsistently applied as EU case law progressed. Such inconsistencies do not 
necessarily align with the consistency in law as one of the rule of law elements. We 
must remember that consistency in case law is one of the prerequisites to legal 
certainty which leads us quickly back to the rule of law. Legal certainty augments to the 
confidence of the public in the judicial process. Moreover, there is a close connection 
 309 
between the consistency of case law and the individuals’ rights to a fair trial. Therefore, 
the research supports the argument that consistency in decision-making must be 
maintained as much as possible. There is also a need to clearly state the reasons for 
deviations from preceding case law if divergences were to take place in future case law. 
Without reasonable justifications for such nonconformities, it could be alarming that 
this area of law is in a state of instability, yet excessive fines are being imposed when a 
dominant undertaking is found to be abusing its position in the market under Article 
102 TFEU. This observation leads us to recommendation 5 as follows: 
Recommendation 5 
Deviations from previous case law should be avoided unless absolutely necessary. 
Although departure from existing case law can sometimes be critical to bridge a gap 
between law and society, there is still a need to clearly outline specific reasons for 
divergences from preceding case law especially if this might be applicable to future 
cases.  
 
The abovementioned remark takes us to the other rule of law element of non-
retroactive law. The Commission in RE Google Search (Shopping) and Google Android 
cases has imposed two of the highest fine ever on dominant undertakings regarding 
breaches of EU competition law. The imposition of severe fines can be problematic 
when illegality of conduct is unclear ex-ante to the sanctions imposed. To impose such 
fines, the EU legal system must provide legal certainty and predictability via the 
consistent application and interpretation of Article 102 TFEU, as well as a clear set of 
guidelines as to abusive conduct. This method would ensure that individuals can predict 
when their conduct could be considered unlawful to gain the opportunity of evading 
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high fines. Without consistent application and interpretation of the law, as well as 
clearly defined law, the imposition of high fines could be in contradiction of non-
retroactive law as a rule of law element. If there are pressing reasons to use retroactive 
law, then the legal system must at least provide individuals with predictability as to 
when retroactive sanctions could be applied.  
Correspondingly, it is argued here that individuals should be able to plan their future 
and predict the outcome of their conduct with clear guidance as to abusive conduct, as 
well as the consistent decision-making to give individuals the opportunity to avoid high 
sanctions. Legal predictability could be achieved, for example, when the Commission 
follows its own Guidance to prevent easy access to technology and ensure legal 
predictability. The EU judicial system should also aim to consistently apply and interpret 
Article 102 TFEU in its decision making so that the individuals can plan and predict the 
outcome of their projected conduct. Without legal predictability and certainty, the 
imposition of high retroactive sanctions should be avoided. This remark can be 
summarised in recommendation 6 as the following: 
Recommendation 6 
No high sanctions should be applied if the illegality of abusive conduct is unclear ex-
ante to the fines imposed. 
 
Moving on to the equality before the law as one of the rule of law elements. Equality 
before the law would require EU courts and competition authorities to treat market 
competitors equally. However, the ECJ in Huawei v ZTE had only examined the 
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expectations of standard users, instead of both standard users and SEP owners, which 
can raise concerns regarding the equality before the law between market competitors.  
Indeed, there might be genuine competition law concerns, but equally, there are also 
genuine IPRs concerns which are accompanied by the need to ensure that the essence 
of IPRs is not undermined with an over-inclusive competition law intervention. We must 
remember that competition law intervention on IP matters should only be applied in 
exceptional circumstances which can indicate that it is to be applied in rare and special 
circumstances.  
Thus, the research suggests that the EU legal system must not neglect the expectations 
of IPR holders with the so-called ‘exceptional circumstances’ test. This study also 
indicates that the examination of the legitimate expectations of right holders should be 
clearly highlighted and balanced against the expectations of other market participants 
during EU decision-making to achieve a better-reasoned balance between IPRs and 
competition law. By doing so, this could ensure better adherence to the rule of law 
element of equality before the law.  
It can be noted from the above that the elements of the rule of law doctrine 
interconnect with one another. Without fulfilling these requirements, it could lead to 
legal uncertainty and legal unpredictability. In the context of this research, IPR holders 
could lose their trust in the EU legal system which might lead to a decline in investments 
within the EU market. This undesirable outcome could occur as IPR holders require a 
high degree of predictability and certainty, particularly given that they would need to 
invest in existing and future innovations.  
The need for a high degree of predictability in IP protection leads to the rule of law 
element of respecting fundamental rights. In Huawei v ZTE, the ECJ had identified the 
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legitimate expectations of third parties to be always granted a FRAND licence but 
neglected legitimate expectations of SEP owners to enjoy a high level of IP protection. 
Respect of fundamental rights falls under the substantive aspect of the rule of law, and 
without high protection for IPR, the respect of fundamental rights as one of the rule of 
law elements could be undermined. This argument is also supported by the fact that 
the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal of England and Wales have criticised 
the ECJ’s decision of Huawei v ZTE in Unwired Planet v Huawei. It was contemplated by 
both courts that the ECJ had justified its conclusion via the existence of legitimate 
expectations of standard users, whilst disregarding the enforceability of FRAND 
undertakings and the legitimate expectations of SEP owners. Respect for fundamental 
rights would call for the enforceability of FRAND undertaking regardless of any 
competition law concerns. Furthermore, Article 13 TRIPS also supports the fact that 
courts must assess the legitimate interests of right holders in order not to add 
unreasonable limitations or restrictions on exclusive rights. Therefore, 
recommendation 7 below calls for the need of addressing the legitimate expectations 
of right holders within the EU decision making to ensure equality before the law and 
furthering the respect for fundamental rights. 
Recommendation 7 
The urgent need for examining the legitimate expectations of right owners alongside 
the legitimate expectations of licence seekers in EU decision-making clearly to 
achieve a better-reasoned balance between IPR and competition law. This would also 
fit in with Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement which can lead to better compliance with 
international obligations on refusal to license as abuse of dominance.  
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The abovementioned recommendation has also led to the following recommendation 
to policy and law makers for compliance with international obligations on refusal to 
license as abuse of dominance as following:  
Recommendation 8 
Full compliance with international obligations can be a complex matter due to various 
reasons some of which may be the type of the treaty, the behavior involved, the 
scope and context. Moreover, there is no clear understanding of the Member States 
and the EU’s obligations towards international treaties which also has an impact on 
compliance with international obligations. Additionally, the nature and scope of the 
TRIPS Agreement on abusive conduct is not clearly laid down which could be one of 
the main reasons as to why its provisions are not taken so seriously.  
Nevertheless, it is to be recommended, to address these issues above, that policy 
makers should  incorporate the TRIPS provisions within their domestic legal systems 
so that the provisions of the TRIPS are taken more seriously whereby the 
expectations of right holders could be better met. 
 
Another aspect of EU framework that could have an impact on the respect for 
fundamental rights as one of the rule of elements is limitations added to access to 
justice. Under the rule of law doctrine, individuals should be able to access the courts 
and enjoy effective judicial protection. Nevertheless, in Huawei v ZTE, the ECJ had 
widely interpreted Article 102 TFEU as it did not give much consideration to procedures, 
rules and remedies that were already well-established in other treaties. The recent 
framework of the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU has somewhat overlooked matters 
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already covered under the CFREU, such access to courts and effective judicial protection 
under Article 47.  
Individuals in legal disputes should have the right to access justice to resolve such 
conflicts without the risk of being found abusing their dominant position under one 
Article that, arguably, goes beyond its scope to cover other areas of established law. 
This thesis, therefore, argues that an IP holder should have the right to access court in 
case of a dispute to ensure adherence to the rule of law. Limitations to access to court 
by right holders should not be introduced at this stage, given that the finding of abusive 
refusal to license is currently in a state of instability and inconsistency. 
Recommendation 8 features this comment as the following: 
Recommendation 9 
 Article 102 TFEU should not go beyond its scope to cover access to justice, especially 
not at this stage, as the finding of abusive conduct is still in a state of instability. 
 
Consequently, the requirement of the rule of law and the aim to foster improvements 
have received increased attention at a national level. Some national courts have aimed 
to provide further legal certainty when administering EU competition law. On the one 
hand, any judicial system usually aims to interpret and apply the law in a way that helps 
the law reach its set out objective. On the other hand, the law on its own must prove 
clear, predictable and consistent legislation to contribute to the rule of law; a judicial 
system can provide better interpretation and consistent application of the law if the 
law is clearly drafted and worded without ambiguity or contradictions.   
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The development in EU case law does not, in itself, contradict the proper management 
of justice. The changes in society may require a new interpretation of the law that can 
bridge an existing gap between law and society by overruling a precedent. 
Nevertheless, the departure from existing case law is a challenging task and should only 
occur when it is truly essential to do so. A judge must also provide convincing and 
specific reasons for departing from settled case law to avoid decisions that are arbitrary, 
and that could have a negative impact on the individuals’ rights to fair trial.  
Some EU Member States have faced some challenges following the inconsistent 
application of Article 102 TFEU by EU competition authorities and courts. As a matter 
of fact, the ECJ’s decision in Huawei v ZTE had an impact on the administration of EU 
law in the jurisdictions of the UK, Germany and Netherlands.  Therefore, chapter six has 
examined the approaches adopted by national courts in the three named jurisdictions 
prior- Huawei v ZTE, and it has then explored the implications of this decision on the 
domestic administration of potential EU competition law intervention on IP matters.  
Prior to Huawei v ZTE, national courts have usually assessed whether or not it wishes to 
accept EU competition law as a defence in IP infringement proceedings. The UK, for 
example, had highlighted that EU competition law defence would only be admissible 
following the examination of all relevant factors regarding IP infringement allegations. 
The UK had also highlighted that competition law defences are to only be admissible in 
court to avoid protracted and expensive trials. The UK judicial system’s approach of 
examining all relevant factors regarding IP infringement claims prior to competition law 
counter-claims is, arguably, consistent with the rule of law as it highlights that the law 
is supreme and an appropriate legal procedure must follow in order to ensure a high 
level of IP protection. This approach also portrays competition law as a secondary 
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matter of concern in IP infringement proceedings as EU competition law defences might 
be examined by the court to avoid lengthy and expensive trials but after the scrutiny of 
IP infringements allegations. 
Recommendation 10 
The need for the EU judicial system to make clear that national courts are to first  
examine all relevant factors regarding IP infringement claims before the scrutiny of 
competition law defences. 
 
Moreover, the Dutch Court of The Hague, prior to Huawei v ZTE, had adopted a similar 
approach in the sense that it had strictly interpreted and applied Article 102 TFEU in the 
case of NL-Philips v SK Kasetten. The Court had explicitly stated that it had undertaken 
a strict viewpoint to provide legal certainty and predictability for right holders. The 
Dutch Court has also highlighted that licence seekers are offered adequate protection 
as they can still access parallel proceedings before a competition court.  
Whereas, the German approach in its Orange-Book-Standard has been seen as 
problematic, given that it was the first to introduce the enforcement of action for an 
injunction as a potential abuse of dominance. It can be said that the German approach 
had influenced the ECJ to confirm the same position in its preliminary ruling of Huawei 
v ZTE. Nevertheless, the German approach has been seen as problematic particularly 
by the Dutch courts as it provides standard users with room to manoeuvre negotiations 
by merely relying on competition law defences.  
Notably, the UK and Dutch legal systems, pre-Huawei v ZTE, have provided more legal 
certainty and predictability as to the administration of Article 102 TFEU compared to 
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the approaches adopted by the ECJ, GC and the Commission. This is because the UK and 
Dutch judicial systems have aimed to examine whether IP infringement has occurred 
prior to the scrutiny of competition law defences or even admitting a competition law 
counter-claim in IP infringement proceedings. Nevertheless, the ECJ’s decision in 
Huawei v ZTE did have an impact on the administration of EU competition law by 
domestic courts. Competition law defences are now, arguably, automatically admissible 
in IP infringement proceedings whereby national courts must assess whether the 
bringing of IP infringement proceedings, in itself, amounts to an abuse of dominance 
under Article 102 TFEU. Although the decision of Huawei v ZTE has provided helpful 
guidance regarding FRAND licensing negotiations, some uncertain areas are still left 
unanswered regarding the framework of Huawei v ZTE.   
It is, for example, unclear whether all right holders are always required to notify licence 
seekers prior to the bringing of IP infringement proceedings or whether this 
requirement is confined to SEPs. This study calls for the need of evaluating the ‘general 
willingness’ of licence seekers before determining an EU competition law intervention. 
The research also supports the argument that the high burden of proof should fall on 
licence seekers to rebut the assumption of otherwise lawful refusal to license. Licence 
seekers should also provide evidence of their communicated genuine interest for a 
licence and that the right holder’s refusal had been abusive. Moreover, limitations to 
the exclusive rights of IP must be addressed with great caution in order to provide legal 
certainty and predictability via the consistent application and interpretation of the law. 
Domestic courts have addressed some of these questions. As a matter of fact, the UK 
has been notably reluctant in applying the framework of Huawei v ZTE in order to evade 
the free-riding of innovation. The final judgement of Unwired Planet v Huawei, for 
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example, had identified that the only one element of the Huawei v ZTE that is to be 
mandatory is the SEP holder’s obligation to notify the implementer of the alleged 
infringement prior to the bringing of IP infringement proceedings. The UK judicial 
system has also presented a flexible and rational approach when examining the process 
of negotiations by looking into the ‘general willingness’ of standard implementers, as 
opposed to the rigid criteria outlined in Huawei v ZTE. The inflexible framework of 
Huawei v ZTE may not fit the circumstances of each case. Moreover, it has been stressed 
in the case of Unwired Planet v Huawei that it is important to particularly examine the 
legitimate expectations of SEP owners as they have invested in research and developing 
their innovation and has gone as far as engaging in a standardisation process. 
Accordingly, recommendation 10 stresses the following: 
Recommendation 11 
 The need for the EU judicial system to adopt an approach similar to the one adopted 
by the UK judicial system by means of looking into the ‘general willingness’ of licence 
seekers as opposed to a strict set of requirements established in the framework in 
Huawei v ZTE.  
 
The approaches adopted by both the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales have emphasised the importance of safeguarding the essence of IPR 
which is to ‘protect’ and ‘reward’ innovation by not allowing the free-riding of IPR. This 
approach fits better with the rule of law doctrine as it offers a higher degree of IP 
protection as per Article 17(2) CFREU and Directive 2004/48 on the Enforcement of IPR. 
The administration of EU competition law by the jurisdiction of the UK ensures respect 
for fundamental rights is not jeopardised by unequal treatment before the law. This 
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argument is supported because UK Courts have assessed the legitimate expectations of 
right holders alongside the legitimate expectations of licence seekers. The need to 
safeguarding the essence of IPR has led to recommendation 11 as the following: 
Recommendation 12 
Free-riding of innovation should be completely prohibited, and competition law 
defences should not be admissible in court if the ‘infringing’ user has not rendered 
accounts once the user has become reasonably aware of the infringing act. 
 
In regards to the question raised in the title of this research, ‘what is the best solution 
for legal certainty?’ It can be argued that the ECJ, GC and the Commission should 
measure the legitimate expectations of right holders in cases of refusal to license 
patents or SEPs, as opposed to just examining the legitimate expectations of licence 
seekers. As a matter of fact, the implementation of an EU framework that similar to the 
UK pre and post-Huawei v ZTE, as well as the Dutch’s approach pre-Huawei v ZTE would 
help improve legal certainty. The UK judicial system, post-Huawei v ZTE has emphasised 
that competition law should not give room for licence seekers to free ride on innovation 
or undermine the essence of IPR. The Dutch approach, pre-Huawei v ZTE stressed the 
need to ensure a higher degree of IP protection via the strict interpretation of EU 
competition law. Both of these approaches lead us back quickly to the rule of law as it 
ensures equality before the law between competition and IP concerns, as well as 
respect for fundamental rights by not undermining the essence of IPR.  
The balance between IPR and competition law could be addressed via the uniform 
application of competition law, particularly regarding IP-related matters. Alternatively, 
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the challenges existing between both areas of law could also be sufficiently addressed 
via major reforms to Article 102 TFEU. Noticeably, the Commission’s Guidance Paper is 
not enough on its own as reforms to Article 102 TFEU, given that the Commission has 
deviated from its own Guidance.  
Therefore, it can be argued that the reform of Article 102 TFEU might be a mission that 
has still not been fully accomplished by the EU legal system. It is to be contemplated 
here that the reforms of Article 102 TFEU would have to identify the central objective 
of this Article. In other words, the core objective of a competition law intervention 
needs to be identified: is it to protect against potential consumer harm or to protect 
competitors?  
The identification of the main objective could lead to an outcome in EU decision making 
that could differ drastically. Let us say that the primary objective of a competition law 
intervention is to prevent potential consumer harm, the EU judicial and competition 
officials would then have to examine potential consumer harm in their decision making 
clearly. However, if the objective of a competition law intervention is mainly focused 
on economic benefits, then this could jeopardise the rule of law doctrine, given that the 
law must be clearly defined and enforceable before any economic benefit can surface. 
Therefore, recommendation 12 below stresses the need to commence major reforms 
to Article 102 TFEU. 
Recommendation 13 
Further reforms to Article 102 TFEU are urgently needed to outline its objectives 
clearly; is the primary aim of a competition law intervention on IP matters to protect 
competitors or consumer welfare? 
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 In addition to the need to openly identify the objective of a competition law 
intervention, there is also an urgent need for major reforms to Article 102 TFEU that 
identify the scope and limitations of Article 102 TFEU. There must be clear guidelines as 
to the measures used to assess the imposition of a competition law intervention and 
the outline of requirements for finding abusive refusal to license. The research stresses 
that, currently, Article 102 TFEU is over-inclusive as it covers matters already covered 
under 47 CFREU, such as access to justice and the right to an effective remedy. If the 
scope and limitations of Article 102 TFEU remain vaguely identified, individuals could 
lose their trust in the EU system which could ultimately lead to potential economic 
challenges and the decrease of incentives to innovate within the EU market. Moreover, 
the researcher argues that there is a need to achieve better uniformity of regulating 
refusal to license as an abuse of dominance under EU competition law. Consequently, 
recommendations 13, 14 ,15 and 16 emphasise the following: 
Recommendation 14 
Directive 2004/48 aims to harmonise the minimum measures, procedures and 
remedies for the enforcement of IPRs as it makes available permanent and 
preliminary injunctions.  In addition, Article 3 states that remedies must be 
proportionate and aim to evade being barriers to trade. However, Member States 
still enjoy the independence of enforcing and regulating their legal procedures. Such 
independence can act as an obstacle to the uniformity of regulating refusal to license 
as an abuse of dominance under EU competition law and can, thus, have a significant 
impact on disputes concerning enforcement actions.  Therefore, the researcher 
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argues that it is important for EU institutions to establish a regulation which sets 
down the legal procedures on enforcing and regulating IPRs. 
 
Recommendation 15 
Further reforms to Article 102 TFEU are urgently needed to identify the scope and 
limitations of Article 102 TFEU.  The application of Article 102 TFEU needs to be 
limited to exceptionally special cases. The interpretation of the Article also need to 
be limited so that it is not interpreted in a way that goes beyond its scope to cover 
matters related of established law.   
 
Recommendation 16 
The application and interpretation of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test should 
ensure better adherence to international obligations falling under Article 13 TRIPS 
regarding meeting the legitimate interests of right holders. The interests of right 
holders would be better preserved by disallowing easy access to technology and 
potential free riding of innovation. 
 
Recommendation 17 
Competition law defences should not be automatically admissible in the EU judicial 
system in order to provide a higher degree of IPR protection and prevent the free-
riding of innovation. We must remember that licence seekers have the prerogative 
to seek the judicial system for a court order for authorisation to use of a patent or 
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SEP. Moreover, the licence seekers could then also claim damages for any harm 
caused by a genuine abusive refusal to license. This approach is derived from the 
Dutch’s administration of Article 102 TFEU pre-Huawei v ZTE. Licence seekers should 
not always assume the right for a licence and commence use prior to authorisation 
from the right holder, or at least, the user must render accounts once it has been 
reasonably identified that such use infringes existing IPR. 
 
The drastic development throughout EU case law, starting with Volvo v Veng and 
ultimately Huawei v ZTE could be necessary to ensure an effective competitive 
structure, but the underlying reasons must be clearly outlined in EU decision-making. 
Moreover, it cannot be denied that the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU has become 
over-inclusive, but this can be problematic. How can one Article cover matters related 
to access to justice under one test: the so-called ‘exceptional circumstances’ test? Let 
us not forget that the term ‘exceptional circumstances’ indicates that the test is to be 
applied only on special and rare cases. If EU competition law intervention remains to 
expand in the same style, we might have to consider renaming the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ test to a merely ‘competition law’ test.  EU competition law is, arguably, 
built on a significant degree of uncertainty. EU decision making on IP-related matters, 
currently, can be categorised by a significant degree of unconformity that could be 
improved to better meet some of the rule of law elements. Nonetheless, legal 
uncertainty in EU competition law as it stands today can be improved if the EU judicial 
system adopted an approach similar to the UK and Dutch judicial systems whereby an 
IP remains enforceable regardless of any competition law claims.  
 
